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Abstract
In this research, I analyze how Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs) and cities
affect the diffusion and transmission of a decarbonization norm. Urban policy and political
science scholars assert that cities and their networks are influential in implementing
internationally coordinated environmental policy. However, few projects have analyzed how
local actors may diffuse environmental norms that have been developed in the international
system. Using the norm life cycle, this research explores the transmission of a decarbonization
norm by means of GHG measurement and mitigation. I identify two critical objectives associated
with a decarbonization norm: establishing a system for monitoring GHG emissions and
developing action plans to reduce emissions. These two components of decarbonization are also
viewed as indicators of norm leadership, which applies to all levels of governance. The
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) is a transnational municipal
network (TMN) that facilitates networking between cities, communication between the
transnational and local levels, and the development of local responses to climate change. To
analyze the influence of ICLEI on the local environmental policy of cities, I used a logistic
regression analysis to explore three time periods (1991-2002, 2003-2010, and 2011-2018). The
findings of the analysis support my hypothesis that both cities and their networks play a
significant role in the diffusion of a decarbonization norm. TMNs, like ICLEI, supply technical
assistance that guides policy and provides a platform for local leaders to act transnationally.
Cities are more likely to adopt decarbonization objectives if they obtain ICLEI services or

viii

membership. Furthermore, through the results of my analysis, I provide evidence that cities in
the United States and Canada acted first as norm entrepreneurs, and then as norm leaders by
creating systems for monitoring and mitigating GHG emissions.

ix

Introduction
In June of 2017, the Trump administration announced the United States’ withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement, which was agreed to by all of the 195 countries in
attendance during the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2015, added to the work of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This environmental
agreement was the most ambitious international environmental endeavor since Agenda 21 and
the UNFCCC, both of which emerged from the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, also known as the Rio Summit, in 1992. Citing research from the National
Economic Research Associates (NERA), President Trump claimed the agreement put the United
States at an economic disadvantage that “could cost America as much as 2.7 million jobs.”1
Trump noted that the impact of job loss would fall squarely on sectors connected to paper
production, oil, natural gas, and coal.2
The Paris Climate Agreement was only the beginning of an environmental protection
policy rollback by the Trump Administration. Shortly after taking office, Trump released a
budget that severely cut funding to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Aeronautical and Space
Administration (NASA), all of which have critical responsibilities in monitoring and acting on

1

Trump, Donald. “Statement by President Trump on the Paris climate accord.” The White House (2017).
It needs to be acknowledged that these figures are disputed by a multitude of sources that highlight a pattern of job
loss in these sectors that pre-dates the Paris Agreement; Trevor Houser, Jason Bordoff, and Peter Marsters. “Can
coal make a comeback?” Center on Global Energy Policy (2017); Additionally, NERA disputed the ways in which
the Trump Administration used their research, stating that the study itself was not a cost-benefit analysis. The NERA
also stated that Trump’s use of their figures “mischaracterizes the purpose of the NERA study”; The National
Economic Research Associates. NERA Economic Consulting’s Study of US Emissions Reduction Policies: Statement
of Facts. NERA Press Release, (4 June. 2017).
2
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environmental issues.3 The Administration also issued multiple executive orders reversing
environmental protections from previous governments, including the granting of land permits for
the Keystone XL pipeline, lifting a moratorium on coal leases on federal land, and dropping
climate change as a national security threat via the Department of Defense. In October of 2019, a
panel of judges from the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the EPA did not meet its minimum
requirements for limiting cross-state air pollutants. The panel ordered the EPA to develop and
present new plans on how to address smog issues that cross state boundaries.4 This incident was
not the first time, or the last time, the federal leadership of the United States announced
withdrawal or non-compliance in the face of an international environmental agreement.
In 2001, the Bush Administration announced the United States would not participate in
the Kyoto Protocols, which extended critical elements of the UNFCCC and committed nation
states to reduce six types of greenhouse gases (GHGs). President Bush argued that Kyoto was
“fatally flawed” and set unrealistic expectations of GHG reduction that favored developing
economic markets over industrialized states.5 Since the ratification of Kyoto in 2005, other
important state actors withdrew from the international environmental agreement citing economic
fears and ideological concerns.
In 2011, Canada announced its withdrawal from Kyoto, which came as little surprise to
nation states and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) engaged in climate negotiations.
Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper ordered the government not to comply with Kyoto
following the Conservative Party’s takeover of Parliament in 2006. The official Canadian

3
Office of Management and Budget. Fiscal year 2019 efficient, effective, accountable: An American budget.
Government Publishing Office. (2018)
4
D.C. Circuit Court. State of New York v. EPA, No. 17-1273. October 1, 2019.
5
The White House, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, Office of the Press Secretary. (June 11,
2001).
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government reason for abandoning the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 was the economic burden of
reining in tar sands oil projects in which the country was involved. As early as 2002 Harper, then
a member of the Canadian Alliance party, urged his party supporters to resist the Kyoto Protocol,
labeling it as “a socialist scheme to suck money out of wealth-producing nations.”6 As Prime
Minister, Harper stressed the need for Canada to improve its economy and work on
environmental programs without the international community.
As central governments were ordered by their leadership to halt efforts to create
international environmental standards in the form of GHG emission reduction, subnational
governments became a viable force in localizing these international goals. In the United States,
state governments and cities have been a progressive force implementing international
environmental standards of governance to the subnational level. In June of 2018, New York State
agreed to pass legislation that would require the state to cut their GHG emissions by 85% from
2018 to 2050.7 The plan calls for a further reduction of the remaining 15% of GHGs by removing
carbon from the atmosphere. New York State has also been active in pursuing legal action
against the EPA, which has blocked environmental cleanup efforts and legislation connected to
smog reduction.8
As New York State became more serious about its environmental responsibilities and
action, New York City has an established reoccurring GHG inventory and climate action plan
that has helped to cut around 7-8% of GHG emissions since 1990. These two subnational
governments have continued to advance environmental and climate change policy, beyond the
6

Bourrie, Mark. Kill the Messengers: Stephen Harper's Assault on Your Right to Know. (Canada: HarperCollins
Canada, 2015).
7
McKinley, Jesse; Plumer, Brad. “New York to Approve One of the World’s Most Ambitious Climate Plans,” New
York Times, June 18, 2019.
8
Office of the Governor of New York State. “Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo on the EPA’s Proposed
Rejection of New York’s Petition on Interstate Smog Pollution,” Office of the Governor of New York State. (May.
9, 2019)
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expressed goals of their federal government. The efforts of local and state governments highlight
a larger pattern of action that align more with international environmental norms rather than the
norms promoted by their own central government.
In recent decades scholars have sought to understand the growing role of subnational
units and international networks in international relations. Cities are engines of manufacturing,
nodes of trade globally, and sites of immense pollution. While the role of nation states and
international organizations in the creation and diffusion of environmental norms and policy has
been the subject of many studies, few research projects analyze the role of cities in
environmental policy creation and norm diffusion. The topic of this research is the role cities and
their networks play in the diffusion of a decarbonization norm aimed at improving air quality
through Greenhouse Gas (GHG) mitigation policy.

Research Question
The research questions are: are members of TMNs, more specifically members of ICLEI,
more likely to diffuse ICLEI-promoted decarbonization norms than non-member cities? Are
those cities that receive technical assistance from ICLEI more likely to diffuse a decarbonization
norm than those cities that do not utilize ICLEI programs or products? My project will utilize
Constructivist theory in international relations to explain the importance of supra and subnational
actors who develop and diffuse environmental governance norms. I will also utilize literature on
multilevel governance and the role of cities in environmental policy diffusion. By analyzing
three periods of time (1991-2002, 2003-2010, 2011-2018), I will determine if TMN membership
influences the environmental policy action of cities. The analysis also assesses whether or not
cities are norm leaders in the diffusion of a decarbonization norm.

4

Significance of Research
The significance of this research is twofold. First, the results will contribute to a more
nuanced understanding of urban environmental policy and how subnational levels of governance
contribute to environmental policy outcomes. Second, this research will determine the relevance
of one variant of constructivist theory in international relations. Constructivist research has
alluded to the impact of subnational actors. However, it has yet to fully illuminate the role of
these actors in the diffusion of global air quality norms and GHG mitigation strategies,
specifically decarbonization. As the statistical analysis of this dissertation measures the impact of
TMNs across time, there is an opportunity to identify patterns of norm diffusion stages within the
life cycle of norms.

Research Outline
The dissertation is separated into five chapters. In Chapter 1, I examine the participation
of nation states and IGOs in environmental conferences. Specifically, I discuss when nations
states recognized a problem with air quality and began to develop international air quality
standards. In the 1990s, attendance in international environmental conferences was expanded to
include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities. This section highlights an
emerging concern at the international level about air quality and the development of strategies to
address the problem.
In the next section, I trace the history of inter-urban governmental networks
concentrating on cities in the United States and Canada. Traditionally, domestic municipal
networks were primarily concerned with local and regional issues. Groups like LEOSR and the
LEO project introduced international issues into the platforms of these networks. As local

5

authorities began to pursue international environmental issues, LEO project leadership was
approached by the UNEP to help develop a transnational network of municipalities. In the
following section, I discuss ICLEI as a product of these early networked environmental efforts.
ICLEI is a TMN that engages with environmental issues and sustainability. ICLEI
formed out of a UNEP-organized conference of local elected officials to create an international
network of cities and frameworks for local action. Cities and their networks began to engage
with international environmental conferences at the Rio Summit in 1992. Subsequently, ICLEI
has lobbied for the inclusion of local authorities in international environmental conferences, and
it has created blueprints for local action derived from international standards. Because of this
work, the Conference of Parties (COPs) has recognized local authorities as government
stakeholders within international climate regimes. This change in recognition highlights the
impact of ICLEI in the progression of cities and their networks from advocate to leader in
environmental issues.
In the final section, I highlight the support and opposition to national environmental
policy development in the United States and Canada from 1991-2018. I provide a background to
the leadership of the central governments of Canada and the United States developing or
disengaging from national environmental programs to reduce GHG emissions. This section
shows how some American administration and Canadian governments attempted to develop
environmental policy that reflected a commitment to international environmental agreements,
and how some leaders sought to move their country away from those agreements. Additionally, I
provide a brief account of anti-Agenda 21 groups and their impact on the work of local climate
change projects in the United States. These groups are motivated by conspiracy theories and
disinformation campaigns that have impacted public perception about the motivations of local
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sustainability projects. The backlash has threatened local sustainability programs and decreased
membership in ICLEI in the United States. Furthermore, the actions of anti-Agenda 21 groups
illuminate the disincentives of ICLEI membership and the pursuit of local environmental
initiatives for cities.
Chapter 2 looks to literature that helps to explain the role of TMNs and cities in the
diffusion of environmental norms and policies. Additionally, this chapter focuses on theories that
decenter the nation state by emphasizing the role of subnational and supranational actors. In
order to structure this research, I utilize a multilevel governance approach and constructivist
theory. Literature on multilevel governance provides a framework for understanding the
coordination of policy and interactions across multiple levels of governments. The addition of
research on TMNs in this chapter helps to illustrate the inclusion of municipal networks into a
multilevel governance framework, but also reveals the internal and outward organization of these
networks. Constructivism emphasizes the ideational structures and norms that shape the
perspectives of actors engaged in governance. Within constructivism, the norm life cycle offers a
way to chart the progress of actors involved in the process of norm promotion, diffusion, and
leadership. I apply the norm life cycle to strategies of decarbonization in order to clarify the role
of cities and TMNs in the diffusion of international environmental norms.
Chapter 3 begins with a description of the research design, presentation of the hypothesis,
and procedures for analysis. The research design frames the time periods used for analysis and
discusses the logistic regression model. A short section on procedures for analysis includes the
identification of issues I encountered when designing the model utilized over the three time
periods for this research. This section also examines other methods that could be used for this
research. Additionally, Chapter 3 includes a section that explains the data collection methods and
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sources. The final section of this chapter deals with the conceptualization and operationalization
of the variables used in the analysis for this research.
Chapter 4 begins with a restatement of the research question and hypothesis. Then, an
analysis spans three time periods (1991-2002, 2003-2010, 2011-2018) for the models ICLEI
membership and ICLEI technical assistance. The results of each analysis will be explained across
all time periods.
Chapter 5 discusses the findings of this research and answers the research questions. The
final chapter ends with the implications of the findings and possibilities for future research.

8

Chapter 1: Historical Background

State and Global Environmental Governance: 1970s-1997
During the 1960s and 1970s, growing environmental concerns triggered the organization
of assemblies and conferences of nation states at the international level to promote the protection
of future environmental resources. Scientists concerned with issues leading to the acidification of
waterways brought international attention to the issue. Svante Oden, a Swedish scientist,
garnered attention when he published an article based on his research in the Swedish newspaper
Dagens Nyheter.9 The article was titled, “An Insidious Warfare Among the Nations of Europe”.10
His research provided evidence that pollution from Great Britain and continental Europe were
the main contributors to the acidification of waterways, which led to aquatic animal die-offs in
Sweden.11 These events prompted Sweden’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations
(U.N.) to issue a request to put on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council, “the question
of convening an international conference on the problems of the human environment.”12 This
request from the Swedish government highlighted a growing concern among some governments
about the deteriorating quality of air and water that appeared to coincide with the rising pattern
of sulfur dioxide emissions from industrial activity.

9

Grennfelt, Peringe, Anna Engleryd, Martin Forsius, Øystein Hov, Henning Rodhe, and Ellis Cowling. "Acid rain
and air pollution: 50 years of progress in environmental science and policy." Ambio (2019): 1-16.
10
Greenfelt et al., “Acid rain and air pollution,” 3.
11
Jacks, G., G. Knutsson, L. Maxe, and A. Fylkner. "Effect of acid rain on soil and groundwater in Sweden."
In Pollutants in porous media, (1984) , 94-114.
12
United Nations General Assembly. Twenty-Fourth Session: Official Record. UN General Assembly
(E/4466/Add.1), (1969 ).
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The request from the Swedish government on the question of the human environment
helped to initiate the first international conference on the environment, which included ideas that
would come to characterize the concept of sustainability. This conference was facilitated by the
U.N. in 1972. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, also known as the
Stockholm Conference, brought together nations, developing and industrialized, to define the
“rights” of human beings as they relate to the environment and social justice.13 A focus on the
intersection of nature and humanity led to declarations on the rights of individuals to potable
water, safe housing, and the creation of strategies to combat environmental degradation.
Action plans and strategy recommendations from the Stockholm Conference called for
the organization of domestic and international resources to provide an evaluation of
environmental conditions.14 Other recommendations called for nation states to address problems
in marine and air pollution by working through sub-national actors (i.e., local, regional programs
of action).15 The Stockholm Conference also provided the framework for environmental
ministries in member states and new U.N. agencies.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a specialized agency within the
U.N., emerged from the non-binding agreements between nation states at the Stockholm
Conference.16 The organization established a voluntary environmental fund to pursue programs
initiated by the U.N. While the UNEP was created to provide developing countries assistance in

13

United Nations. “Declaration of the United Nations conference on human environment,” (1972)
http://www.UNEP.org/Documents; Handle, G. “Declaration of the United Nations conference on the human
environment (Stockholm Declaration), 1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992”
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, (2012), 11.
14
Sohn, L.B. “Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,” The Harvard International Law Journal, 14,
(1973), 423.
15
United Nations. “Declaration of the United Nations conference on human environment.”
16
Johnson, Stanley. UNEP the first 40 years. (UNEP, 2012).
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implementing environmental policies,17 the institution has expanded to include cities, regional
economic communities, and nation states.
UNEP-organized efforts included the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (CLRTAP) (1979), the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(1985), the Montreal Protocols (1987/1989), the World Congress of Local Governments for a
Sustainable Future (1990), and the Rio Summit (1992). As a specialized agency, the UNEP
provided an international space for state governments, local governments, IGOs, and NGOs to
develop plans for environmental action.
CLRTAP marked a significant moment in international efforts to coordinate
environmental policy between nation states and was ratified by 34 countries and the European
Union. The convention coordinated an agreement for monitoring, improving, and sharing data on
state efforts to reduce air pollution. The Stockholm Conference set in motion a process to
investigate and improve issues with acid rain and the acidification of lakes in Scandinavia and
other European countries. This process resulted in several studies, which confirmed that air
pollution could travel thousands of miles and impact regions not engaged in the activities that
lead to intense pollution.
CLRTAP tasked countries with developing a state monitoring system for air pollution,
cooperating in cross-border research on transboundary air pollution and abatement techniques,
and agreeing to limit the production of specific harmful chemicals. Though its initial target was
sulphur dioxide, countries have added eight protocols to CLRTAP since 1984 that limit the
production and use of several chemicals and production processes harmful to the environment.

17

United Nations. “Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,” A/CONF.48/14 (1972).
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Another notable agreement, one between Canada and the United States, took place in 1991,
when the U.S. agreed to place caps on the emissions of sulfur dioxide and a reduction of nitrogen
oxides.18 Both CLRTAP and the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement are examples of
central governments taking steps to monitor and reduce contaminants that impact air quality.
In 1980, the UNEP brought together state representatives and international
organizations19 to develop the World Conservation Strategy (WCS). This strategy emphasized
the role of development in bringing disadvantaged peoples and nation states out of poverty. The
WCS demonstrated the problems inherent in combining ecological protection and state-led
economic development.20 The WCS presented strategy and action that was central to the
evolution of a concept of sustainability. Because of international conferences and commissions
associated with the WCS, sustainability as a concept received increasing attention in academic,
policy, and urban planning communities. The WCS was influential in the approval of the World
Charter for Nature, which was approved by the 48th U.N. General Assembly in 1993.21 As
international agreements and conservation strategies continued to build support in the
international system, global commissions introduced critical environmental concepts like
sustainability and sustainable development.
The establishment of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
and its subsequent reports were critical events in streamlining terminology and environmental
governance at the international level. Also known as the Brundtland Commission, the WCED

18

Government of Canada. “Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement: overview.”
Last modified: January 16, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/airpollution/issues/transboundary/canada-united-states-air-quality-agreement-overview.html
19
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUNC).
20
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and World Wildlife Fund. “World conservation strategy:
Living record conservation for sustainable development,” (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 1980).
21
Lele, S.M. “Sustainable development: a critical review,” World Development, 19(6), (1991) 607-621.
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was established in 1983 by the United Nations to bring countries together to develop strategies to
combat environmental degradation. The commission was responsible for several tasks designed
to direct future development strategies that take into account environmental concerns. The goal
of these strategies was to achieve sustainable development by 2000. Also, the commission
recommended ways in which countries of every economic standing in the international system
could come together to develop “common and mutually supportive objectives that take account
of the interrelationships between people, resources, environment, and development”.22
Finally, the Brundtland commission defined shared commitments for long-term issues of
environmental concern, developed long-term plans for accomplishments, and set goals for a
global community. The report released by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, Our Common
Future, highlighted interlocking crises (environmental, economic, energy) that occurred
alongside the massive expansion of populations and economic activity.23 This publication put
forward a workable definition for sustainable development: “Sustainable development is
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.”24 Urban development received notable attention with the
recognition of demographic changes (rural to urban shift) and weak resources afforded to city
leaders. Stressing the connection to the urban poor, the Brundtland Report asserted the need for
involvement of the poor as “true city builders.”25 The Brundtland Report created space in the
international system for even greater dialogue between international, domestic, and local sources
of power.
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Aside from overseeing CLRTAP and the Brundtland Commission, the UNEP was
instrumental in organizing the international ozone depletion regime that led to the Montreal
Protocol. By means of conferences held in the late 1970s, an international ozone regime emerged
based on monitoring and action. These conventions were in response to emerging scientific
research that confirmed long-held theories on the destructive nature of Chlorofluorocarbon
(CFCs) to the ozone layer.26 According to scientists a deterioration in the ozone layer leads to
excessive ultraviolet radiation that causes mutation and other damage to human, animal, and
plant life.
In March of 1977, the UNEP held a conference that adopted the World Plan of Action on
the Ozone Layer and created a Coordinating Committee of the Ozone Layer. In 1981, the UNEP
Governing Council organized negotiations, which led to a framework that was adopted by the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985. The Vienna Convention itself
was an agreement that coordinated research, air quality monitoring, and research exchange
without forcing participating countries to commit to reducing ozone-depleting substances
(ODSs).
The work between countries to reduce the use of CFCs came in 1987 with the Montreal
Protocol. The Montreal Protocol is a binding agreement among nation states to phase out ODSs
in production and general consumption. Most of the ODSs were scheduled to be phased out by
2000, with any remaining substances to be phased out by 2005.27 Research suggests that the
agreement and its subsequent amendments created real change in the phasing out of ODS
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globally and contributed to positive stratospheric ozone recovery.28 The Montreal Protocol was
the first treaty in history to achieve universal ratification; 197 countries have signed on as of
2019.
During the late-1980s, NGOs began to gain influence within IGO conferences and
general meetings. In March of 1990, a preparatory committee for the Rio Summit issued a call
for greater participation of NGOs.29 As a result, relevant NGOs were provided consultative status
via the Economic and Social Council, a specialized agency of the U.N. The UNEP was
designated to organize actors to participate in the next major environmental conference, the Rio
Summit.30 In this pursuit, the UNEP invited NGOs, and global and regional networks, including
municipal networks, to participate as observers in the conference alongside countries. The
purpose of the Rio Summit was to create standards for economic development that accounted for
present-day as well as future environmental resources.
The Rio Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. A record 2,400 NGOs participated
in the conference, and almost 17,000 individuals participated in parallel NGO forums.31
Attendees sought to reimagine how current and near-term economic development could be
revised to consider the needs of future generations in terms of resources, equality, and the
environment. Two significant international environmental agreements, Agenda 21 and the United
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), became the centerpiece in
efforts aimed at improving air quality.
Agenda 21 is a non-binding agreement that provides blueprints for how nation states, and
local governments, might address challenges to sustainability. Specific to this research, Agenda
21 provided suggestions to local governments as to how they might create plans for sustainable
development in the face of a changing climate. Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 stated that local
authorities should create their own “local agenda 21” and take into consideration the unique
position of each city or municipality in creating a plan for sustainable development.32
In this pursuit, local authorities were to work with citizens and the private sector “through
consultation and consensus-building” to construct the social, economic, and environmental
dimensions of sustainability.33 Community consultation should involve “educating, mobilizing,
and responding to the public to promote sustainable development” and local plans of action to
address sustainability.34 The goal of the community consultative process was to raise public
awareness of sustainability issues and develop local laws and regulations to achieve the
objectives of Agenda 21.35 The objectives of chapter 28 in Agenda 21 make clear the standard of
appropriate behavior for local governments in creating their own ‘local agenda 21’ in a
consultative process with citizens, private stakeholders, and local authorities.
The UNFCCC is a critical document in terms of improving standards of air quality. The
stated objective of the UNFCCC is “to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
32
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would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”36 A country
would commit to critical components of monitoring, information sharing, and education
programs to achieve this central objective. These include:
•
•
•
•

Develop, publish, update, and make available inventories of anthropogenic emissions and
the removal of such contaminants through sinks.37
Create and publish national and regional programs that mitigate climate change by
addressing the removal of GHG not already controlled by the Montreal Protocol.38
Promote and aid in the development of technologies and practices that lead to a reduction
in the emission of GHGs.39
Promote education, training, and public awareness of climate issues and “encourage the
widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations.”40

The UNFCCC was signed on March 21, 1994 and continued an international project which
aimed at improving air quality.
Though a significant step forward, the treaty was inadequate in its presentation of
timelines and actual goals in GHG reduction. The first COP in Berlin began negotiations to
strengthen the commitments established in the initial UNFCCC. The negotiations established real
dates and targets for GHG reduction among nation states and resulted in the Kyoto Protocol.
This agreement, a result of the third COP in 1997, established a timeline from 2008-2012.41 In
this period, over 40 countries and the European Union agreed to reduce GHG levels to 5.2%
below the 1990 baseline. The UNFCCC developed an outline for how countries could address
climate change by taking steps towards improving air quality. Within the first three meetings of
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the COP, a majority of countries agreed to the commitments of timelines and targets for reducing
GHG emissions presented at Kyoto.

Municipalities and Transnational Environmental Governance
For more than a hundred years, in North America, municipal networks shared knowledge
and ideas connected to urban development. Originally, the role of municipal organizations was to
share ideas between domestic local authorities. The following section provides an overview of
the efforts of local authorities to create municipal networks in the United States and Canada. This
section is meant to show how cities moved from addressing domestic concerns to engaging with
transnational environmental issues.
Canadian municipalities have a long history of participating in regional, provincial, and
national associations that addressed concerns of municipal representatives. Currently, there is at
least one municipal association operating in each province in Canada. In addition, there are
regionalized unions of mayors and cities, as well as associations for rural municipalities.
Provincial, municipal associations have a high membership rate, with a majority of cities
represented across most provinces.42 The Municipal Association of British Columbia was one of
the first organizations to represent cities with goals of information sharing, promotion of
municipal concerns, and development of a system of uniformity across municipal members.43
Canadian municipalities first organized nationally under the Union of Canadian
Municipalities (UCM) in 1901.44 The UCM sought to improve municipal operations, and
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promote and protect the interests of municipalities.45 Municipal concern with public utilities was
perhaps the greatest motivation to join early associations or unions. Across Canada, utility
companies were ignoring public land rights or destroying public lands when installing their
equipment. These issues were central in the formation of the Ontario Municipal Association in
1899, the Union of Canadian Municipalities, and the Union of Manitoba Municipalities in
1905.46
In 1937 the UCM joined with another Canadian municipal organization, the Dominion
Conference of Mayors,47 to form the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities
(CFMM). The unification of the two groups was, in part, a reaction to deteriorating economies of
municipalities during the Depression.48 The CFMM offered a platform for conferences and
publications on municipal affairs, as well as a chance to lobby federal and provincial
governments for support. Renamed the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) in 1976,
the organization pushed for a more significant role in Federal-Provincial constitutional debates.
However, issues with membership troubled the FCM during the 1970s, especially in Quebec,
where nationalist sentiments influenced municipal leaders who pulled out of the organization.49
The FCM also failed to make meaningful gains for municipalities in a constitutional process that
ended with the passage of the Constitution Act in 1982.
During the 1970s, many Canadian cities experienced a loss of population in urban cores,
with many citizens moving to smaller city centers and ex-urban areas.50 As larger city centers
began to lose local tax revenue, some cities responded by annexing municipalities surrounding
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their urban core. Most notably, Toronto, Vancouver, and Edmonton expanded their respective
city-limits by incorporating adjacent suburbs, land, and municipalities. While this was a source
of increased revenue for cities, other issues with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in the 1980s
created a need for a negotiating body for cities. The FCM reasserted its relevance to
municipalities by negotiating a reduced GST for some goods that saved citizens more than $500
million annually.51
Municipal networks in the United States share a similar history of knowledge sharing and
cooperation in the development of local strategies for urban planning and development. Founded
in 1924, the American Municipal Association (AMA) began with the goal of organizing
information for municipal leagues and sharing methods of governance. From 1947 to the late
1970s, AMA membership opened to cities of 100,000 or more. In 1977, the AMA changed its
name to the National League of Cities (NLC), and city population limits for membership were
eliminated. This provided a significant boost in membership. As membership expanded, the NLC
continued to lobby the federal government for funding meant for city projects and uniform urban
planning projects.
During the 1970s, the real impact of sprawl and urban decay began to reveal itself in
cities across the United States. The departure of residents and corporate entities left many cities
in formerly robust industrial areas with dwindling revenue from taxable sources. Subsequently,
cities turned to the federal government for aid, but instead were offered bankruptcy assistance. In
1975, New York City’s revenue from taxes and other sources decreased to a point where the city
could no longer afford to provide essential services to its residents. Captured in a now-famous
headline from the New York Daily News, the response from the Executive Branch made no
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mistake in its position on the matter of financial assistance, “Ford to City: Drop Dead.”52 United
States President Gerald Ford, in a public statement, announced he would veto any bill coming
from Congress that attempted to bail out New York City. For many other cities, the reality of tax
revenue loss led to the privatization of municipal resources and services. The troubling economic
climate of many cities caused municipal leaders to act in new ways to impact the power position
of subnational governments.
The movement of municipal leaders demanding a louder voice in national debates was, in
part, a response to deteriorating conditions experienced by many cities in the 1970s. Federal
funding, once allocated to cities, was diverted to foreign affairs projects. During this period,
many cities experienced budget crises, with some eventually privatizing municipal resources. As
a result, a growing number of municipal leaders sought a larger role in foreign policy debates of
the 1980s. During a speech at the NLC conference in 1985, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley
stated that cities had both a right and obligation to take part in “the great national debate” on
foreign policy issues “from trade policies to opposing apartheid, from immigration policies to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.”53
Local Elected Officials for Social Responsibility (LEOSR), formed in 1983, sought to
advance the position of cities in foreign policy debates in the United States. Members of LEOSR
developed local policy that led to the proliferation of sanctuary cities and action against
apartheid, which gave them credibility in international affairs.54 In 1986 LEOSR joined with
another municipal network, Local Elected Officials USA, as part of the Local Elected Officials

52

Van Riper, F. “Ford to City: Drop Dead” Daily News (New York), (1975) 30.
Leviton, D. Horrendous Death and Health: Toward Action (New York: Hemisphere Publishing, 1991), 219.
54
Leviton. Horrendous Death and Health; Veon, Joan. “How ICLEI was created,” Eco-Logic magazine. (1997).
53

21

(LEO) Project, which was directed by the Center for Innovative Diplomacy in Irvine,
California.55
After some early success in the realm of foreign policy, the LEO Project shifted focus to
environmental concerns. The organization utilized environmental experts and city leaders to
develop local policies to protect natural resources. Additionally, the LEO Project organized a
meeting between a group of leaders from 30 American cities and Sherwood Rowland, a Nobel
Prize winner for work on ozone depletion.56 They met to discuss how municipalities could
design policies to implement the Montreal Protocols at the local level by phasing out CFCs.57 As
a result of this meeting, some cities were motivated to enact laws that follow the Montreal
Protocol’s guidelines on CFCs.
In Irvine City, California, for example, the city council passed a local ordinance
prohibiting the use of most CFCs in industrial processes, except where medical or military
products had no alternative to the chemicals.58 In addition, San Diego passed an ordinance to
address CFC emissions from government-owned vehicles by requiring CFC “recovery units” be
used to repair and maintain air conditioning systems.59 It is important to note that the passage of
these ordinances occurred in cities before the federal government took action. The leaders of the
LEO Project sought to challenge the federal government to act on environmental issues.60 LEO
Project officials were contacted by the UNEP61 after the success of their CFC initiatives and
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were invited to work with the group in developing a global conference of mayors focused on
environmental concerns.
In 1990, the World Congress of Local Governments for a Sustainable Future convened at
the United Nations headquarters in New York City. The World Congress was produced as a joint
effort between the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID), the UNEP, and the International
Union of Local Authorities. However, the CID is credited with the initiation and logistical
management of the conference.62 Represented at the World Congress were over 200
municipalities from 43 countries. At this meeting, representatives called for municipal
cooperation in the development of a transnational effort and created ICLEI as a result. As an
international network, ICLEI acted as an advocate for municipal leaders and participated in and
organized international conferences. The network actively pursued interaction with international
organizations and local agents to promote progressive change in environmental policy. In so
doing, the organization contributed to U.N. programs, like Local Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC.
ICLEI also helped to create other municipal networks, like the Cities for Climate Protection
Campaign (CCPC).
The CCPC began as the Urban CO2 Reduction Program, which was funded by ICLEI,
the EPA, the City of Toronto, and other service-based partners.63 In its first stage, the program
involved officials from 14 municipalities from the U.S., Canada, Turkey, and Europe who
developed local strategies to mitigate CO2 emissions.64 The CCPC formed a generic framework,
based on these local strategies that members could adopt. This program also used the first GHG
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inventory measurement software for cities, which was developed by ICLEI.65 The CCPC
developed four goals:66
1.
2.
3.
4.

Strengthen commitments at the local level to reduce urban emissions.
Create new planning and management tools that focused on CO2 policies that were
cost-effective.
Research past experiences of cities to develop best practices in strategies of GHG
emission mitigation.
Attempt to tie municipal action into a broader national and international effort.

The CCPC sought to connect cities to create local action plans for GHG monitoring and
mitigation, sharing best practices in reduction strategies, and using ICLEI as a service-providing
platform.67 The CCPC organized municipal leaders to present information and update the
progress of the campaign by means of municipal conferences. The campaign was maintained by
ICLEI and was funded by central or supranational government sources and other international
networks and foundations. 68
One of ICLEI’s first attempts to apply sustainability standards was the Local Agenda 21
Planning Guide.69 Between the Rio Summit and the release of the guide in 1996, ICLEI and
various national associations of local government had technically assisted hundreds of municipal
leaders in developing sustainability action plans. ICLEI used the experience of CCPC members
to develop the guide as a resource for municipalities to develop local action plans for
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sustainability.70 The LA21 Planning Guide offered a framework for cities, which included
examples of successful programs. The guide stressed the importance of developing action plans
at the local level, bringing together stakeholders from both public and private spheres to work
towards more sustainable practices.
ICLEI and its members’ engagement with international environmental conferences did
not end with the Rio Summit. Since Rio ICLEI members and leadership have attended
international conferences hosted by the U.N. as observers. ICLEI also hosts municipal summits
that parallel COPs and Meeting of Parties (MOPs) and the results of these summits are then
communicated to the COPs or MOPs. At the conclusion of the 2nd Municipal Leaders’ Summit, a
communiqué was sent to the COP-1, urging the creation of an agency to support local authorities
complying with UNFCCC. Representatives from 50 countries and 150 local authorities signed
the communiqué.71 This request resulted in the COP establishing the Local Authorities and
Municipal Authorities Constituency which secured observer status for ICLEI leadership and
local authorities.
At an ICLEI-organized event held during COP-10 municipal leaders issued a statement
asking “delegates of COP-10 to remember that local government is separate and distinct from
national governments and NGOs.”72 This statement illustrates a changing dynamic in how local
governments expressed their positions within international environmental negotiation and action
on air quality. Between COP-1 and COP-10, cities encouraged nation states to make laws
addressing climate change. Furthermore, cities and their networks began to embrace the role of
70
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policy leader on the international stage. This idea gained strength as more local governments,
and their networks reaffirmed a space for local authorities at the international level.
At COP-13, many countries signed the Bali Action Plan, which continued international
environmental negotiations on establishing an international climate regime beyond 2012.
Because cities and subnational governments were excluded from the Bali Action Plan, they
created the Local Government Climate Roadmap73 (LGCR), which again urged members of the
UNFCCC to include local governments in international plans to reduce GHGs and fight climate
change. The LGCR was a document that meant to parallel the U.N. Climate Roadmap created at
Bali. The Roadmap also made suggestions that the Convention should:
•

Include the development and implementation of local policies on the agenda of the
UNFCCC.

•

Request the UNFCCC Secretariat to strengthen cooperation with cities and local
authorities.

The LGCR began a new series of meetings of local authorities called the Local Government
Climate Sessions that were held parallel to future COPs. These meetings continued to emphasize
the need to recognize local authorities for their work in the arena of sustainability and climate
change initiatives.
After years of challenging members of the UNFCCC to recognize and support local
climate efforts, COP-16 marked a pivotal moment for cities and their engagement with
international environmental conferences. At COP-16, in 2011, cities and local governments were
officially recognized as government stakeholders.74 During this conference, local governments
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and their networks adopted the Mexico City Pact, a ten-point climate action plan that included
signees committing to reduce GHG emissions and joining the Carbonn Climate Registry.75 This
plan created a carbon registry where cities designate targets designed to improve air quality and
report levels of emissions.76
COP-19 included the addition of working groups that facilitated:
the sharing among Parties of experiences and best practices of cities and subnational
authorities…in identifying and implementing opportunities to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions and adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change.77
This statement highlights the growing importance of cities and subnational governments as part
of an international climate strategy.
The Paris Agreement, developed at COP-21, was a landmark event in international
environmental cooperation between nation states and local governments. The agreement
included a commitment by nation states to take action that would limit rising temperatures by
over 2 degrees Celsius.78 The Climate Package recognized local and subnational governments for
their successful sustainability efforts. Additionally, the agreement expanded plans to strengthen
the capacity of local governments to pursue climate activities.
In addition to advocating for cities at the international level, ICLEI also offers technical
assistance to municipal leaders. ICLEI creates products for local authorities that include software
packages for air quality inventories, guidelines for local action, and platforms to report results of
local action. One program that ICLEI offers is Clean Air and Climate Protection (CACP). This
software allows cities to inventory GHG emissions produced by municipal operations. CACP
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allowed cities to input data on energy and fuel consumption to plan for future reduction of cityfleet vehicles.79
Released in 2013, Clearpath is the most recent software package from ICLEI that allows
cities to conduct local GHG emissions, track emissions progress, and forecast future emissions.
Clearpath is available as an online alternative to the previous software developed by ICLEI. In a
partnership with the Compact of Mayors and the Bloomberg Philanthropies, ICLEI offered
Clearpath to all cities for free between 2015-2018.80 The goal of this arrangement allowed for
more cities to access ICLEI’s software and technical resources, including cities outside of the
TMN’s membership network.
Both versions of ICLEI’s GHG software utilize Local Government Operations Protocol
(LGO), which are standards for how local governments should conduct GHG emissions
inventories. This standardized protocol was first developed as a joint project by ICLEI, the
California Air Resources Board (ARB), and the California Climate Action Registry (CCAR) in
2008. The parties involved in the creation of the LGO for GHG inventories have updated the
protocols once in 2010 and again in 2014. The EPA, Mayor’s Compact, C40, and other
significant organizations have relied on the LGO protocol since its inception as a standard to
measure municipal emissions. As a TMN, some of ICLEI’s most influential work has been in the
development of standards for collecting data and reporting GHG emissions.
In addition to working with state environmental agencies, ICLEI has also engaged with
supranational actors. In 2012, ICLEI joined with the C40 and the World Resources Institute to
create a globally recognized protocol for cities to collect and report data on GHG emissions and
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energy use. With the help of the World Bank, the UNEP, and U.N. Habitat, the pilot version of
the Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories (GPC) was
released. 8182
Groups like the LEO Project and the CID represent a break from traditional municipal
networking strategies that paved the way for the formation of ICLEI. The methods employed by
ICLEI and its members enhanced the position of cities in the international community. First,
cities voluntarily adopted protocol set by the UNFCCC even though they were left out of the
process. Second, where nation states often failed to achieve the standards set by the UNFCCC,
local authorities claimed success. Many local leaders globally adopted the standards of these
agreements and were in many cases able to create coherent action plans. Third, through TMNs,
cities aggressively publicized their accomplishments at the international level. These actions by
cities and their networks have impelled the international community to recognize local
governments as stakeholder in an international climate regime.

Environmental Efforts in the United States and Canada: 1991-2018
This section provides a background to the environmental efforts of political leaders in the
United States and Canada. From 1991-2018, some prime ministers and presidents have attempted
to develop national programs that meaningfully reduce GHG emissions. However, both countries
have been inconsistent in their leadership at the international and domestic levels on
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environmental policy. First, I will consider Canada’s engagement with international
environmental agreements and the federal government’s difficulty creating unilateral federal
policy to achieve their commitments under the UNFCCC. Then, I will provide a brief overview
of American efforts to pursue, or disengage from, environmental policy that matched the
minimum requirements of international agreements on climate change.
Canada’s Concern with Climate, Competition, and Kyoto
The Mulroney Government
During the 1980s, Canada claimed a position as an environmental leader in the
international arena. Canadian government negotiators were instrumental in work on the Vienna
Convention and Montreal Protocol. Additionally, the Mulroney government hosted one of the
first environmental summits on climate change in Toronto in 1988. At this convention, Prime
Minister Mulroney advocated for broader international efforts to reduce the emission of harmful
contaminants and atmospheric protection. Additionally, the Prime Minister announced that
Canada would set a reduction target that required the government to reduce emissions by 20% of
the 1988 levels by 2000.83 Shortly after the Toronto climate change conference, government
subsidies for fossil fuel projects off of the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador drew criticism.
Environmental groups in Canada were concerned that the Canadian government was not taking
its espoused commitment to reduce atmospheric contaminants seriously.
Other environmental efforts included additions to the Canadian Environmental Protection
Act (CEPA) in 1988. The regulatory framework introduced through CEPA provided a system to
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monitor and index toxic substances that are byproducts of Canadian businesses.84 Provincial
leadership retained the power to make additions to the index of toxic substances with CEPA
acting as a minimum standard.
In 1990, the Mulroney government introduced Canada’s Green Plan. The goal of this
national strategy was to “secure for current and future generations a safe and healthy
environment.”85 The plan called for an increase in research and information campaigns to
educate the public and private sectors on the need for atmospheric protection, and their role in
reducing emission. However, the plan was condemned by environmental researchers and
activists as being too reliant on voluntary measures and information sharing systems that would
not achieve a significant reduction in emissions.86

The Chretien Government
As the Chretien government came to power in the early 1990s, the Liberals continued to
promote advancing environmental protections in similar ways to the previous conservative
government. The Chretien government signed the UNFCCC, still advocating for the expansion
of treaties and international law to curb emissions of harmful contaminants. Through the next
four years, the Chretien government made multiple attempts to construct a national strategy that
aligned provincial and federal policy.
When the government negotiators agreed to Canadian targets for Kyoto in 1997, the
Chretien government had to contend with pushback from business interests and provincial
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leaders. Provincial officials argued that the central government had acted beyond its authority
when it accepted official national targets for emission reduction by 6%.
Following the Kyoto conference, a First Ministers Conference addressed concerns
between provincial and federal leaders. At the Ministers Conference, provincial leaders and
central government officials came to three agreements related to emission targets and
international climate negotiations:
•

The Prime Minister committed to a balanced approach to environmental policy
that did not place an unequal burden on specific provinces.

•

A joint cost and benefit analysis of Kyoto would be conducted by provincial
and federal officials prior to ratification.

•

Provincial and territorial governments pledged to work together on an
implementation plan for a nationally aligned environmental policy.87

One of the efforts aimed at aligning provincial and federal environmental policy, which took
place in 1998, resulted in the creation of the Nation Climate Change Process (NCCP). This
consultative process was a collaboration between the Province of Alberta and the federal
government.88 While the NCCP illustrated that provincial-federal environmental leadership
shared concerns related to climate change and agreed on the relative science behind the problem,
the leaders failed to make progress in developing credible plans to meet Canada’s commitments
to emission reduction.
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Leading up to Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, a coalition of anti-Kyoto
opponents demanded an alternative, “made in Canada” approach to environmental policy.89 This
opposition included oil and gas interests, the Canadian Alliance Party, and the Province of
Alberta. During an oral question period in Parliament, Alliance party leader Stephen Harper
framed Kyoto as a “made in Japan” policy that had not been appropriately negotiated with
provincial representatives.90 Provincial leaders from Alberta and oil interests asserted that
moving forward with Kyoto commitments would cost between $23 and $40 billion a year.91
Additionally, the anti-Kyoto group claimed that Canada’s reduction in emissions would be minor
and that a policy representing “real interests of real Canadians” was necessary.92
Though the Prime Minister’s cabinet had the power to approve international treaties, the
Chretien government moved to a parliamentary vote to ensure the support of the House of
Commons. Though not required, gaining the approval of the House of Commons placed pressure
on ministers of parliament to create legislation that helped the Kyoto process to continue
nationally. The parliamentary vote succeeded93 with the Liberal party, New Democratic Party
(NDP), and Quebecois Bloc supporting ratification. The Conservative Alliance and Progressive
Conservatives voted against Canada’s continued participation in Kyoto.
The 2004 federal elections were a significant moment for Canadian conservatives. In the
previous year, multiple conservative political parties in Canada agreed to merge into a single
political party, the Conservative Party of Canada. After a year of internal organizing under
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interim leadership,94 Stephen Harper was elected the party’s leader. The newly formed
Conservative Party of Canada claimed a total of 99 seats after the 2004 federal elections.95
Additionally, the Liberal party lost 37 seats and majority control of the government, keeping
only 135 seats in the House. To maintain majority control in parliament in 2004 required at least
50% of the vote, or 154 seats. After the election, the Liberal Party maintained control over the
government albeit in a minority capacity.

The Martin Government
After the 2004 elections, Paul Martin led the minority Liberal government as prime
minister. The environmental policy of the Martin government reflected a continuation of the
Liberal party’s public support for honoring the commitments made at Kyoto and in the
UNFCCC. Stephane Dion, Environmental Minister in the Martin government, oversaw COP-11
in Montreal in 2005. At this conference, the Canadian government was instrumental in pushing
forward the Montreal Action Plan, which negotiated some new emission targets and guaranteed
the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012.
In addition to government negotiations at the international level, the Martin government
introduced Project Green at the national level, which began with information sharing and
voluntary reduction subsidies.96 Project Green was attacked by environmental activists as a
costly version of previous government plans to reduce emissions. The plan contained no real
mechanisms to ensure that commercial emitters of GHG would reduce their emissions.
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Furthermore, because Alberta continued to oppose the implementation of the Kyoto targets, it
was impossible to develop a national environmental policy.
In addition to national policy challenges, the Liberal party was also losing its grip on
political power. In February of 2005, the Auditor General of Canada released a report that
detailed a money laundering scandal between the Liberal Party of Canada and various
advertising agencies across Quebec.97 The scandal drew in former Prime Minister Jean
Chretien’s cabinet members, including Paul Martin, who was at that time the Minister of
Finance. In November 2005, the parliament held a no confidence vote, which forced a federal
election. In this election, the Conservative party was able to secure minority control of the
government, winning 124 of 308 seats in the House of Commons.98 The results of this election
brought a conservative party back to power in Canada for the first time since the Mulroney
government. It was the Harper government’s responsibility to assess Canada’s future in Kyoto.
The Harper Government
While Canada officially withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, the effort organized
by the Harper government began in 2006. As I discussed in the introductory chapter, Stephen
Harper personally advocated for the country’s removal from the Kyoto process as early as 2002.
As a member of the Canadian Alliance Party, Harper had given four reasons for opposing the
Kyoto Protocol:
•
•
•

The presence of tentative and contradictory scientific evidence about climate
trends.
Too much focus on carbon dioxide, “which is essential to life.” 99
The devastating impact on the oil and gas industries of Canada; and finally,
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•

The claim that Kyoto was a “socialist scheme to suck money out of wealth
producing nations.”100

As prime minister, Harper instructed his Environmental Minister and representatives in
charge of the Bonn climate talks to oppose strict targets placed on Canadian emissions.101 During
the COPs in 2006 and 2007, delegates from other countries noted that the Canadian delegation
was antagonistic towards the establishment of specific targets for participants of the
UNFCCC.102
In 2007, the Harper government introduced the “Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to
Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution”, which called for a reduction in GHG emissions
from Canadian industries.103 The plan represented a national response to rising GHG emissions,
which allowed the government to sidestep its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. However,
the planned targets for GHG emission reduction were considerably lower than those assigned to
Canada in the UNFCCC.104 The Harper plan reestablished the baseline year for emission
measurement to 2006,105 which reduced the goals for GHG emission targets overall.106 The
central government believed that Kyoto was too expensive for Canada to implement and would
cause a severe economic recession. Opponents of the plan asserted that the Harper government
attempted to move forward with environmental policy that was insufficient to reduce GHG
emissions that matched the commitments of previous Canadian governments. Critics contended
that the Harper government had no intention of continuing with the international climate
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negotiations and was actively sabotaging climate talks by refusing to discuss specific targets for
GHG reduction.
By 2009, the Harper government had again revised its GHG emission targets downward.
The new plan aimed at implementing a sector-by-sector approach to regulating GHG
emissions.107 In the same year, Canadian leadership signed the Copenhagen Accord, in which the
government agreed to voluntary reduction targets for GHG emissions. Critics again asserted that
the Harper government and members of the Conservative Party of Canada had little to no actual
plans on how to achieve these goals.108 A report from Environment Canada109 in 2014 revealed
that the country would not meet the goals set at Kyoto, Copenhagen, or in the Turn the Corner
plan.
Between 2008 and 2011, the Harper government expressed an interest in developing a
cap and trade system. Canadian conservatives ran on a reelection platform in 2008 that included
a cap and trade policy that held large scale emitters of GHG responsible for the pollution
produced by their activities. Preceding the election the Conservative Party of Canada maintained
minority control over the parliament. However, a cap and trade system proposal never
materialized. The central government blamed the global economic crisis of 2007-2008 for its
inability to impose new taxes or fees on the provinces.110
In 2011, Canada announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. The announcement
was followed by the country’s official removal from the process initiated by Kyoto in 2012. The
same year Canada withdrew from Kyoto, the Harper government made significant cuts to
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national environmental programs totaling $222 million. This included cuts to programs like the
Canadian Foundation for Climate and Atmospheric Sciences (CFCAS) and the National
Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NTREE).111 The impact of the budget cuts
forced the CFCAS to begin the closure of the Polar Environment Atmospheric Research
Laboratory (PEARL), Canada’s northernmost data collection facility in the Arctic.112 However,
through private donations, PEARL remained open after the government’s budget pullback.
NTREE was unable to continue operations with the significant budget cuts but eventually
reorganized, operating as a private organization.113 Through nine years and six different
Ministers of the Environment, the Harper government did not provide a workable national
alternative to Kyoto or the subsequent international environmental agreements.
The Trudeau Government
The liberal government regained control of Parliament in 2015. It ran on a platform that
included returning to environmentally friendly policies and meeting international commitments
to climate change. During the campaign the Liberal party platform included the following three
important environmental planks:
•
•
•

Phase out subsidies to the fossil fuel industry.114
Fund $2 billion towards a Low Carbon Economy Trust.115
Create a pan-Canadian framework for dealing with climate change that aligns with the
Paris climate conference.
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The Trudeau government made good on a campaign promise to reengage with the
international community on climate change through negotiations at the Paris climate conference.
Canada’s Environment and Climate Change Minister, Catharine McKenna, affirmed that Canada
was committed to negotiating an agreement that included achievable targets.116 Before the
conference, McKenna acknowledged that both the provincial and federal leaders had to accept
realistic reduction targets and that those targets needed to be met with actual plans. In October of
2016, the House of Commons ratified the Paris agreement117, with the Liberal and NDP members
joining together to vote in favor.118
In 2016, the Trudeau government called a First Minister’s Meeting to discuss climate
change policy with provincial leaders. At the conclusion of the meeting, the leaders issued the
Vancouver Declaration on clean growth and climate change. In this declaration, provincial and
federal leaders agreed on a framework to meet emission reduction targets and other climate
change goals. A critical agreement within the Vancouver Declaration called for the transition to
carbon pricing mechanisms to help reduce GHG emissions.119
The “Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change” (PCFCGCC) was
an environmental agreement between provincial and federal leadership released following the
First Minister’s Meeting in 2016. The framework represented the first national strategy aimed at
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reducing GHG emissions by developing carbon pricing benchmarks, increasing standards for
energy efficiency, and investing in clean technology.120 The PCFCGCC established a schematic
for provincial cap and trade systems or carbon taxes as appropriate standards for emissions
reduction. All provinces were required to implement one or both of the carbon pricing
instruments by 2018 to assure their adherence to the framework. The PCFCGCC outlined a
carbon price of $10 per ton beginning in 2018, with an additional $10 increase each year until
2022. The agreement represented 93% of the population of Canada.121
Only the provincial leadership of Manitoba and Saskatchewan refused to support the
PCFCGCC. Provincial leadership in Saskatchewan opposed the framework based on the carbon
pricing instrument, which they suggested could reduce the GDP of the province by $1.8 billion
annually.122 Manitoba leadership claimed their “Made in Manitoba” climate plan contained a cap
and trade system that met the requirements of the initial PCFCGCC benchmarks. However,
Manitoba’s carbon pricing system set a carbon emission price frozen at $25 per ton for industrial
emitters until 2022, which was not stringent enough for the national benchmarks. The federal
standard provided in the framework required provinces to set at least $50 per ton at 2022. Other
issues with provincial cooperation include Ontario’s removal of its cap and trade instruments in
2018.
While the Pan-Canadian climate framework marked a significant moment in the
formation of a mostly national strategy to reduce GHG emissions, the “Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Pricing Act” (GGPPA) created federal law that required compliance of environmental
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standards for provincial governments. The GGPPA officially created federal guidelines for
carbon pricing and initiated a new nationally aligned policy to reduce emissions.123 This
legislation was passed as a portion of the Budget Implementation Act in 2018, an omnibus
bill.124 Those provinces that had not established a carbon pricing system that aligned with the
PCFCGCC were required to create a pricing indices or be subject to the federal guidelines. The
federal government returned 90% of the money collected from carbon and fuel taxes to
provincial governments that complied with the GGPPA.125 Provincial leadership could then
decide how to redistribute the money among provincial programs. For provinces not committed
to the GGPPA or carbon pricing, the federal government returned the money directly to citizens
through a Climate Action Incentive payment.126 The carbon pricing mechanisms had not yet
taken effect across all provinces by 2018 when this study’s analysis ends.
The enactment of the GGPPA has been complicated by provincial pushback against
federally mandated carbon taxes. The provincial governments of Saskatchewan, Ontario, and
Alberta sued to stop the enactment of a federal carbon tax in 2018.127 In the cases of Ontario and
Saskatchewan appeal courts upheld the federal government’s authority to regulate GHG
emissions via the GGPPA. However, the Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled against the federal
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government’s carbon tax plan in 2019.128 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed to hear appeals
from Saskatchewan and Ontario on the validity of a federal mandated carbon tax in 2020.
The Trudeau government was moving to establish national programs to meet the
country’s goals in emission reduction. However, environmental activists and other critics
asserted that the Liberal government was too entrenched with the fossil fuel industry. The
concern from activists centered on the continuance of subsidies to fossil fuel industries and the
proposed expansion of the Trans Mountain Pipeline System (TMPS). In 2016, the Trudeau
cabinet approved the expansion of the TMPS. The expansion project included the addition of
another pipeline to run alongside the original TMPS system. Before the expansion project could
proceed, the government required Kinder Morgan, the group that owned the TMPS, to meet over
150 conditions linked to environmental and economic feasibility. Additionally, legal issues with
permitting prevented the expansion project from moving forward with construction for over a
year. Protests from First Nations people and environmental activists further delayed the
expansion of the TMPS. British Columbia presented another significant threat to the project
when the provincial government opposed the expansion by proposing restrictions to
environmentally harmful imports from Alberta. As a result of legal challenges to the expansion
project, and the continued protests, Kinder Morgan stated that they were considering abandoning
the expansion project.
In May of 2018, the federal government of Canada announced its intent to nationalize,
through purchase, the TMPS. The Liberal government’s investment set in motion court battles,
as well as a renewed protest from First Nation communities, environmental activists, and
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Members of Parliament. Jagmeet Singh, Leader of the NDP, stated that “climate change leaders
don’t spend $4.5 billion dollars on pipelines.”129 Immediately following the nationalization of the
TMPS the planned expansion, approved in 2016, was halted by the Federal Court of Appeals.
The court ruled that Kinder Morgan did not appropriately seek the consent of First Nation’s
leaders, and failed to account for increased waterway traffic surrounding the project.130 If the
federal government wanted to continue with the TMPS expansion, it would have to show a plan
to gain consent from First Nations leaders. As of the end of the timeline for research in this
dissertation the TMPS expansion was still in question due to legal challenges from First Nation
leaders.
The United States and Federal Environmental Policy Action
The Clinton Administration
The Clinton Administration’s attempts at environmental initiatives began in 1993 with
the introduction of a plan to create a British Thermal Unit (BTU) tax and the Climate Change
Action Plan (CCAP). The BTU tax faced opposition in Congress and was replaced with a
gasoline tax.131 If passed, the BTU tax would have been the first carbon tax applied to industries
across an industrialized country. The CCAP was a package of initiatives that aimed at reducing
emission levels to the 1990 baseline by 2000.132 Through the CCAP, the President ordered the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the EPA to develop coordinated initiatives to help commercial
buildings reduce their emissions and energy consumption through knowledge sharing and
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technical support. To accomplish these goals the agencies were directed to utilize the Energy
Star Buildings and Rebuild America programs to aid in the retrofitting of energy saving
systems.133 Additionally, the CCAP called for the EPA to “narrow the scope of uses allowed for”
harmful emission, like hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) used in some commercial products.134 Yet,
environmental groups and critics asserted that the plan amounted to voluntary measures that
could not achieve the desired outcome of emission reduction to the baseline target.
In 1995, many of the environmental initiatives contained within the CCAP were placed in
jeopardy as the Republican Party won control of both Congressional bodies. Many of the
directives contained within the CCAP did not require Congressional approval. Other initiatives
were voluntary, urging companies to collect data and reduce emissions. However, Congressional
authorization for budgetary requirements of the CCAP experienced significant delays or gridlock
as republican leaders focused on their platform, the “Contract with America.” Furthermore, the
Republican-led legislative agenda included budget cuts to environmental programs, including the
EPA, and a rollback of environmental protections that were considered harmful to business.135
These environmental cuts were part of a larger budgetary struggle in the United States that led to
a government shutdown in late 1995.
As part of COP-1 in 1995, the United States agreed to the Berlin Mandate. This
agreement outlined the basis for which countries would participate in GHG reduction targets and
determined the format of future climate negotiations. However, the Congressional pushback
created problems with United States’ participation in the UNFCCC when the Senate passed the
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Byrd-Hagel resolution.136 Senators expressed concern about emission targets and timetables,
including the fact that developing countries were not required to make the same commitments as
industrialized countries. The Byrd-Hagel resolution was partially a product of concerns about
economic competitors, like China and India, gaining unfair market advantages because of their
“developing” status.137Additional lobbying from the energy sector promoted a negative response
from U.S. congressional members to the Berlin Mandate and other international environmental
efforts. 138 In a 95-0 vote the United States Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution in July of
1997. This resolution expressed the Senate’s position that any international environmental treaty
would require the “meaningful” participation from developing countries in GHG reduction
targets and goals.139
The United States officially signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 during COP-4. However,
chief negotiator Stuart Eisenstat confirmed that the Clinton administration did not intend to
submit the treaty to Congress until key developing countries pledged themselves to targets and
timetables.140 Efforts from the Clinton administration to convince countries to adopt emission
reduction measures continued through bilateral agreements and negotiations by way of the
COPs. Through bilateral agreements, U.S. negotiators secured pledges to plan targets and
timetables for emission reduction from Argentina, Kazakhstan, 141 China, and India.142
The addition of pledges from developing countries did little to sway debate over Senate
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Senators charged that the targets set by the protocols were
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unreasonable and would harm markets across the United States.143 Additionally, critics of Kyoto
claimed the lack of meaningful participation among developing countries gave an unfair
economic advantage to market rivals like China, India, and Brazil.144 After the suspension of
COP-6, the Clinton administration made no effort to send the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for
ratification.
Soon after Kyoto, the administration of George W. Bush revoked the United States’
participation in the Kyoto process and altered how the United States would conduct future
international climate negotiations.
The George W. Bush Administration
As discussed in the introduction to this research, the George W. Bush administration
announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol. The Bush
administration stated that the goals contained in Kyoto would place an uneven economic burden
on industrialized countries and would injure the U.S. economy.145 In his statement, Bush noted
that his working group on climate change was developing recommendations for an alternative to
Kyoto.146
President Bush announced his administration’s alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol in
2002, the Clear Skies Initiative (CKI) and the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI). The
CKI called for a “new market-based approach to clean air,” where technological innovation and
private sector stewardship could slow the rise in emissions. In 2003, the republican sponsored
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Clear Skies Act (CSA) was introduced to the Senate. Critics charged that the proposed
legislation would reduce the control already in place for many harmful emissions. One example
of change to established environmental programs was the “new source review” (NSR) process
established in amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1977. NSRs are required when industrial
facilities make modifications to energy systems that impact the amount of GHG emitted. The
NSR process is a nuisance to high emission industries because of directives to use modern
pollution controls in the construction of new facilities like gas-fired turbines instead of coal-fired
power plants. The CSA as presented in the Senate would have retired the NSR process for a
proposal on a cap and trade system.147 Furthermore, the CSA went to extraordinary lengths to
replace critical components of the Clean Air Act, in some cases, leaving emissions like carbon
dioxide out of inventory mandates.148 The CSA was abandoned in 2005 after senate republicans
failed to successfully move it out of committee for a vote. The GGCI proposed reducing the
“intensity” of GHG emission 18% by 2012 by means of market-based initiatives. The
mathematics involved in this reduction scheme tied base GHG emission targets as a ratio of
GHG emission to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).149 Through the GGCI, the Bush
administration proposed initiatives for corporations to gain tax credits if they conducted
voluntary corporate-wide emissions reporting or implemented technological innovation to reduce
emission.
The CKI, CSA, and GGCI were all influenced by policy directives established during the
first year of the Bush administration. During his first month in office, President Bush created the
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National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) and named Vice President Dick Cheney
as the chairperson. The activities and meetings of the NEPDG were held in private but were
accessible to over 100 executives from the energy industry.150 For example, executives from
Enron, Shell, ExxonMobil, and the American Coal company expressed their concerns and policy
recommendation to the energy taskforce personally. However, environmental groups and
alternative energy companies were unable to attend the NEPDG as experts. Some groups were
allowed to submit structured comments to the NEPDG that appeared to have no impact on the
final report. The release of the 2001 Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group
(NEPDG) was heavily criticized as a policy that was influenced by representatives from the
energy industry. The Congressional Committee on Government Reform, the House Committee
on Energy, and the U.S. General Accounting Office requested information from the White House
on the consultation process of the NEPDF. Nonetheless, the White House refused to
acknowledge those requests. An investigation in 2005 revealed that undue influence was given to
executives and lobbyists from the energy sector when planning climate change and other
environmental policy.
At the international level, the Bush administration did not provide adequate support to the
Kyoto process or to the formation of an international environmental regime. In multiple COPs
under the Bush administration, officials from the United States tried to remove emission targets,
replace the phrase climate change with “climate variability”,151 and emphasize the role of
technology to meet the energy crisis in place of regulating industries. During the first MOP in
Montreal in 2005, the United States delegation walked out over a disagreement with the Kyoto
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targets timetables.152 One of the only moments of cooperation with the international
environmental regime and the United States occurred at Cop 13 in Bali, where the United States
joined international environmental efforts when it supported the Bali Roadmap.153 During this
COP, the E.U. engaged in a concentrated effort to bring the United States back to the negotiating
table, in the event that a more environmentally progressive administration would replace the
Bush White House following the 2008 election.

The Obama Administration
The American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA) was the Obama administration’s
first attempt at major legislation on climate change. Introduced by Representative Henry
Waxman in the House in May of 2009, the ACESA proposed efficiency standards for electricity
suppliers that required 20% of energy generated should come from renewable sources.
Additionally, the ACESA empowered the EPA to enact measures on carbon capture and
sequestration, improve the environmental reporting system between state and federal
governments, and create subsidies for renewable energy projects.154 The majority of opposition
to the legislation in the House came from the Republican representatives. They claimed the
ACESA was a cap and trade system that would hurt consumers by increasing energy prices.155
The ACESA passed the House 219-212 in late June of 2009. Over 40 democratic representatives
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and 168 republicans voted no, while eight republicans and 211 democratic representatives voted
yes to advance the legislation to the Senate.156
In the Senate, the ACESA was contested fiercely along party lines. Although the
Democratic Party had a near filibuster proof majority in the Senate, the atmosphere became even
more contentious with the continuing debate surrounding healthcare legislation and the
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Though a small group of Senators tried to advance the ACESA to a
Senate vote, there was not enough support to bring the bill to the floor. In July of 2010, Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid acknowledged that his party did not have the 60 votes required157 to
move forward with debate in the Senate.158
Since overcoming Senate gridlock required 60 votes, the Obama administration leaned on
Presidential Memorandums, unilateral executive action, and budgetary requests to develop
processes to reduce GHG emissions. In 2013 the Obama administration put forward a climate
action plan that called for cutting carbon pollution, preparing resilient systems in preparation for
climate change, and a return to environmental leadership at the international level.159 In the same
year, a Presidential Memorandum ordered federal government agencies to derive at least 20% of
their energy consumption from renewable energy sources.160 In 2015, the Obama administration
announced the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which directed the EPA to set standards that addressed
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carbon output from power plants.161 The CPP was the result of a community consultation of
“states, tribes, utilities, stakeholders and the public, including more than 4.3 million comments
that the EPA received on the proposed rule.”162 Congressional pushback came from both
chambers of Congress, and individual leaders who refused to accept the CPP. Senator Mitch
McConnel suggested that states concerned with the plan should refuse to implement the new
regulations.163 Additionally, the House and the Senate issued resolutions of disapproval as part of
their power under the Congressional Review Act. These resolutions had the authority to cancel
the CPP and many of its provisions.164 However, the President vetoed both resolutions.
At the international level, the Obama administration rejoined efforts by committing to
new emission reduction targets. In 2014, China and the United States announced a joint
environmental agreement. China agreed to place a cap on its emissions by 2030, increase energy
produced from non-fossil fuel sources, and reduce its carbon intensity.165 The United States
committed to reducing its emissions by 26% below 2005 levels by 2025.166 The bilateral climate
cooperation agreement, announced a year ahead of the Paris conference, expressed the
commitments the Obama administration thought were achievable. This agreement also signaled
to the international community what reduction targets and mechanisms were acceptable to each
country. In 2015, the United States was one of 195 countries to agree to targeted reductions in
GHG emissions.
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In 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Paris climate agreement. The President was
accompanied by President Xi Jinping of China, whose country also initiated the process to
officially join the Paris agreement on the same day as the United States. The United States’
commitment to reduce GHG emissions to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025 was very close to the
bilateral agreement made with China in 2014.
The Trump Administration
As one of its first official acts the Trump administration removed the United States from
the Paris Accord. The Trump administration’s deregulation of environmental policy is a
reflection of its nationalist “America First” slogan. The administration has followed in the
footsteps of previous republican political leaders that favor deregulation and economic growth
over environmental protection. The Trump administration ended many of the programs contained
within the 2013 Presidential Climate Action Plan, citing the high costs of the programs on
industry and the country. During his campaign for president, environmental activists and the
scientific community were alarmed at Trump’s insistence that as president he would, in reference
to the EPA, “get rid of the agency.”167 Occasionally referring to the EPA as the “Department of
Environmental,” then candidate Trump claimed on Sean Hannity’s television program that the
agency was “just killing our businesses.”168
The administration’s pattern of environmental deregulation is epitomized by the
governing of the EPA. In 2017, Trump selected Scott Pruitt as his first administrator of the EPA.
In his former position as the Attorney General of Oklahoma, Pruitt sued the EPA to block
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regulations related to the CPP.169 The pushback against Scott Pruitt’s nomination came from
members of congress, environmental activists, and employees within the EPA. Other
controversial appointments to the EPA include:
· Andrew Wheeler: Former coal mining lobbyist for Deputy Administrator.
· Erik Baptist- Former senior counsel for the American Petroleum Institute for Senior
Deputy Council.
· Nancy Beck: Former executive at the American Chemistry Council for Deputy
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention.
· William Wehrum: a lawyer with previous challenges to the Clean Air Act on behalf of
companies from oil, gas, and coal industries for the position of Assistant Administrator
of Air and Radiation.
The personnel changes at the EPA were accompanied by budget cuts to programs across the
agency. This included cuts to the entire EPA budget by 31% in 2018170 and 23% in 2019, as well
as a 90% cut to the EPA’s Atmospheric Protection Program.171
In the first year of his presidency, Trump asserted his affinity for deregulation. In 2017,
President Trump issued an executive order directing all agencies to “repeal at least two existing
regulations for each new regulation.”172 Within the executive order, guidance from the Trump
administration suggested that the “costs of all regulations should be no greater than zero.”173 In
2017, Trump issued an executive order that directed the EPA to review regulations that harmed
jobs in the coal mining industry. As Administrator of the EPA, Scott Pruitt replaced half of the
members of the Board of Scientific Counselors, which advises the EPA on scientific questions
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related to environmental research.174 J.P. Freire stated that the EPA under the Trump
administration was “not going to rubber-stamp the last administration’s appointees.”175 During
the reorganization of scientific boards, the EPA also canceled subcommittees on the environment
for the summer of 2017.
At the international level, the Trump administration offered little input to international
environmental efforts surrounding the Paris climate agreement. At COP 23 in Bonn the Trump
administration sent low-level delegates who used the event to promote nuclear power and fossil
fuels to supply industrializing countries with energy alternatives.176 The United States delegation
to COP 24 again used their platform to promote coal.177 Additionally, at COP 24 the United
States joined with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in a vote against welcoming a report
compiled by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which suggested aggressive action
to avoid a global environmental crisis.178 The Trump administration sent no official delegation to
COP 25 in Madrid. However, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi attended the conference to
reaffirm the United States Congress’ support for the international environmental process.179
Anti-Agenda 21 Movements in the United States
In the United States, opposition to environmental agreements formed with an unexpected
narrative that impacted local authorities and some climate change projects. An anti-Agenda 21
position from the far-right John Birch Society was amplified by conservative radio personalities,
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state legislators, political committees, and presidential candidates. The narrative behind this
stance against Agenda 21 was based in a conspiracy theory involving a UN plot to take away
individual property rights in the United States. This anti-Agenda 21 movement placed pressure
on some local authorities and municipal networks that sought to implement environmental policy
in the spirit of Agenda 21.
In a study of conspiracy theory narratives that drive anti-Agenda 21 movements, Shaffer
identifies the Schiller Institute as the first group to tie Agenda 21 into a larger conspiracy
narrative.180 By means of a document titled “Eco92 Must Be Stopped,”181 the Schiller Institute
tied the Rio Summit and Agenda 21 into a more extensive menagerie of conspiracies that include
a Malthusian New World Order, a “Gaia Cult”, and “technical apartheid.”182 Other early
amplifiers of a conspiracy-driven anti-Agenda 21 message include Tom DeWeese from an
organization called the American Policy Center, which was founded with the mission of stopping
the enforcement of Agenda 21. DeWeese has described Agenda 21 as the “ruling principle of
the revolution” that was a new form of tyranny.183 Framing Agenda 21 as a communist plot,
DeWeese has further described the voluntary environmental agreement as a “blueprint to turn
your community into a little soviet.”184 The John Birch Society was also an early opponent of
Agenda 21 accusing its supporters of joining a world government by creating a document which
they view as comparable to the Ten Commandments.185
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Former radio DJ Glenn Beck has been a vocal critic of Agenda 21 and groups that
promote the non-binding environmental agreement. Mr. Beck first used his radio show, then his
television show, to amplify the message about the dangers presented by Agenda 21. Beck went
so far as to co-author a novel of a dystopian future where the U.N. has instituted a world
government with Agenda 21 as the governing principle. During a segment advertising his book
on Fox News Channel, Beck insisted that the United Nations had formed alliances with local
governments and radical activists, and that his novel captured the possible outcome of this
political union.186
These arguments have taken root with some citizen groups and political figures in the
United States. Though the idea of a freedom-stealing cabal of global elites using the vehicle of
environmental policy was limited to fringe conspiracy theorists for almost 15 years, the antiAgenda 21 movement became more normalized within specific political circles around 2011.
Notable political leaders that amplified the anti-Agenda 21 message include Ted Cruz, Newt
Gingrich, and Jim DeMint. Gingrich, another latecomer to anti-Agenda 21 activism, stated he did
not know about the program until he began his run for President in 2011.187 Gingrich also
highlighted his perception of an “extra-constitutional control” over the citizens of the United
States emanating from Agenda 21 and the United Nations.188 As part of his campaign platform,
Gingrich vowed to fight Agenda 21 projects across the United States. In early 2012 Ted Cruz, a
candidate running for Senate at the time, sat down with the Glenn Beck Radio Program to share
his thoughts on Agenda 21. Cruz claimed that, if left to its own devices, Agenda 21 would
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“undermine property rights,” and “undermine individual liberty” which would push citizens
away from the notion of private property.189
During a winter meeting of party officials planning the Republican National Convention
(RNC) in 2011 a resolution was adopted titled “Resolution Exposing United Nation’s Agenda
21.”190 The resolution framed Agenda 21 as “a comprehensive plan of extreme
environmentalism, social engineering, and global political control.”191 Anti-Agenda 21 language
also appeared in the 54-page platform of the RNC in Tampa in the summer of 2012. Though not
as pointed as the winter meetings, the official RNC platform stated, “We emphatically reject
U.N. Agenda 21 as erosive of American sovereignty, and we oppose any form of U.N. Global
Tax.”192
As the fringe view of Agenda 21 became more accepted within the Republican Party, the
political backlash for local leaders in some areas was swift and devoid of scientific reason. In
Oklahoma, State Senator Sally Kern introduced anti-Agenda 21 legislation saying the plan would
ban cars and remove property rights from American citizens.193 Arizona State Senator Judy
Burges sponsored a bill194 targeting Agenda 21 that would bar the state of Arizona and its
counties and local governments from implementing principles from the Rio Summit.195 In her
opening remarks, Burges said that the “truth contained within this U.N. program depicts
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something sinister and dark.”196 In doing so, she was repeating the fringe argument that the
objectives of Agenda 21 are centered around a “redistribution of wealth” and “control of every
aspect of our lives.”197 Governor of Maine Paul LePage canceled a planned expansion of Route 1
along Maine’s coastline in 2011.198 In development since 2005, Gateway 1 was a project largely
managed by local governments along Route 1 aimed at easing congestion. However, following
protests from Tea Party groups concerned of an Agenda 21 plot to remove property rights the
project was canceled without explanation to local officials. In October of 2012, State Senate
Majority Leader of Georgia Chip Rogers sponsored a closed-door briefing for Republican
legislators in his state about the dangers of Agenda 21. During this four-hour event, Field Searcy,
a Georgia Tea Party member, gave legislators a presentation in which he warned the group that
the Obama Administration was using “mind-control techniques” to implement the global
directive known as Agenda 21.199
The rise of an anti-Agenda 21 wing of the conservative movement in America had
repercussions on networks like ICLEI and local efforts aimed at improving air quality. After
reaching a record 565 members in the United States in 2010, ICLEI experienced a significant
drop of 20% in membership by 2012.200 According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, many of
the cities that left ICLEI did so, at least in part, due to pressure from anti-Agenda 21 groups.201
Furthermore Krause, Yi, and Feiock used the CCPC as a case to study policy termination.202
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Their findings indicated that political ideology was the most significantly correlated indicator of
policy termination. The authors found that during the time period 2007-2012 Republican party
affiliation increased the likelihood of a city terminating their CCPC membership.
The rise of anti-Agenda 21 and Tea Party movements and their impact on public officials,
local environmental projects, and municipal networks203 is noteworthy. The anti-Agenda 21
stance within the American conservative movement placed pressure on city and state leadership,
who were engaged with climate change or sustainability efforts. An organized effort against
environmental policy from the American conservative movement is not a surprising occurrence.
However, the anti-Agenda 21 conspiracy theories that permeated conservative political circles
were surprising, as national political candidates and previous high-level party leaders expressed
their alarm for projects influenced by Agenda 21.

Conclusion
Since the early 1970s, nation states in the international system have taken steps to correct
environmental degradation. Beginning with the Stockholm Conference in 1972, nation states
responded in earnest to global and cross-border environmental issues in conjunction with the
U.N. and the UNEP. The standards defined at Stockholm laid the foundation for environmental
action from nation states during the 1970s and 1980s. Both the Vienna Convention and Montreal
Protocol were significant steps toward nation states committing to the reduction of airborne
contaminants that interfered with human health and environmental systems.
Some local governments and their leaders adjusted policies to align with the objectives of
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol. After the Rio Summit, cities and other non-state
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actors took on a larger role in transnational environmental governance. Additionally, the
UNFCCC created objectives that local governments could utilize to monitor and improve air
quality. Post-Rio, many cities and their networks began to pursue local plans for sustainability,
using chapter 28 of Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC as a guide.
As a TMN, ICLEI offered programs and platforms to cities that helped to amplify the call
for cooperation between local and international climate initiatives. Additionally, ICLEI has
helped to create software, programs, and information sharing systems for cities to diffuse
international environmental standards and policies to the local level.
In both the United States and Canada, some political leaders engaged in international
environmental policy and leadership, but failed at the national level to implementing meaningful
environmental legislation. Presidents have utilized unilateral executive authority to enact
portions of their environmental agenda or as a means to remove environmental policy that
interfered with market growth. Often, congressional impediments stunted or halted the
progression of sound environmental legislation that matched the intensity of international efforts.
Vocal support for a nationally aligned environmental policy that reduced GHG emissions has
been a hallmark of Canadian governments since the 1980s. Nevertheless, many governments
failed to secure the support of provincial leaders, which led to the creation of environmental
policies that relied heavily on voluntary measures. In both counties, the absence of a federal
government response forced many governments below the nation state level to consider action
aimed at protecting environmental resources.
As some local governments and their networks pursued local action to improve air
quality, pushback grew from an anti-Agenda 21 movement that was eventually adopted by some
in the conservative party in the United States. Additionally, the anti-Agenda 21 language inserted
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into the RNC platform and the political figures asserting the dangers of Agenda 21 placed
pressure on some projects at the state and city level. This shows the risk involved for some
municipal leaders when engaging in environmental policy in American cities. Conservative
Canadian political leadership does not seem to have adopted the conspiracy driven stance of their
American counterparts.
Some questions emerge after covering the histories of international environmental policy,
municipal networks, and federal environmental efforts in the US and Canada. How is federal
leadership from the US and Canada reflective of rogue state behavior within the international
climate regime? Additionally, the pushback against Agenda 21 and international environmental
agreements from fringe conservative groups placed additional pressure on some subnational
governments and local GHG mitigation activity. Has opposition to environmental policy
development deterred cities and networks in the United States and Canada from pursing GHG
mitigation efforts? I return to this question in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter Two: Theory
Introduction
The history outlined in Chapter One presents the possibility that cities and their networks
may disseminate international environmental norms. My research seeks to measure this
possibility. Literature on multilevel governance provides a framework for understanding the
interactions across multiple levels of governments. Constructivism emphasizes the ideational
structures and norms that shape the perspectives of actors engaged in governance. Within
constructivism, the norm life cycle offers a way to chart the progress of actors involved in the
process of norm promotion, diffusion, and leadership. Furthermore, both multilevel governance
and constructivism decenter the nation state and emphasize the role of subnational and
supranational actors. I apply the norm life cycle to strategies of decarbonization in order to
clarify the roles of cities and TMNs in the diffusion of international environmental norms.

International Relations Theories
The 1980s marked a period of transition and restructuring that helped to clarify
contending perspectives among International Relations theories. Structural realism and liberal
institutionalism agreed on the premise of general anarchy in the international system. However,
these perspectives disagreed on how power was distributed among nation states and how they
cooperated in response to international pressure. Scholars also disagreed to what degree
international institutions and building international regimes helped to improve nation state
security.
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Structural realism204 emerged as an updated variant of realism, with an emphasis on the
structure of the international system. For structural realists, the anarchic structure of the
international system generated pressure and insecurity for nation states, which reoriented their
preferences and behaviors. These scholars assert that the anarchic structure caused states to
pursue power within the international system for their own protection. While they believed that
the needs of nation states were similar in the international system, the distribution of capabilities
among nation states was not. Structural realists’ interest in the polarity of power compelled them
to explore further how nation states approach each other in competition. This polarity has
changed through time, with eras of unipolarity,205 bipolarity,206 and multipolar systems207
marking different moments.
Liberal scholars accepted the general anarchy of the international system but emphasized
the role that international institutions play in facilitating cooperation between nation states.
Liberal institutionalists208 carried out research projects that focused on the complex
interdependence of nation states where cooperation can be tenuous. In the creation of these
international organizations and institutions, nation states avoided conflict by increasing state-tostate contact and communication. This process of cooperation by means of international
agreements and IGOs established credibility among nation states, whether through trade or work
in IGOs. For liberal institutionalist scholars, when nations states adhere to the rules and norms of
international institutions, they refrain from pursuing purely national interests.209 This
arrangement brought nation states into stable relationships based on a mutual interest in global
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capital.210 These scholars identified a cooperative interdependence maintained in the absence of a
hegemon. For realists, and structural realists, a nation state can ignore international conventions
if the agreement is not beneficial to that nation state.
Within neoliberal institutionalism, regime theory explores the driving forces behind stateto-state cooperation. This area of research uses rational choice and game theory to explain stateto-state cooperation, in the context of international regimes. Krasner defined these regimes as
“principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations
converge in a given issue-area.”211 His concept posits regimes as an “intervening variable”
separating causal factors212 and state behavior.213 However, regime theory is most reliable when
analyzing institutions that align norms in specific issue areas, such as war, trade, human rights,
and CFC emissions. Nation states cooperate with the expectation of advancing new standards of
behavior. The neoliberal institutionalist conception of state cooperation emphasizes activity in
the international system via IGOs and supranational actors.
My research emphasizes the role of cities and TMNs in the diffusion of norms. Therefore,
I have chosen to analyze this question using constructivism because the various other
international relations theories do not focus on subnational governments and TMNs as significant
actors. Structural realism places such an emphasis on nation states, and their capabilities, that it
presents a conflict in the analysis of subnational actors in norm diffusion. Liberalism takes into
account those factors and institutions that enable more expansive cooperation within the
international system. However, liberal institutionalist scholars leave little to no room for a
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subnational unit of analysis. The essential problem with structural realism and liberal
institutionalism, as a framework for this research, is the centrality of the nation state. In the next
section, I look to literature that attempted to explain the diffusion of power in an evolving system
of multilevel governance.

Multilevel Governance and Global Environmental Governance
Research on multilevel governance explains the interaction between various levels of
governance and highlights shifting relationship of power between these levels. My research
necessitates an approach that takes into account actors above and below the level of the nation
state. Therefore, I am using a multilevel governance framework in order to center subnational
and supranational actors, specifically cities and TMNs. Furthermore, this scholarship explains
how levels of government interact within a governance structure where state power has become
diffuse. This literature aids my research by framing the role of cities and their networks in
environmental policymaking.
Research in globalization studies, multilevel governance, and network studies points to a
role for non-state, supranational, and subnational actors. During the 1990s, scholars recognized
the changing dynamics between levels of governments and began to address these changes in
literature.
Hooghe and Marks addressed and organized literature that explored the decentralization
of authority and emerging forms of governance.214 The authors identified studies in disciplines
throughout the social sciences that analyzed “multilevel governance, multi-tiered governance,
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polycentric governance, multi-perspectival governance.”215 Literature related to this emerging
form of governance tended to coalesce in two approaches to analyze multileveled governance.
Hooghe and Marks categorized these approaches as Type I and Type II.
Type I Governance is characterized by jurisdictions that are limited to the international,
national, meso, and local.216 In these general-purpose arrangements, jurisdictional memberships
are territorially separated and do not intersect at the highest and lowest levels. Scholars who
utilized a Type I approach to viewing multilevel governance have often cited the E.U. as the best
example of a governmental structure with strong, nested institutions that exist at the
supranational and subnational levels. These bodies can create regional and foreign policy, as well
as set benchmarks for areas like commerce and human rights.217 While the central government of
the nation state plays a role in the process of policy creation and integration, as is the case for the
E.U., local governments and supranational entities also have a degree of agency in the process.
Local governments and supranational entities can include units of analysis like cities and
transnational networks.218
A type II multilevel governance structure, or task-specific jurisdiction, is one where
jurisdictions of varying levels may operate and coordinate on a specific policy issue.219
Essentially, this approach recognizes the various overlapping jurisdictions that come together to
deal with problems like climate change, global health initiatives, and other initiatives driven
within a community. Type II approaches to governance include a multitude of members,
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including supranational institutions, central governments, regional governments, local
governments, and NGOs. Examples from the United States include “special districts” that bring
overlapping jurisdictions together. These districts coordinate and address issues related to water,
transit, and other utilities that cross state and sometimes municipal boundaries.220 Census data
indicates the vast majority of these special districts are “single-function districts.”221 Local
governments in European nation states have engaged in climate change policy coordination with
regional and supranational partners in order to mitigate climate change.222 The actors involved in
this Type of multilevel governance are varied and include transnational networks, TMNs, NGOs,
and other supranational and subnational units.223
Corfee-Morlot et al. used a Type I multilevel governance framework to consider the
evolving governance structure surrounding environmental climate regimes. Applying their focus
to regional and local entities’ interaction in climate governance, the authors attempted to identify
“what is good practice?” in terms of multilevel governance. This research used the practices of
cities and regions in climate initiatives to provide an overview of top-down, bottom-up, and
models of policy diffusion. The findings indicate that a lack of nation state support sometimes
hinders local authorities. As a starting point to improve multilevel governance function, three
tools were suggested:
•

Improve GHG reporting systems for local governments
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•
•

New, more regionalized research programs that bring together local expertise and
expert information exchange
Develop and enhance urban policy networks; include groups from civil society

The studies above suggest, that over the past 30 years, the power of the state has become
diffuse. My research utilizes a multilevel governance approach in order to center non-nation state
actors. Because I examine the role of cities in an evolving multilevel system of environmental
governance, this framework is useful in explaining how different entities interact across a system
of many actors.

Transnational Municipal Networks
The literature on multilevel, multilateral cooperation, and polycentric governance sought
to explain the decentering of state authority, and how new actors or institutions might claim new
power in a multilevel governance structure.224 The proliferation of municipal networks, both
transnational and regional, provided a way for scholars to look at the rising power of local
authorities. The studies below help to illustrate the role of TMNs engaged with cities and central
governments in a multilevel structure. This literature is central to my research as I analyze the
impact of TMN membership on the local environmental norms of cities. Furthermore, this
literature helps to clarify what types of cities join TMNs, how they are internally governed, the
impact of such networks on local environmental policy, and how these networks proliferated
globally.
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Early research on the emergence of TMNs in Europe used multilevel governance as a
framework from which to approach questions of decentralization of state power. Bulkeley et al.
looked at the expanding role of TMNs in European environmental governance.225 Their study
provided multiple conceptualizations of these networks based on how they engaged with
environmental efforts in Europe. The authors noted that scholars used both Type I and Type II
multilevel governance frameworks to analyze the position of TMNs in environmental policy
diffusion. Through an analysis of multiple studies, Bulkeley et al. suggested that TMNs impact
policy processes by:
1. Dispersing best practices by creating knowledge sharing processes that help local
authorities shape municipal environmental policy
2. Lobbying the E.U. to influence the direction of policy
3. Using their position as “implementation agencies” within the arena of European
policy.
4. Creating and promoting policy, which brings together local, national, and
international actors.226
Some researchers analyzing the role of networked governance were focused on with the
internal organization of transnational networks. Kern and Bulkeley used theories of
Europeanization and network governance to find out if TMNs make a difference at the local,
national, or European level. Their research combined interviews and case studies to assess the
impact of these networks.227 The authors assign three characteristics to TMNs. First, city
membership in such a network is entirely voluntary. Second, TMNs are self-governing, with
non-hierarchical structures. Third, while NGOs lobby governments to implement policies, TMN
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members implement policies directly.228 Their findings suggest that TMNs provide a path for
supranational entities, like the European Commission, to interact with local authorities without
involving the nation state. The authors also assert the internal governance of TMNs trended
towards a laissez-faire approach that does not actively seek to hold members accountable to
network benchmarks. This internal approach to TMN organization means that TMNs are, in most
cases, “networks of pioneers for pioneers.”229 Passive members of a TMN may not have the
resources to move forward with environmental benchmarking locally. The benefits of TMN
membership accrue to those cities most actively engaged with environmental policy locally and
those cities that seek to influence dialogue within international climate regimes.
In an analysis of the CCPC, Betsill and Bulkeley examined how TMNs interact with their
members to foster knowledge sharing, learning, and local policy change.230 Their research used
case studies of six cities231 to analyze the local practices and integration of CCPC programs on
member cities. In only two cases, Denver and Newcastle, did cities integrate and advance the
policies promoted by the CCPC into “the institutional structure and policy practices of local
government.”232 Additionally, both of these cities contributed the majority of information on best
practices back to the CCPC. The authors assert that those cities most engaged with the TMN
were less concerned with technical guidance and best practices, and more focused on the
political and financial benefits that membership in the CCPC could provide.
Some cities do not have the resources to participate in proposed network benchmarks,
network hosted conferences, and other activities. Cities must be willing to commit to dialogue
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related to best practices in GHG mitigation and to coordinate with a horizontal network of other
city members.233 Those cities that are most engaged in the TMN may participate in the vertical
aspect of the network, which is to lobby central governments for a particular norm or policy
through international conferences. Some scholars define the most active members of TMNs as
“pioneering cities” that join networks early and are usually active in their engagement with other
cities.234 However, TMNs like ICLEI are not exclusively for urban environmental pioneers.
TMNs create guidelines for local governments for action, emission monitoring software, and
mitigation programs that can also influence those cities not engaged at the level of Denver or
Newcastle.
Some research has illustrated the different ways pioneering and laggard cities benefit
from TMN membership. Busch, Bendlin, and Fenton highlight the impact of TMNs on cities that
traditionally lag in response to environmental issues.235 The researchers used a survey instrument
to assess the experiences of 136 German cities in developing local environmental policy and the
influence of TMNs in that process.236 From their analysis, the authors found that TMNs
influenced local governments by:
•

•

Enabling Internal Mobilization: Internal mobilization includes a rising awareness among
citizens, policymakers, and community stakeholders. Various cities reported that joining
a TMN coincided with an increase in public participation and a demand for climate
change mitigation strategies from citizens.
Formulating Emission Reduction Targets: Upon joining a TMN, cities commit to enact
some form of emission reduction strategy. In setting benchmarks and offering blueprints
for local action, TMNs provide city leaders and local proponents of sustainability
strategies to move forward with local initiatives.
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•

Direct Information Exchange: TMN membership allows local leaders to access the
expertise of other urban environmental leaders, the staff of a TMN, and scientific
knowledge that helps local action progress.

The authors were cautious about the positive impact that Transnational Municipal Climate
Networks (TMCNs) might have on cities that have pioneered climate policy.237 Their caution is
in part because municipalities that lag in response to environmental action gain the most benefit
from membership processes that emphasize institutionalizing the objectives related to climate
change. Pioneering cities had already institutionalized many of these processes and were more
interested in network functions that emphasized financial project support, green city branding,
and lobbying national and international entities.
Other research seeks to understand the role of TMNs within a framework of climate
governance that involves supra-national, regional entities, and non-state actors. Hoffmann asserts
that nation states’ failure to address climate change in the international system has led to the
emergence of new actors to address the oncoming climate crisis. 238 With this in mind, local
governments and TMNs are recognized as new environmental actors. The author noted for
instance that most TMNs conduct “governance experiments,” where they “engaged in explicitly
making rules that shape how communities respond to climate change.”239 The author’s central
question is concerned with the effectiveness of these governance experiments in the face of
stalled nation state efforts to address international climate issues. Hoffmann signals that these
governance experiments are important sources of momentum and action for climate initiatives.
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However, the author cautions that these experiments are too early in their existence to be deemed
successful and would not replace the multilateral treaty system anytime in the near future.240
Often TMNs are used in research as an indicator of a local governments’ commitment to
environmental policy. Brody et al. used the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) as a
baseline indicator of a city’s commitment to environmental policy on GHG mitigation.241 Their
analysis found that the impact of the CCPC on local governments is dependent on a city’s
capacity242 and commitment from public and private stakeholders. Brody et al. used CCPC
participation as a measurement of municipal commitment to environmental policy.243 Using a
sample of 3101 counties in the U.S., they identified characteristics that impact a city’s
commitment to environmental policy change.244 The researchers’ central question asked why
cities would voluntarily commit to the CCPC campaign “when there are powerful incentives to
do otherwise.”245 To answer this question, Brody et al. analyzed three models to explain why
cities commit to voluntary environmental action. The three models were risk, stress, and
opportunity.246 Using a binary regression model, the researchers established log-odds that

240

Hoffmann, Climate governance at the crossroads.
Zahran, S., Grover, H., Brody, S. D., and Vedlitz, A. “Risk, stress, and capacity: Explaining metropolitan
commitment to climate protection,” Urban affairs review, (2008) 43(4), 447-474; Zahran, S., Brody, S. D., Vedlitz,
A., Grover, H., and Miller, C. “Vulnerability and capacity: explaining local commitment to climate-change
policy,” Environment and Planning C: Government and policy, (2008) 26(3), 544-562; Brody et. al., A spatial
analysis of local climate change policy in the United States.
242
Capacity refers to a city’s availability of funds and municipal control over factors of development.
243
Brody et. al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States”.
244
Using counties as the unit of analysis seems to create problems with construct validity. While the CCPC is aimed
at cities being the main participant, Brody et al. scaled up the dependent variable to represent counties. If a city
within a county is a participant in the CCPC, the county receives a 1. Those counties without a participating city,
receive a 0. The authors used the example of Florida, where the majority of participants in the CCPC were counties,
as the reason for scaling up this variable. With this in mind, it is difficult to determine if the regional effect of cities
participating in the CCPC represents a commitment (and support) from the surrounding localities that represent the
county at large.
245
Brody et. al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States,” 34.
246
Brody et. al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States.”: The variables that make up
the risk model include, coastal proximity, extreme weather causalities, and expected temperature change. Variables
included in the stress model included emissions per capita, light transportation, and carbon-intensive industries.
Climate opportunity model uses proportion of environmental non-profits, solar energy use, and proportion of college
educated.
241

73

provided odds ratios representing the likelihood of city commitment to the CCPC. The results of
the binary regression suggest significance across all models and variables, with the exception of
solar energy use.247 This research helps scholars understand what factors help develop or inhibit
local climate change policy and membership in TMNs.
Other research used global cities to analyze the impact of TMN membership on
municipal climate policy. In an analysis of 57 C40 cities, Lee and Koski explore the relationship
between membership in TMNs and climate change action at the municipal level.248 The central
question for this research is: what effect does membership in environmental networks have on
climate change mitigation at the city level? Variables representing climate change mitigation
activity included setting reduction targets, planning local policies, and implementing local
policies.249 The analysis used an ordered logit model to measure the strategies of local actors
who were members of the C40. Their findings suggest that among C40 cities, those who were
also CCPC members were “much more likely to engage in more difficult and impactful climate
change mitigation actions.”250
Krause categorized the CCPC and Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA) as
policy networks in a study that examines to what degree participation in climate networks
influence “GHG-related activity.”251 The author used questionnaires to compile data related to
GHG mitigation efforts of over 300 U.S. cities. The results of their analysis indicate that
membership in the MCPA constitutes policy signaling but “does not effectively stimulate cities
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to take additional definitive steps to reduce their GHG-emissions.”252 The lack of impact could
be due to several factors including low cost to join the mayoral network, no monitoring activity
on behalf of the network, and local officials joining the network as symbolic policy.
Furthermore, the findings showed that CCPC members were more effective in promoting local
GHG reduction at the city-level.253 However, the impact itself was minimal to moderate. The
author stressed that the research did not assess the effectiveness of individual city programs
related to GHG emission reduction.
Additional literature that examined the historical development of an urban response to
climate change noted the importance of TMNs and the evolution of municipal networks since the
1990s. Bulkeley recognized two distinct ‘waves’ of municipal responses to climate change.254
The author asserted that these waves of action were in response to a growing dissatisfaction with
international progress on environmental protection and the restructuring of political authority.
The first wave was identified by scholars in the 1990s who were interested in the activities of
local authorities in their engagement with climate issues. Following the Toronto Climate
Conference in 1988,255 a small group of pioneering cities helped drive a conversation
surrounding urban sustainability. Local leaders from these cities were instrumental in the
creation and success of TMNs like ICLEI, Climate Alliance Europe, and energie-cites. Each of
these networks were transnational in their membership with similar goals that helped cities
overcome issues with implementing local plans for energy efficiency, climate change, and
sustainability.
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Bulkeley suggested that a “second wave” of municipal action emerged in the early 2000s
with the rise of a “new generation of municipal networks.”256 One important development among
the new generation of municipal networks is that their work is focused within the boundaries of a
nation state or economic community. For example, MCPA membership is limited to mayors of
cities in the United States who commit to reducing GHG emissions. Another important
difference of municipal networks in the second generation is that they build relationships with
private actors who share influence with members of the network. One example of this
cooperation includes the C40 joining with the Clinton Foundation and the Clinton Climate
Initiative, to create GHG emissions software for local authorities and business owners.257
Viewing the municipal response to climate change through waves helps to account for the
proliferation of municipal networks around 2003. Furthermore, the history of the municipal
response to climate change is a critical area of research to view the restructuring of political
authority discussed in the previous section.
To summarize, scholars have analyzed reasons why cities join TMNs,258 what types of
cities follow through with environmental policy creation,259 and possible “waves” of municipal
response to climate change.260 Since TMNs are central to my research, these studies are useful in
clarifying the differences between governance structures in the EU and North America and how
it impacts TMN membership and the power of cities engaged in environmental policy. The
framework of the EU provides TMNs with a more formal position within environmental
governance than in the United States and Canada. This makes it easier for cities and their
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networks to coordinate environmental policy from the local to the supranational level in the EU,
removing unnecessary central government interaction. In the United States and Canada, cities
and their networks have engaged with environmental policy development, in the absence of
consistent central government directions for GHG monitoring and mitigation. In fact, both of
these governments have been unable or unwilling to put forward environmental policy that
matches the intensity of international GHG mitigation goals. It is this type of inaction that forced
many local leaders to consider an urban response to climate change. Scholars like Bulkeley
recognize the importance of the municipal response to climate change as a key site from which to
analyze the restructuring of nation state authority in a system of multilevel governance. With this
in mind, my research seeks to fill a gap in literature that addresses the diffusion of environmental
norms within non-compliant states by TMNs and their members.

Constructivism
The essential problem with neorealism and liberalism as a framework for this research is
the centrality of the nation state. Criticisms of neorealism and liberalism centered on a lack of
attention to other factors that contributed to outcomes in global relations and the behavior of
nation states. The multilevel governance literature attempts to fill this gap by beginning to
document the patterns of interaction among sub-national, nation state, and supranational actors
when addressing governance functions. While all the trends in the multilevel governance
literature are not yet clearly identifiable, these authors agree that the power of the nation-state is
being diffused and that the roles of cities and of TMNs in this diffusion warrant further
investigation.
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One way to continue the investigation is through the guidance of Constructivist theory
because it considers two potentially relevant factors neglected by both neorealism and liberalism
in their essential focus on the centrality of the nation state: norms based ideational structures
underlying state behavior and the role of actors other than nation-states such as TMNs and
cities.261 During the 1980s, a small group of scholars began to develop new avenues of research
that emphasized the social construction of identity and its impact on state behavior. Against the
backdrop of this scholarly debate, constructivism distinguished itself by emphasizing the social
construction of meanings and identities. Constructivist critiques pointed to realism’s lack of
interest in the identity of nation states and how their interests and preferences are shaped.262
Early constructivists questioned the foundational principles of realism and liberalism, because
they were preoccupied with how nation states approached and conceptualized ideas like “selfhelp,” “power politics,” and “anarchy.” While realist and liberal scholars viewed nation states as
interacting with predetermined interests, constructivists attempted to uncover the sources of these
interests. Constructivist scholars emphasized ideas and norms, over the distribution of
capabilities and material interests of actors in the international system. They argued that it is
through ideational and normative structures that the interests and actions of actors emerge.263 For
constructivist theorists, the knowledge and practices of actors develop structures that, in turn,
condition the identity and interests of those actors.
In the 1990s, constructivist scholars noted an obfuscation of individuals and non-state
actors and their impact on the policy and norms of nation states in the international system.264 By
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decentering the nation state in their research platform, scholars sought to identify the practices of
agents and how they shape state interests. Some notable developments in constructivism include
analyses of epistemic communities,265 Transnational Advocacy Networks,266 and norm life
cycles.267

Second Generation Constructivism
Multiple research projects have separated the work of constructivist scholars into distinct
generations. For example, Widmaier and Park identified three “generations” of constructivism.268
Similarly, Kessler and Steele chart the differences between the work of constructivist scholars
through the 1980s to the 2010s in their attempt to identify a third generation.269 The first
generation was a critique focused almost exclusively on structural realism and liberalism. The
second generation focused on units other than the nation state.270 Widmaier and Park assert that
third generation constructivists emphasized the psychology of individuals and how their
emotions impact societal change.
Within the constructivist perspective, first and third generations are not applicable to this
proposed analysis. First generation constructivism does not apply to this study as its driving
force is to challenge the dominance of structural realism and the view of how nation states
conceive of their interests. This generation explained how societal interests aid in shaping the
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interests of nation states and how this leads to specific patterns of behavior between nation
states.271 The research program from first generation constructivists does not allow for analyses
of individual actors and units of governance below the state level. In so far as it would be
possible to study the environmental policy of nation states from this perspective, it would be
virtually impossible to conduct an analysis of transnational or municipal units and their
influence.
Third generation constructivism is more focused on the beliefs of individuals and how
they are influenced by a range of psychological issues.272 This generation of constructivism
borrows from sociology and psychology to such a degree that an analysis of municipal action
related to environmental policy would require a qualitative study of individuals who are in policy
formation positions. This is because it looks at factors that influence the ideas that people
eventually advocate when they are making policy.
The theoretical focus for this dissertation will be second generation constructivism
because it is the most useful in an analysis of how norms influence policy-related choices of
subnational units like cities. This generation of constructivism allows for an analysis of the
mobilization of ideas, from municipalities and TMNs, that seek to change existing urban
environmental norms. The life cycle of norms, as framed by Finnemore and Sikkink,273 provides
a structure from which to analyze the impact of norm entrepreneurs and other influencers of
norm emergence and diffusion.
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Second generation constructivist researchers described the role of international
organizations in the formation of state interests and perception of those interests.274 These
scholars focused on how norms and shared ideals structure how nation states approach each other
in the international system. As the framework developed, scholars began to place a more
considerable emphasis on norm formation and diffusion. Furthermore, they included an analysis
of non-state actors that play a role in changing extant norms and shifting the perceptions of
nation states. Constructivism allows for an analysis of the mobilization of ideas, from
municipalities and TMNs, that challenge extant norms and advocate for new norms. The life
cycle of norms, as framed by Finnemore and Sikkink,275 provides a structure from which to
analyze the impact of norm entrepreneurs and other influencers of norm emergence and
diffusion.

Norms Defined
The description of norms is vague, and academics from varying fields have sought to
create a functional definition. Scholars from sociology, political science, law, and other fields
have shaped the meaning of norms to fit their generalized areas of interest. However, in most
academic fields, the definition of norms has been left intentionally broad. This ambiguity makes
it difficult to analyze the role that norms generally play.
Krasner defines norms as “the standard of behavior regarding rights and obligations.”276
The author’s goal was to frame the dynamics of international regimes. Krasner offered a
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workable definition of norms that informed future research and created space for a discussion
about norms in the field of international relations.
Katzenstein added to the definition of norms. In assessing the nation state’s position in
international security regimes, he defined a norm as the “collective expectation for the proper
behavior of actors with a given identity.”277 Both Krasner and Katzenstein were interested in the
ways that international regimes and security arrangements between countries impacted nation
state behavior. These authors assert that a norm is the standard of expected nation state behavior.
The standard is adopted through behavior that is compelled by expectations of group interests or
social attitudes but not necessarily enforced through institutions of governance. Due in part to
their focus, both authors’ definitions did little to illuminate a deeper meaning of norms.
Other scholars proposed using a broad definition of norms. For example, Sunstein
described norms as “social attitudes of approval or disapproval, specifying what ought to be done
and what ought not to be done.”278 He proposed a broad definition of norms that he applied to the
study of law and bifurcated them into social and regulatory categories.279 This distinction is
helpful when analyzing how different aspects of norms impact public policy. The author’s
conceptualization of the legal impact of norms allowed space for a discussion on the reciprocal
influence of laws and civil society on social norms. Sunstein’s research into norms emphasized
how they were developed from social attitudes and diffused through law. Noting the codification
of some norms into law, Sunstein highlighted the role of government and influential individuals
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in promoting new social norms. He focused on the implementation of new domestic legal norms
and their impact on citizens.280
Individuals and organizations are also influential in promoting new norms. While the role
of legal systems and political elites is essential in understanding social norms, other actors
influence social behaviors and advocate for new laws. Sunstein identified “norm entrepreneurs”
as individual agents who occupy a power position within influential social movements or
political circles, and who seek to alter or change existing norms.281 These norm entrepreneurs
utilized “fragile” social conditions to their advantage in their personal or organizational
challenges to existing norms. For example, during civil rights demonstrations in the United
States, norm entrepreneurs like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others from the broader civil
rights movement, illustrated the need to change prevailing social norms related to racial
discrimination. The movement was able to sway public opinion by openly challenging existing
laws and social norms related to the unequal treatment of American citizens based on race.
As the social cost to individuals who follow new norms lessens, a process of “norm
bandwagoning” begins.282 As more individuals adopt a rising social norm, a “tipping point” is
reached. When a society moves beyond the tipping point of acceptance, a “norm cascade”
begins.283 For example, the Civil Rights Movement helped to challenge social and legal norms
that compelled Congressional action in 1964. Prevailing social attitudes about a rising norm can
lead to segments of society advocating for changes to existing norms. However, the purveyors of
existing norms will be reluctant to accept a new norm and often push back against those
individuals, organizations, or governments advocating in favor of the new norm.
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Norms in Second Generation Constructivism
Drawing on the research of Krasner,284 Katzenstein,285 and Sunstein,286 Finnemore and
Sikkink attempted to detail a three-stage life cycle of norms in the international system.287 The
first stage of the norm life cycle, which Finnemore and Sikkink label as norm emergence, is
driven by “norm entrepreneurs” and norm advocates, mainly at domestic levels. The authors
theorized that norm entrepreneurs, and their organizational platforms, are central to the first stage
of the life cycle of norms. The authors noted that new norms enter into a “highly contested
normative space where they must compete with other norms.”288 During norm emergence,
persuasion is the dominant mechanism used by norm entrepreneurs to convince nation state
leaders to adopt a new norm. Norm entrepreneurs are essential actors that have framed and
educated nation states and their leaders on the benefits of altering social or legal norms. In the
case of many adopted norms, small organizations or individuals began to advocate for new
standards of appropriate behavior in their respective societies. Those who advocate for new
norms do so out of ideational commitment, altruism, or empathy.289 Nadelmann analyzed norms
related to prohibition, finding that “transnational moral entrepreneurs” operated in domestic and
international settings to lobby for changes in legal norms.290 According to Nadelmann, moral
entrepreneurs often proposed prohibition laws because of moral or ethical concerns.291
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Norm entrepreneurs act “as agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt
new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international
standards.”292 When norm entrepreneurs convince government officials to advocate in favor of a
specific norm, those governments become “norm leaders.” According to Finnemore and Sikkink,
during norm emergence, as domestic norm entrepreneurs and networks continue to persuade
nation states to adopt norms, a “tipping point” is reached. 293 The number of countries required to
adopt a norm in order to reach the tipping point is dependent on the norm in question. Ramirez,
Soysal, and Shanahan found that one-third of the total nation states in the system represented a
tipping point in the fight for women’s suffrage.294 Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink noted
that one-third of nation state support was a tipping point for anti-landmine norms.295
As a critical mass of actors comes to support a new norm, a tipping point is achieved and
marks a transition into the second stage of the norm life cycle: norm cascade. During norm
cascade, the central actors are nation states, IGOs, and networks.296 Much of the pressure during
the first stage comes from domestic norm entrepreneurs, with some international support.
However, the second stage is characterized by the adoption of norms, even in the absence of
domestic pressure.297
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the second stage of the norm life cycle involves a
cascade of acceptance of the norm as it is adopted by a critical mass of nation states. The
relevant actors during this stage of the life cycle are states, IGOs, and networks.298 Within the
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norm life cycle, some nation states are more important than others in terms of a norm’s adoption.
Finnemore and Sikkink noted the presence of “critical states” in the norm life cycle. These
critical actors “are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is
compromised.”299 The authors used the case of an anti-landmine norm to highlight the need to
gain support from nation states that produced landmines. While the support of those countries
that did not produce landmines was welcome, these nation states could not appropriately affect
cutting production of the weapon. It was only when landmine producing countries, like France
and Great Britain, gave their support to an anti-landmine treaty that the norm began to cascade.
This example shows the importance of critical state support for a norm’s adoption. In cases
where state leaders support an emergent norm, institutionalization plays a significant role in
moving beyond the first stage of the norm life cycle.
During the second stage of the norm life cycle, socialization is utilized as a mechanism
by nation states where “new states are induced to change their behavior by adopting those norms
preferred by an international society of states.”300 The institutionalization of norms by
supranational actors, like IGOs, help to achieve higher rates of socialization. Norms that are
institutionalized by international law at the U.N., or other influential IGOs, are more likely to be
accepted by a large number of nation states. The institutionalization of norms addressing
weapons proliferation, trade, and human rights led to a significant rise in nation state acceptance
and norm adoption. As norms are institutionalized and codified by international law, norm
leaders as a group often take a position that punishes norm-breaking by rogue states. Nonfollowers of emerging norms may face regional or global scrutiny if they decide not to follow
norm leaders. At the regional level, Klotz likened this process to “peer pressure” that might
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compel countries to adopt the norms of neighboring nation states.301 During a norm cascade,
non-conforming states become more reflexive about their position in the international system. A
change in norms of a nation state may speed up the process of normative change to its
neighbors.302
With this pressure in mind, Finnemore and Sikkink theorized that legitimation,
conformity, and esteem represent motivations for nation states to follow norms during the second
stage of a norm’s life cycle. Some theorists viewed this process as one where “social proof” is
offered by nation states to express that they belong.303 Scholars have noted nation state
legitimation as a central motivation for norm adoption during the second stage of the norm life
cycle. Nation states that refused to adopt norms during norm cascade, especially those that have
been institutionalized, run the risk of being labeled as “rogue states.” Under those conditions, a
nation state would expect to experience a decline in international trust and reputation that could
undercut domestic legitimacy.304
The third and final stage, norm internalization, involves full acceptance of a norm by
nation states and their domestic institutions.305 As norms internalize, they produce domestic legal
barriers to norm-breaking, such as women’s suffrage or the treatment of prisoners of war.
Processes of socialization proliferate through professional training and bureaucratic structures
endogenous to nation states. In the case of women’s suffrage, nation states employed an array of
legal and social mechanisms to ensure that subnational governments followed the norm. As
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institutionalization and habit continue to reinforce a norm, it attains a taken for granted quality.
At this final stage of the norm life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink depict norms as having an
“oughtness” that permeates social and private life.306

Decarbonization in History
As discussed in Chapter 1, international efforts to improve air quality began at the
Stockholm Conference. Plans for international action that monitored and sought to mitigate
anthropogenic carbon emissions were introduced by way of the Vienna Convention. The
Montreal Protocol expanded decarbonization efforts by creating binding agreements that
compelled nation states to act. Additionally, Montreal enumerated particular types of carbon that
should be phased out. The UNFCCC focused on decarbonization by creating a framework for
nation states to address GHGs. Kyoto amended the UNFCCC by setting timelines and targets for
nation states to follow.
Cities began to adopt the objectives of decarbonization that were established at the
international level. Starting after Montreal, some cities passed local ordinances that aligned with
international climate agreements. With the help of the UNEP, local authorities formed ICLEI in
order to organize and network to achieve urban sustainability. ICLEI attended the Rio Summit,
leading a delegation of local authorities, which brought cities into decarbonization efforts at the
international level. Then, ICLEI developed blueprints for local action based on international
agreements. Through sustained interaction at the international level, ICLEI and its members were
recognized by nation states as stakeholders within an international climate change regime.
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Terminology
Decarbonization as a process is the reduction in the intensity of anthropogenic GHG
emissions.307 The term originated in the energy production sector, which emphasized alternatives
to carbon intensive energy production, like coal plants.308 Other industries have adopted this
term. Policy research, from industries including road transportation,309 maritime services,310 and
other private sectors311 recognized the need to make changes that reduce GHG emissions. For
these industries, decarbonization is discussed in terms of strategies. I seek to create a delineation
of decarbonization that is broad enough to apply to multiple industries and governments, but
specific enough to measure. Therefore, I define decarbonization as the monitoring and mitigation
of GHG emissions.

Decarbonization as a Norm
A norm is the standard of appropriate behavior for an actor with a given identity.312 The
norm central to this research is decarbonization. The goal of a decarbonization norm is the
reduction of anthropogenic GHG emissions to a net zero status. In order to reach this goal,
governments must be willing to take critical first steps that account for emissions and make
changes to existing practices that can reduce an emissions footprint. For this research, two
appropriate technical steps towards decarbonization are:
1. Developing a system to monitor GHG emissions
307

Kanoh, Tokio. "Toward dematerialization and decarbonization." Science and Sustainability (Selected Papers on
IIASA 20th Anniversary- Laxenburg: IIASA) (1992): 63-94.
308
Messner, Sabine, and Nebojša Nakićenović. "A comparative assessment of different options to reduce CO2
emissions." Energy Conversion and Management 33.5-8 (1992): 763-771.
309
Hughes, Peter. "The role of passenger transport in CO2 reduction strategies." Energy Policy 19.2 (1991): 149160; Roy, R. “The evolution of ecodesign.” Technovation, 14(6), (1994): 363-380.
310
Psaraftis, H. N. “Decarbonization of maritime transport: to be or not to be?” Maritime Economics &
Logistics, 21(3), (2019): 353-371.
311
Rockström, Johan, et al. "A roadmap for rapid decarbonization." Science 355.6331 (2017): 1269-1271.
312
Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”.

89

2. Developing an action plan that includes steps to reduce GHG emissions

These steps are viewed as benchmarks at multiple levels of government, including cities. Ideally,
these steps precede policies to reduce GHG emissions. This could include local policy that
updates building codes, transportation systems, and energy sectors in a way that moves a city
closer to decarbonization. However, my research is focused on the technical steps of local
governments’ decarbonization efforts and not on the subsequent steps needed to reduce GHG
locally.

The Norm Life Cycle: Decarbonization
As mentioned earlier, international efforts to create standards aimed at improving air
quality through monitoring and removal of atmospheric pollutants began in earnest in the 1970s.
Norm entrepreneurs from Sweden initiated the Stockholm Conference. The conference initiated a
monitoring process that was coordinated by the UNEP and carried out by Global Environmental
Monitoring System (GEMS).313 As a part of the norm life cycle, the establishment of the UNEP
and GEMS was the starting point of an international decarbonization norm. After more nation
states began to support this emerging norm, international action following Stockholm intensified
and clarified efforts beyond monitoring and establishing baseline inventories.
Following Stockholm, the decarbonization norm continued to develop within the first
stage of the norm life cycle. As discussed in Chapter One, more complex international regimes
of climate protection began when nation states addressed the monitoring and phasing out of
CFCs through the Vienna Convention and then the Montreal Protocol. The agreements included
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using baseline emissions inventories to develop targets and create strategy blueprints for nation
state action. Working groups of the U.N. could not agree on the protocols for a control section of
the Vienna Convention. Therefore, only a general framework was agreed to at the time of
ratification. Upon ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in 1987, nation states grew closer to a
tipping point for a decarbonization norm in the international system. The protocol was a formal
arrangement to improve deteriorating air quality by engaging in decarbonization efforts. The
arrangement required monitoring, via UNEP coordinated efforts and removal, by means of
nation state action, of ozone depleting substances.314 As discussed in Chapter One, a very small
amount of cities and local authorities responded to the Montreal Protocol by aligning local
ordinances to phase out CFCs. The cities’ response shows that as a decarbonization norm
developed, new norm entrepreneurs found additional ways to advocate and support an emerging
standard to improve air quality.
As previously discussed, scholars demarcate the threshold for the tipping point in support
of a norm just before it receives one-third of nation states’ support in the international system.
The Rio Summit marked the tipping point for a decarbonization norm in the international system.
The emergence of the UNFCCC and Agenda 21 represented a mobilization of nation states
advocating in favor of changes to standards that expanded monitoring and reduction targets for
GHGs. Agenda 21 created a blueprint for sustainability action across all levels of government.
The UNFCCC ushered in a new framework that shaped efforts aimed at decarbonization. Though
the UNFCCC only needed 50 ratifications to advance, 153 countries signed the climate
document. The overwhelming support demonstrated a realignment of standards and action,
underpinning a norm of decarbonization.

314

Barratt-Brown, Elizabeth P. "Building a monitoring and compliance regime under the Montreal protocol." Yale J.
Int'l L. 16 (1991): 519.

91

During COP-3, the norm of decarbonization reached a cascade, albeit a stalled one. As
discussed in Chapter 1, the Kyoto Protocols provided a framework for targets and timetables to
reduce emissions by establishing monitoring and action plans for nation states. However, the
United States, which is a critical nation state in terms of normative strength, never ratified the
protocol. Additionally, Canada’s non-compliance and withdraw from the UNFCCC hindered the
progression of an air quality norm in the international system. While a decarbonization norm has
institutionalized in some regions, like the E.U., inconsistent action from critical actors has stalled
the norm’s movement beyond the 2nd stage of the norm life cycle.
In terms of norm adoption, some nation states have more influence in the international
system depending on the norm in question. Finnemore and Sikkink noted that without the
support of these critical states, the “substantive norm goal” could be compromised. Both Canada
and the United States are nation states that create large amounts of GHGs, often ranking in the
top ten GHG producing countries. Their status as “high emitters” of GHGs gives both countries
the position of critical states. In addition, the central governments of these countries have failed
to consistently support international agreements, thereby abdicating norm leader status. As a
consequence, the United States and Canada have been rogue states at varying times in the
ascendance of a decarbonization norm and climate negotiations in general. Because of the
actions of these rogue states, decarbonization norm cascade and institutionalization has stalled.
However, work has continued at the international and local levels in developing frameworks that
strengthen a decarbonization norm.
Between COP-10 and COP-12, the Conference of Parties recognized cities as a
stakeholder within an international climate regime. My research seeks to understand if this
recognition was a direct result of local authorities’ engagement with a decarbonization norm at
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the international and local levels. If TMNs and their members were influential in diffusing a
decarbonization norm from 1991-2018, there should be a broader discourse that recognizes them
as norm leaders within a constructivist framework.
Conclusion
This chapter identifies several areas of literature that frame this research and analysis of
networks, subnational units, and norm diffusion. As discussed earlier, both neorealism and
liberal institutionalism do not provide adequate tools for analyzing actors outside of nation states.
Multilevel governance literature provides a framework from which to view the emerging
jurisdictional architectures noted by scholars in the 1990s. Additionally, research that
emphasized the decentering of nation state authority illustrates coordination between networks
and their members that enhances the role of local authorities in international climate regimes. To
better explain these networks that inhabit a key position in a system of multilevel governance, a
section on TMNs explains their role in the urban response to climate change that began in the
early 1990s.
My research uses the Type II classification to center the authority of cities and the
influence of their networks when engaging with environmental policy. It can be argued that cities
fit neatly within the “nested” jurisdictional structure of the Type I perspective. However, cities
utilize TMNs as a platform for engagement with international climate regimes. ICLEI operates at
multiple levels as both a platform for cities at the international level and a network that shares
technical expertise among members at local levels. Because the influence of networks in norm
diffusion is central to my research, an approach to viewing governance from the perspective of
overlapping jurisdictions is essential in terms of analyzing the behavior of subnational and
supranational actors. Additionally, the inconsistent support of international climate agreements
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from the national governments of the United States and Canada strengthens the justification for
using this perspective.
Analyses of European cities showed coordination between supranational and subnational
entities, which drives some regional environmental policies. Currently, there is a dearth of
research that analyzes the impact of TMNs on the environmental policy of cities in the United
States and Canada. Scholarship on TMNs revealed the formation of a platform for cities that
enhanced their capacity to collect, share, and create new sustainability ideas. My research adds to
a body of literature that has analyzed TMNs in the United States and Canada. Through an
analysis of member and non-member cities, I assess the impact of TMNs on the decarbonization
norm. This research brings together literature from multilevel governance and TMNs to clarify
the role of networks and subnational governments in the process of norm diffusion.
Second generation constructivists developed a life cycle of norms, using ideas and
definitions from previous research on norms and regime theory. Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm
life cycle posits a significant role for norm entrepreneurs and their organizational platforms in
the first stage of the norm life cycle. However, the authors noted that following the first stage of
the norm life cycle it is nation states, networks, and IGOs that are the central actors in norm
diffusion. As an actor in the second stage of the norm life cycle, the central function of a network
is to monitor the adherence of nation states to international standards. The type of network that
Finnemore and Sikkink had in mind was most likely non-governmental in its structure, which
means that TMNs may be unique in their ability to influence policymakers. The role of networks,
specifically TMNs, in the diffusion of environmental norms and policy is underexamined in the
United States and Canada. A large portion of research dedicated to TMN and city engagement
with international climate governance focuses on cities in Europe or regions where central
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governments have been more consistently supportive of international climate agreements. It is
for this reason that my analysis focuses on the capacity of networks to coordinate and diffuse
environmental norms to cities in the United States and Canada.
My research seeks to test the principles of the norm life cycle that address the role of
norm entrepreneurs, norm leaders, and networks in the diffusion of a decarbonization norm. I use
cities as cases to analyze the implementation of local environmental policy over a time period of
almost 30 years. Through an analysis of membership in ICLEI, this research seeks to explain the
role of TMNs in the diffusion of a decarbonization norm. Additionally, this research seeks to
clarify the position of cities as norm leaders within environmental climate regimes. Should the
analysis confirm that local governments in the United States and Canada adopted the objectives
of decarbonization, then cities can be norm leaders in the absence of leadership from central
governments. This research uses the idea of “waves” of action among municipal networks to
develop this timeframe.315 The timeframe used for this dissertation also reflects the first two
stages of the norm life cycle for decarbonization. In the following chapter, I outline the
parameters of the analysis of ICLEI and its impact on the GHG policy of those cities that utilize
the network’s resources.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
My research seeks to answer the following questions: Are ICLEI member cities more
likely than non-member cities to adopt GHG mitigation strategies? Are those cities that utilize
ICLEI’s programs more likely to initiate local environmental policy, specifically GHG
inventories and complementary action plans?
Because my research examines the impact of TMN membership on local environmental
policies, the research question is answered by the following hypotheses: (H1) ICLEI membership
has a significant impact on the environmental policy and local environmental action plans of its
member cities. (H0) ICLEI membership has no impact on the environmental policy and local
environmental action plans of ICLEI member cities. Non-member cities are just as likely as
ICLEI member cities to complete GHG inventories with complementary local action plans.
Additionally, my research will analyze the impact of ICLEI technical assistance on both
members and non-members. The second analysis uses the same three time periods316 for the
research question on cities and the technical assistance they receive from ICLEI. The research
question on ICLEI technical assistance is answered by the following hypotheses: (H2) Technical
assistance from ICLEI has a significant impact on the environmental policy and local action
plans of those cities that utilize the organization’s programs. (H0) Technical assistance from
ICLEI has no impact on the environmental policy and local environmental action plans of those
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cities that utilize the organization’s programs. Cities that do not use ICLEI sponsored or created
programs are just as likely as cities that seek ICLEI assistance to complete a GHG inventory with
a local environmental action plan.
This chapter will unfold as follows: First, the research design will frame the time periods
used in the research, the statistical model, and the unit of analysis. Next, my hypotheses provide
the predicted outcomes for the three time periods. Then, the procedures for analysis section
presents issues I encountered when creating models for analysis. Additionally, this section details
why I used a logistic regression in the planned statistical models and how that changed the
timeline of this research. I also give a more detailed justification for the time periods used for
this research. The data collection section outlines the sources of the variables used in the
analysis. Finally, I conceptualize and operationalize the variables used in the study, which
includes a detailed justification for the control variables.

Research Design
My research explains the impact of TMNs and their members on norm and policy
diffusion of international environmental standards. I constructed my data set using 99 cities in
the United States and 20 Canadian cities. I coded the independent variable using city data on
ICLEI membership. Using cities as cases, I examine ICLEI’s growth and role as an
organizational platform for diffusors of a decarbonization norm.
My study uses a logistic regression model over three time periods. The model elucidates
the relationship between ICLEI membership (independent variable) and the diffusion of an
international decarbonization norm by means of GHG monitoring and action (dependent
variable). The time periods under analysis are 1991-2002; 2003-2010; 2011-2018. An analysis of
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three periods of time is necessary to connect this research to the idea of “waves” of municipal
action on climate change.317
Through each of the three time periods, I will control for education level, median
household income, political party affiliation, population density, and employment in
manufacturing. This model will assess if ICLEI membership impacts the local diffusion of a
decarbonization norm. The second model will use the same control variables but assesses the
impact of ICLEI technical assistance on members and non-members.
This research will use primary and secondary sources to collect the data used in the
analysis. Primary sources include the United States Census, Statistics Canada, newspaper
articles, and conference documents from the United Nations. Secondary sources include
conference reports, scholarly literature, and advocacy network documents. I will explain the data
collection for each variable in the variable section of this chapter.

Hypothesis
TMNs provided cities with organizational platforms from which to advocate for a
decarbonization norm among local governments. This research hypothesizes that membership in
ICLEI leads to policies consistent with Local Agenda 21, the UNFCCC, the CCPC, and a norm
of decarbonization. For the second model, my research hypothesizes that ICLEI technical
assistance leads to even higher rates of the objectives of decarbonization.
My research specifies objectives that lead to decarbonization at the local level from
ICLEI’s CCPC, the Montreal Protocol, Agenda 21, and the evolving UNFCCC. As a nonbinding agreement, Agenda 21 proposed ways in which states and local governments might
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address challenges to sustainability. Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 is the most important for cities and
local authorities. This chapter suggested that local authorities develop a “local agenda 21” that
takes into consideration the challenges of sustainability.318 Both the Montreal Protocol and the
UNFCCC are documents of importance to ICLEI and cities that are engaged with the objectives
of decarbonization. Cities and their networks have used both of these agreements to create
blueprints that align to the aims of an international decarbonization norm. ICLEI’s CCPC is an
example of a network that used elements of Local Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC to create
blueprints for cities. For many cities, these blueprints contained the first steps towards removing
anthropogenic GHGs through monitoring and local action.
My hypothesis hinges on the relationship of ICLEI members and their respective
constituencies. Because cities represent the membership of ICLEI, their ability to diffuse norms
is unique. The city representatives319 of ICLEI have the authority to create local policies that
adhere to international standards and a decarbonization norm. Taking into account Finnemore
and Sikkink’s norm life cycle, creating policies that achieve the objectives of a norm like
decarbonization makes these cities more than advocates. In this research, engagement with the
objectives of decarbonization measured in this analysis is viewed as norm leadership. Cities act
as norm leaders when they create policies that direct new behavior for constituents, local
businesses, and government operations.
As ICLEI expanded membership, its capacity to develop initiatives and facilitate
horizontal communication among members grew. ICLEI resources that helped cities translate
international environmental norms to the local level were underdeveloped until the release of The
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Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide in 1996.320 Throughout the 1990s, ICLEI expanded its
membership significantly across North America and Europe. These programs provided benefits
to both members and non-members.321 I expect the impact of ICLEI membership on GHG
mitigation policy implementation to deepen with the progression of each time period under
study. That means that there will be minimal impact of ICLEI membership during the time
period 1991-2002. Likewise, ICLEI technical assistance during 1991-2002 will not have a
significant impact on the GHG mitigation strategies of cities.
For both 2003-2010 and 2011-2018, I expect a significant relationship between ICLEI
membership and cities that developed GHG inventories and local action plans. From 2003-2010
local governments and their networks translated international environmental agreements and
objectives into blueprints for local efforts that contribute to a decarbonization norm. During the
same time period, ICLEI continually updated and enhanced new GHG emissions software,
aligning it with international standards for local governments.
During the 2011-2018 time period, local authorities and their networks continued to
demand recognition for their contribution towards decarbonization. This resulted in the
declaration from nations states that subnational governments are “stakeholders” in the
international climate change regime. The implementation of the Mexico City Pact, the Local
Government Climate Roadmap, and the Carbonn Registry are examples of local governments
stepping up their efforts towards decarbonization. Because of these events, 2011-2018 should
have the strongest relationship between ICLEI membership and reaching the first two objectives
of a decarbonization norm. In the model analyzing ICLEI technical assistance, I expect a
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significant relationship between cities engaging in GHG strategies and those that seek technical
assistance from ICLEI. This assistance can come in the form of membership, licensing ICLEIsoftware that uses Local Government Operations Protocol, or being a member of an ICLEIcreated organization (CCPC).

Procedures for Analysis
There are a multitude of ways to research and analyze networks and their members who
diffuse or align norms from the international to the local level. This section will explore options
that could have been used to analyze the relationship between TMNs and cities in the diffusion
of a decarbonization norm.
Event history analysis (EHA), also referred to as ‘survival analysis,’ is used when
analyzing the occurrence of events that are time specific. Researchers employ EHA when trying
to determine the patterns and causes of changes in the behavior of governments, networks, or
individuals.322 As a type of analysis, EHA could provide a broader analysis to this research as
each city and year is counted as a case in the analysis.323 When Cox Regression is used as a tool
in EHA, it models membership by those cities that joined and left the organization per unit of
time.
A central reason EHA was not applicable to my research is the lack of data related to
gaps in ICLEI membership. The data for ICLEI member was collected from multiple sources
including city records, official ICLEI conference records, and newspaper articles detailing a
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city’s membership in ICLEI. Unfortunately, recording the length of network membership or
identifying gaps in city membership for each year is difficult when considering the restrictions of
time and funding placed on my research. This difficulty is compounded when considering ICLEI
had no official membership records dating back to the 1990s and 2000s. This uncertainty could
have created a problem in calculating the hazard rate324, which is inextricably linked to the
dependent variable, because of incomplete information related to a city joining ICLEI, leaving
the network for a number of years, and then returning.
Additional issues with EHA are sometimes revealed when selecting a continuous or
discrete time measurement. A continuous time axis for my dissertation research offer more
robust evidence of the diffusion of a decarbonization norm. However, as discussed above a yearby-year breakdown325 of membership information was not available for the current research
presented in this dissertation. A discrete time axis, which is sometimes used in EHA analysis,
works better than a continuous axis given the data collection method for this dissertation.
However, in developing a discrete time analysis I would have created distinct time periods to
capture municipal action, which would have been very close to the time periods presented in this
study. For research analyzing the impact of network membership on the diffusion of a
decarbonization norm, the benefits of EHA are diminished using a non-continuous time axis.
Using a mixed methods research framework could have resulted in a more complete
analysis. Nested analysis is an example of mixed methods approach. For example, nested
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analysis is a mixed methods approach that is generally applied to comparative politics.326 This
type of analysis requires mixing a large-N analysis and small-N analysis to answer a research
question.327 This approach first tests a preliminary large-N dataset. Then, upon confirmation of
that preliminary analysis, a small-N analysis further strengthens the results of research by
analyzing cases that represent the expected relationship.328 In the case of researching TMNs and
cities, a large-N analysis would be conducted to find a quantitative relationship between TMNs
and local policy outcomes. Subsequently, a small-N analysis using qualitative methods would
explore in detail those cities that represent ‘pioneering’ cities in terms of environmental policy.
The exploration using a small-N analysis would be case study driven, providing a more in-depth
analysis of historic policy outcomes and governmental action associated with the diffusion of a
decarbonization norm. The range of time involved in this research makes it challenging to use a
mixed methods approach. Trying to assemble meaningful information related to events within
city governments from the 1990s would be challenging in terms of qualitative methods; both in
terms of establishing interviews or creating and accurately disseminating survey instruments.
For this research, I find it most appropriate to consider those cities that join ICLEI over a
specific time period. Using the progression of municipal action as a marker between time period
better fits within the norm life cycle literature and how a decarbonization norm developed among
cities in the United States and Canada. The time periods for my research are influenced by
previous research on municipal action and TMN activity surrounding climate change.

326
Rohlfing, Ingo. "What you see and what you get: Pitfalls and principles of nested analysis in comparative
research." Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 11 (2008): 1492-1514.
327
Lieberman, Evan S. "Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research." American political
science review (2005): 435-452.
328
Lieberman."Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research."

103

The original plan for this research included running an ordinal logistic regression from
1991-2005 to find evidence of the impact of cities and TMNs on actual municipal environmental
policies. The initial data coding for the dependent variable revealed problems with the frequency
distribution. This variable measured the diffusion of a decarbonization norm by means of GHG
mitigation techniques (Dependent Variable) to municipalities. Table 3.1 contains the original
variable coding:
(Table 3.1 Here)

I constructed this variable to measure the possibilities of a municipality implementing up to four
essential policy objectives to improve air quality and enhance GHG mitigation strategies. While
coding this variable, it became clear that there were too many municipalities that did not achieve
any of the policy objectives included in a local action plan by 2004. When presented with these
issues, I ceased data collection before coding Canadian cities to analyze the distribution of my
variables. The frequency distribution of American cities showed 65 cities with no local action
plan or any local policy related to fleet vehicles, building codes, or ordinances about on-road
traffic. 12 American cities had reached at least one of the variable objectives, while only 8 cities
achieved 2 variable objectives and 6 cities achieved 3 objectives. No cities achieved all four
goals. The dependent variable’s low frequency distribution made it impossible to use ordinal
logistic regression as a tool for analysis. For this reason, I collapsed the dependent variable into a
dichotomous variable with a value of 0 or 1. Table 3.2 lists the new coding for the dependent
variable.

(Table 3.2 Here)
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Because I collapsed the dependent variable, the type of statistical analysis shifted to binary
logistic regression.
Logistic regression is used to predict the relationship between independent variables and
dependent variables when the dependent variable is dichotomous. This type of statistical
technique is an extension of simple linear regression. In an analysis using logistic regression, all
of the predictors are tested in one block, assessing the model’s predictive ability and controlling
for the effects of the control variables.
In addition to shifting to a binary logistic regression, I chose to reorganize the timeframe
for this research. Reorganizing the timeframe for this research provides an opportunity to capture
the growth of TMN membership in periods where the activities and organization strategies of
such networks changed to increase efficiency and influence. The original timeframe for my
research was 1991-2003 which leaves out the expansion of municipal networks, both regional
and transnational, and the work of city leaders engaged with international climate regimes.
Additionally, the low number of cities with climate change policies that aligned with the
dependent variable required an extension of the timeline.
I developed the new timeframe based on the literature about municipal action on policies
aimed at decarbonization. This study analyzes three time periods; 1991-2002; 2003-2010; 20112018. The development of these time periods is based on the idea of municipal “waves” of action
from Bulkeley’s 2010 research.329 It is important to note that, while the alteration to the
timeframe of my research was influenced by Bulkeley, the division of the time periods is unique
to my research.
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The time period of 1991-2002 represents the first wave of municipal action in my
research. Bulkeley identified that this wave began with the emergence of scholarship on
municipal activity in the early 1990s and ended in the “early 2000s.”330 Throughout the time
period, city leaders participated in international environmental conferences, via ICLEI
delegations, and organized municipal conferences to engage with climate issues.331 Additionally,
ICLEI created guides for local authorities to adapt practices that were suggested in Agenda 21 to
local sustainability efforts. Finally, ICLEI helped to develop and distribute technical information
and software for cities to inventory GHGs and design benchmarks for reducing emissions.
The idea of the second wave of municipal action was used to create the time period 20032010. According to Bulkeley, the second wave was defined by the creation of municipal
networks that were more regionally focused than their transnational predecessors.332 Examples of
these efforts include the expansion of Cities for Climate Change Campaigns in Australia and the
Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network. Additionally, national municipal networks,
like the US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA), formed to challenge central
government action on climate issues. All of these networks advocated for a decarbonization
norm. During the second time period of this study, ICLEI and its members continued to pursue
recognition at the international level for local efforts that diffuse a decarbonization norm.
During the third time period of this study, 2011-2018, cities and their networks gained
clout as a stakeholder within an international climate regime. I identify this time period as the
beginning of the third wave of municipal activity. Critical moments in this time period include
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COP-16, the Durban Local Government Convention, the signing of the Mexico City Pact, and
the creation of the Carbonn Climate Registry.333 During this time, local governments received
recognition as “key governmental stakeholder(s) in climate change efforts.”334 For some
American political groups, this was a period of growing distrust of international environmental
initiatives. Anti-Agenda 21 messaging from the American conservative movement intensified
during 2012. Some of this pushback against sustainability efforts could have had a negative
effect on the membership of ICLEI and the programs of local authorities within the United
States.
Using three time periods to test my research question provides an opportunity to examine
a decarbonization norm over the course of 28 years. Given the proliferation of municipal
networks related to climate change over almost three decades, I assert that ICLEI remains a
relevant actor in terms of technical expertise, organizational capacity, and networking among
members. ICLEI membership over these periods of time may be a useful indicator of the impact
of TMNs on their member’s policy creation. As both the independent and dependent variables
are dichotomous, the most appropriate statistical technique to analyze these periods is binary
logistic regression. This model will assess if ICLEI membership or technical assistance impacts
the local diffusion of a global environmental decarbonization norm through improving air quality
by way of GHG mitigation policies at the local level.
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Universe of Cities
I used a sample of cities to determine the impact of ICLEI membership in the diffusion of
global air quality norms. This sample includes 99 American cities and 20 Canadian cities.
Because this research emphasizes the role of municipal governments in the process of norm
diffusion, city-limit data will be used (as opposed to Metropolitan Statistical Area data).
Population values of over 150,000 determined the selection of cities used for this research. I
collected population data for both Canadian and American cities from the National Census and
Statistics Canada. Appendix A contains a list of cities used in this research.

Conceptualization and Operationalization of Variables
Dependent Variable: Greenhouse Gas Monitoring and Local Action Plans
This variable records the presence of local level policy among cities in the dataset. The
activity of cities in creating environmental policy that protects air quality and improves on GHG
mitigation strategies is central to this research. The variable is dichotomous with a coding of 0
for those cities that have not implemented any local action plan or policy that is related to GHG
mitigation or air quality. I coded cities as 1 if they had conducted a GHG inventory and put
forward a complementary action plan. These action plans take into account previous GHG
inventories and propose local solutions that enhance decarbonization efforts. These plans include
any of the following action:
1. Municipal Leaders order alterations to municipal vehicles with the goal of improving
efficiency and emissions.
2. Municipal plans deal directly with emissions through building code (residential or
commercial) or emissions from businesses within the city limits.
3. Municipal plans created that deal with on-road traffic, railways, and aviation that falls
within the authority of a city.
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4. Plans to coordinate programs that include citizens and other local stakeholders. Program
examples include information sessions, community workshops, and public updates
related to local sustainability action.
I collected data from primary sources to construct the dependent variable. These sources
include archives of city records to confirm the announcement of GHG inventory or local action
plan. The LEXIS NEXIS database was also used to locate newspaper articles recording the
announcement of GHG inventories and local action plans.

Independent Variable: ICLEI Membership
My research explores the connection between TMNs and cities in the diffusion of
environmental norms. With this in mind, the independent variable will record if a city in the
dataset is an ICLEI member. As a TMN, ICLEI acts as an advocate for municipal leaders at the
global level. A city obtains ICLEI membership by submitting an application to the organization
and issuing a public statement confirming their commitment.
I collected data for the independent variable through primary documents from ICLEI, city
archives, and the LEXIS NEXIS database. Initially, I planned on collecting membership data
directly from ICLEI. Having submitted a request for documentation on membership, I
communicated with Angie Fyfe, ICLEI’s executive director. The executive director was able to
provide me with three years of membership material from 2016-2018. To assemble the
membership for the years 1991-2002, I used ICLEI conference material, city archives, and
LEXIS NEXIS news archives to find out if or when a city joined ICLEI. I used the same
collection method for 2003-2010 and 2011-2015.
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Independent Variable: ICLEI Technical Assistance
It is important to examine the overall impact of TMNs on their city members’
environmental policy choices. However, it is also essential to understand to what extent these
networks help those cities who are not members but utilize specific services offered by TMNs.
Therefore, ICLEI technical assistance will be coded and analyzed, separately from the
membership independent variable, across the three time periods; 1991-2002, 2003-2010, and
2011-2018. I code cities as 1 if they are members of ICLEI, use ICLEI software to compile a
city’s GHG inventory, use county or regional ICLEI-membership to access the resources of
ICLEI,335 or have used the consulting services of ICLEI. Cities are coded 0 if they have not
utilized ICLEI in the development of local environmental policy.
This variable incorporates data from the ICLEI membership variable and a city’s use of
ICLEI programs or software. I collected the data for this variable from primary sources,
including official city announcements, city action plans, membership lists from organizations or
regions aligned with ICLEI, or software licenses purchased by a city for ICLEI GHG software.

Control Variables:
For this research, I include the following control variables: education level, median
household income political party affiliation, population density, and employment in
manufacturing.
Education Level
Some research suggests that education level is positively correlated to voluntary
environmental policy commitments or municipal action in terms of environmental policy. Using
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a two-tailed t-test, Boyle found that the education variable was one of the most influential
variables associated with environmental policy commitment.336 Controlling for other variables337
enhanced the strength of education level’s positive relationship to MCPA commitment.338
Krause also uses the MCPA as a dummy variable to represent city commitment to
environmental policy.339 Education level was among the city level characteristics that showed a
significant positive correlation with city commitment to the MCPA. The data for Krause’s
education variable was taken from the 2000 US Census and represented the percentage of adults
with a B.A. or higher. Findings from Krause340 show that education level and commitment to
environmental policy via the MCPA were significantly positively correlated. These studies
provide some evidence that higher levels of education are correlated to an increased likelihood of
committing to environmental policy change.
Brody et al. used CCPC participation as a measurement of urban commitment to
environmental policy.341 The findings of the analysis revealed a significant positive association
with education level and CCPC participation. The odds ratio shows a standard deviation positive
change of 7% of the proportion of college-educated in a county increases the odds of CCPC
participation by 68%.342

336
Boyle, P. W. “Examination of US cities as forces in environmental policy,” Intersections, (2010) 10(1), 181-198,
195.
337
i.e.- proportion of Bush vote, median income, proportion employed in manufacturing.
338
In the case of both the MCPA and Cities for Climate Protection Campaign, it is difficult to separate action and
advocating for urban environmental policy. Any city can join either of these endeavors. However, that does not
guarantee local action or the implementation of local environmental policy. For example, the success of a city to
achieve the goals established in the CCPC is dependent on city financial and civic capacities.
339
Krause, R. M. “Policy innovation, intergovernmental relations, and the adoption of climate protection initiatives
by US cities,” Journal of urban affairs, (2011) 33(1), 45-60.
340
Krause, “Policy innovation, intergovernmental relations”.
341
Brody et al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States”.
342
Brody et al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States,” 36.

111

Analyses on municipal indices of sustainability have contributed to research related to the
actual progress of cities in environmental policies. Portney developed a “Taking Sustainable
Cities Seriously” index to score cities based on their progress in sustainable activities343. Many
items on the index developed by Portney are reflective of local environmental policy and
membership in environmental networks. Using this index of sustainability seriousness, Portney
then conducted a comparative analysis of twenty-four cities to test four hypotheses related to
why some cities take local practices of sustainability more seriously than others.
Findings from his comparative analysis of cities indicate a significant positive
relationship between higher rates of high school graduation and “sustainability seriousness.”344
However, when Portney extended his analysis to an OLS regression, which included the five
most highly correlated variables related to the sustainability seriousness index, the education
variable was not significant.345 Though analysis of the education variable offers mixed findings
in this study, other research in urban planning has emphasized education level as a determinant
of environmental policy action at the city level.
Lubell, Feiock, and Handy attempted to answer the question of why some cities have a
higher level of adoption of local environmental policy, which led to the creation of an updated
index for municipal sustainability.346. heir research showed a tendency for education levels to
increase with population size. This means that education levels in dense urban centers tended to
be higher than in rural areas, towns, and suburbs. The authors use a measurement of education
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level347 in their regression analysis. However, the researchers collapsed the education variable
into a socioeconomic variable that included median income and median housing value.348 The
socioeconomic status variable was found not to be a significant predictor of the environmental
index established by the authors. The reason for collapsing the education variable into a
socioeconomic status variable is not made explicit. However, in their conclusion, the authors
suggest it would be desirable to “disentangle these influences over time to determine whether
one would be a more effective lever for changing policy.”349
Tang et al. created a “local climate change effort policy index” to measure policy action
in local jurisdictions of California.350 The data that structured the index was MCPA membership,
CCPC participation, and the presence of a local climate change action plan. Tang et al. used this
index in a regression analysis against independent variables that included education as part of a
variable measuring socioeconomic effects.351352 The results from the regression analysis revealed
that the socioeconomic variable positively correlated with higher index scores.
The studies discussed above illustrate the importance of controlling for education level in
my research. In my analyses, I expect the education variable to positively correlate to a city
completing local GHG inventories and establishing action plans. My education variable is based
on the percentage of individuals over 25, with a college degree. I obtained this data about U.S.
cities from the U.S. Census Bureau’s online search engine.353 I collected data on Canadian cities
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using Statistics Canada, which is an electronic information archive that houses census and city
data.

Political Party Affiliation
Political party affiliation is a variable that interests many scholars who analyze city level
commitment to environmental regimes or policy change. Multiple studies analyzing municipal
commitment to environmental policy have highlighted a link to partisan voting behavior.354
Boyle’s analysis of city commitment to the U.S. MCPA355 highlights the influence of
political party affiliation on a city level commitment to environmental policies.356 Boyle utilized
the MCPA as a dependent variable in research that attempted to understand why some cities are
advocates for environmental policy change, while others are not. Of the models used to analyze
the determinants of urban environmental advocacy, a citizen characteristics model contains a
variable used to measure party affiliation. The party affiliation variable is based on the
proportion of those citizens that voted for George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election.
Boyle collected data for this variable from CNN Presidential Election results. Using a two-tailed
t-test, Boyle found that the political party affiliation variable357 was negatively related to MCPA
commitment.358 When controlling for other influential variables across all models,359 the
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negative relationship of the party affiliation variable on MCPA commitment remained
significant. Boyle’s conclusion suggested that political culture, among other variables,360
“…effect(s) adoption of environmental policy far greater than theorists imagined.”361
In her analysis of state versus local factors influencing environmental policy
innovation,362 Krause used the MCPA as a dependent variable representing urban commitment to
environmental policy.363 The findings from this analysis suggest a much more significant role for
local characteristics364 as drivers of urban innovation in environmental policy. Among the local
level characteristics of interest that influenced city commitment to the MCPA, Krause used a
partisanship variable representing the percentage365 of votes that were supportive of the
Democratic candidates during the 2000 presidential election. When controlling for other
variables in the local level model, the partisanship variable was significantly related to an
increased likelihood of a city being a signatory to the MCPA.366 Also, when variables, that were
deemed to have a “substantial effect” on joining the MCPA were analyzed together, the
partisanship variable was again significant.367 Like Boyle’s research, Krause finds some
evidence to suggest a variable representing political party affiliation or partisanship may have an
impact on a city’s commitment to environmental policy agendas.
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Krause’s analysis of municipal “follow-through” on MCPA commitment also revealed
some interesting findings related to party affiliation and environmental policy. To test why some
cities follow-through with a commitment to environmental agreements and others do not, Krause
developed a Municipal Climate-Protection Index (MCPI) that could assess the progress of cities
in GHG mitigation. While this index is “loosely based” on indices from Portney368 and Lubell et
al.,369 the author used ICLEI publications from the US Conference of Mayors Climate Protection
Center and ICLEI to craft the MCPI. Krause’s research assembled a twenty-four-item index that
sought to capture the ways city governments engage in GHG mitigation.370 The list items of the
MCPI were equally weighted but separated into an industrialization component371 and two action
components. The two action components were separated by city-guided operations372 and
broader community objectives.373
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The results of Krause’s regression analysis showed that higher levels of Democratic Party
representation positively correlated with an increase in a city’s MCPI score.374 However, when
the political party affiliation variable was included in a full model, which included multiple
variables, party affiliation was not significantly correlated to the MCPI score. Though the results
are somewhat mixed in this analysis, the study still offers some motivation for adding a variable
for political partisanship.
Given the findings of the preceding literature, my research includes a dummy variable
controlling for political partisanship. I hypothesize that political party affiliation will be
positively correlated with GHG inventories and local action plans. Stated clearly, that means a
rise in support for a liberal political party will increase the likelihood that a city will have a local
action plan that includes GHG mitigation strategies and air quality standards.
I use the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, also known as Elections Canada, to collect
data for Canadian cities’ voting records. Elections Canada houses an archive of the election
results from 1997, 2008, and 2011. I use multiple sources to collect data for cities in the United
States. Results for the 1996 Presidential Elections are gathered from county-level data collected
from Dave Leip’s Atlas of US Elections.375 Unfortunately, there was not sufficient data available
at the precinct level for 1996, so county-level data was used for an approximation of municipal
vote. Ansolabehere, Palmer, and Lee compiled data from 2002 to 2012 that record votes at the
precinct-level for federal elections.376 I use this dataset to construct the political party affiliation
variable for American Cities in 2008 and 2012.
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I use precinct and district level voting data from the U.S. and Canada to create a variable
representing political party affiliation. The variable is dichotomous, with 0 representing
conservative and 1 representing liberal political party choices in elections in the U.S. (1996,
2008, and 2012) and Canada (1997, 2008, and 2011). In the U.S., those cities that voted for the
Republican Party candidate for president in 1996, 2008, or 2012 are coded as 0. The American
cities that chose the Democratic Party candidate in these elections are coded as 1. Districts within
the city limits were accumulated for the total vote and then converted to the dichotomous
variable.
The political culture of Canada and the U.S. have differences that are noteworthy for this
research. Historically dominant, the Liberal Party in Canada is center left in terms of political
ideology. To the left of the Liberal Party in Canada is the NDP, which generally joins with the
liberal party during minority governments in parliament. Formed in 2003, the Conservative Party
of Canada is the center to right political party.
While the Liberal Party has a more stable history, the conservative movement has
undergone reordering. In 1993 the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada suffered massive
losses in the general election that cost them 167 members, leaving them only two MPs in
parliament.377 From 1993-2003 the conservative voters in Canada were split between a number
of regional and national parties.
The Conservative Party re-formed in 2003 from a merger between the remnants of the
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and the rising Reform Party.378 The unification of
political forces that revived the Conservative Party of Canada eventually lead to a conservative
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government in 2006 with Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who served until 2015. The
Conservative Party is center-right and currently the minority party in parliament.
For the 1997 elections, those cities that voted in MPs representing the Progressive
Conservative, the Reform Party, or conservative Quebecois members are coded 0. Those cities
voting for Liberal Party MPs are coded a 1. In the post-conservative merger period of Canadian
politics,379 those cities that voted for MPs from the Conservative Party of Canada are coded 0. In
the same time period, those cities that voted for MPs from the Liberal Party are coded 1.

Median Household Income
Median household income is a variable of interest in analyses of municipal commitment
to environmental policy. In multiple studies that analyze variables that impact a city’s
commitment to environmental policy, median household income appears to have an effect in
city-level participation related to the implementation of environmental policy.
As discussed previously, Krause analyzed variables representing state and local (urban)
characteristics to find variables that influence local environmental policy.380 The research used
the MCPA as a dependent variable that represented city-level commitment to environmental
policies. The findings from her analysis suggest a link between multiple local level
characteristics, including median income.381 In an analysis including two models,382 median
income was negatively correlated with an urban commitment to the MCPA. This means that as
the median income of a city rises, there is a reduced likelihood of commitment from that city to
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the MCPA. In the second stage of analysis, Krause analyzed variables of “substantial effect” on
joining the MCPA. This analysis also posits median income as significantly negatively correlated
to an urban area being a signatory to the MCPA.383
Krause’s other analysis measures factors influencing cities’ follow-through of protocols
established in the MCPA.384 To accomplish this, the author converts MCPA protocols into an
index. This study showed an impact of median income on local environmental policy. To assess
the progress of municipalities in implementing real environmental policy, Krause developed the
MCPI. Krause used ICLEI and US Conference of Mayors documents to develop the MCPI. The
twenty-four-item index represents the ways in which city governments engage in GHG
mitigation.385 The researcher received questionnaires from fifty-three towns and cities386 in
Indiana that were analyzed to assess the impact of ‘supply’387 and ‘demand’388 models on the
MCPI. The goal of this analysis was to reveal predictors of cities’ involvement in GHG
mitigating activities. Findings suggest that in both the demand model and full model, higher
median income is significantly associated with lower city MCPI scores. Both of Krause’s
analyses argue that median income is an influential variable in terms of city-level environmental
policy engagement.389
Other research, seeking to understand the impact of local social and economic variables
on city level commitment to environmental policy, offered additional detail on the impact of
median household income. Using a two-tailed t-test, Boyle found that median household
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income390 had a significant negative correlation with MCPA commitment.391 Beyond the initial ttest, Boyle used a regression analysis of the most influential control variables, which showed the
strength of median household income remained significantly negatively correlated with MCPA
participation. Boyle noted that the median income as a measurement is a “relative measure.”392
Median income does not necessarily translate to different regions and states. However, the
findings that lower median income reduces the chances of a city participating in the MCPA
raises questions for researchers. These findings also connect to Krause’s analyses of the MCPI
and lower scores for cities with higher median income.
The preceding literature suggests that some of these environmental policies are sensitive
to local characteristics, like median household income. The literature above suggests that higher
median income levels should be negatively correlated with the dependent variable in this
dissertation. Therefore, the higher the median income is in a city, the lower the likelihood of an
established local action plan that includes air quality standards or GHG mitigation strategies,
unless otherwise regionally mandated.
My research will use data collected from the U.S. Census and Statistics Canada. I used
Statistics Canada’s ‘Local Area Profiles’ to collect the data for the median household income of
the cities in the dataset. Local area profiles contain a large amount of data from within city limits
and larger metropolitan regions. The US Census provides median household income as a percent
for cities in their County and City Data Book.393 The United States Census search engine,
American FactFinder, provides data for median household income data for the cities in the
dataset.
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Employment in Manufacturing
Employment in manufacturing and carbon-intensive industries plays a role in
environmental degradation and city-level environmental policy. Some studies suggest that the
presence of a robust urban manufacturing industry can lead to barriers in the creation of local
environmental policy.
Research tracing the historical advancement of municipal environmental policy suggests
a role for large-scale manufacturers that has diminished since the rise of the service sector in the
United States.394 Portney conducted case studies and some statistical analysis of cities in the
United States to determine their respective sustainability seriousness.395 This research argued that
manufacturing employment negatively impacted the progression of urban sustainability until the
eventual decline of manufacturing beginning in the 1960s. As manufacturing employment was
lost to the internationalization of labor across the industrialized world, cities found little
pushback from local business coalitions to enact policy related to sustainability. In Chapter 9 of
his book, Portney conducted an analysis of selected cities396 to determine the environmental
techniques and strategies that they used to promote, adopt, and implement sustainability-driven
environmental policy. His analysis of the cities’ development of sustainability programs revealed
that a range of variation exists between cities in both “extent and content” in terms of efforts to
“become more sustainable.”397
Portney dedicated a portion of his research to a regression analysis of variables against a
sustainability index. Building on previous research related to sustainability indicators,398 Portney
394
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used a sample of 55 cities to test their sustainability seriousness. Portney modified an earlier
sustainability index to create a new index with thirty-eight variables representing progress, or
lack thereof, in sustainability activities.399 In terms of a variable representing employment in
manufacturing, Portney hypothesized that cities, where the local economy is largely dependent in
manufacturing, would score low on the sustainability seriousness index. Findings from a
regression analysis confirm his hypothesis, as cities more reliant on manufacturing as a source of
employment are less likely to pursue strategies of urban sustainability.
Boyle’s analysis of MCPA membership and influences on a city’s position as an advocate
for progressive environmental policy highlighted a role for manufacturing employment.400 An
investment model was used to test previous hypotheses related to coalitions of business and
environmental action.401 The investment model included variables representing proportion
employed by manufacturing, median income, percent unemployed, and population per square
mile. Boyle collected data for the investment model variables from the U.S. Census. Within the
investment model, the researcher used a variable representing proportion employed in
manufacturing to assess a relationship to MCPA adoption. The results of Boyle’s regression
analysis suggested that the manufacturing variable was not significantly correlated with MCPA
adoption.
Even though the previous studies have mixed results, I include a variable that measures a
city’s portion of manufacturing employment. If a carbon-intensive industry is a significant
employer in a city, it may view environmental policy as a high-cost, low-reward situation.
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Therefore, this research expects to find a negative correlation between increased employment in
manufacturing and the dependent variable. This means that as employment in manufacturing
increases, it is less likely that a city has established local GHG mitigation strategies.
I use both the County and City Data Book from the U.S. Census to collect data for the
employment in manufacturing variable. Data on employment in manufacturing in a city is also
available through the Census search engine. Through the ‘Local Area Profiles,’ data for
Canadian cities are available from the Statistics Canada archives. Though it would be optimal for
my analysis, a carbon-intensive industry variable is too difficult to develop in terms of data
collection for over 100 cities. As a variable, employment in manufacturing is measured as the
proportion of employment in manufacturing in a city.

Conclusion
This research uses logistic regression to determine the impact of TMNs and their
members on a decarbonization norm through GHG monitoring and local action. In doing so, this
study will determine the relevance of the variant of constructivism related to the norm life cycle
and norm diffusion. It will also illustrate the role, or lack thereof, of subnational units and their
networks in environmental policy creation and norm diffusion. Using three time periods, my
study will fill a gap in the literature that examines the diffusion of norms in the form of local
policy implementation.
This chapter examines the shortcomings of the original analysis related to my research
question. In overcoming this issue, I determined, with the help of my committee, that it was best
to create a new timeline for analysis and collapse the dependent variable. Collapsing the
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dependent variable also provided an opportunity to use logistic regression as the statistical
method for the analysis of each time frame.
The next chapter will provide a presentation of data and analysis. The presentation of
data includes the Independent Variables (ICLEI Membership and ICLEI Technical Assistance),
Dependent Variable (Local GHG mitigation policy), and the control variables selected for this
research. The chapter will then present the model results of the three time periods using logistic
regression. Finally, an explanation of the results will conclude this section.
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Table 3.1: Original Coding for Dependent Variable
0
1
2

3

4

No GHG inventory and no local action plan
Local action plan, but no concrete policy passed related to GHG mitigation strategy
Local action plan and 1 of the following:
- Municipal leadership orders alterations to municipal (fleet) vehicles with the goal
of improving efficiency and emissions.
- Municipal ordinances created that deal directly with emissions through building
code (residential or commercial) or emissions from businesses within the city
limits.
- Municipal ordinances created that deal with on-road traffic, railways, and
aviation that falls within the authority of a city.
Local action plan and 2 of the following:
- Municipal leadership orders alterations to municipal (fleet) vehicles with the goal
of improving efficiency and emissions.
- Municipal ordinances created that deal directly with emissions through building
code (residential or commercial) or emissions from businesses within the city
limits.
- Municipal ordinances created that deal with on-road traffic, railways, and
aviation that falls within the authority of a city.
Local action plan and all of the following:
- Municipal leadership orders alterations to municipal (fleet) vehicles with the goal
of improving efficiency and emissions.
- Municipal ordinances created that deal directly with emissions through building
code (residential or commercial) or emissions from businesses within the city
limits.
- Municipal ordinances created that deal with on-road traffic, railways, and
aviation that falls within the authority of a city.

Table 3.2: New Coding for Dependent Variable
0 No GHG inventory and no local action plan
1 City has conducted a GHG inventory and introduced complementary local action plan
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Chapter Four: Analysis and Results
Introduction
My research seeks to examine the impact of TMNs and cities on the diffusion of
international environmental norms by means of local GHG action. With this in mind, analysis in
this chapter is concerned with whether ICLEI membership and ICLEI technical assistance impact
cities’ engagement with a decarbonization norm. This chapter reports and interprets two analyses
over three time periods, 1991-2002, 2003-2010, and 2011-2018, and will proceed in three
sections. First, it will restate the research questions and hypotheses. Second, it will report the
results of the analysis of models for the time periods used in the study. Finally, I report the tests
for multicollinearity among the independent variables.

Research Question
The literature, reviewed in Chapter Two, raises two main questions this research seeks to
answer: Does ICLEI membership have an impact on GHG and air quality policy of its members?
Does ICLEI technical assistance have an impact on GHG mitigation and air quality policy of
those cities that utilize ICLEI-driven projects, like the CCPC, Clearpath software, and ICLEI
membership? Do both ICLEI membership and ICLEI technical assistance have an impact that
increases through the three time periods this research seeks to analyze (1990-2002, 2003-2010,
2011-2018)? The first question attempts to understand the effectiveness of TMNs in diffusing
environmental policy through their members. The second question addresses the ability of ICLEI
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to diffuse environmental norms and policy through a technical capacity that is connected, not just
to ICLEI membership, but to other ICLEI created or sponsored programs.

Hypothesis
The above questions can be answered by considering the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis Model One: ICLEI Membership
(H1) ICLEI membership has a significant impact on the environmental policy of member cities.
(H0) ICLEI membership has no impact on the environmental policy of member cities. Nonmember cities are just as likely as member cities to complete GHG inventories with
complementary action plans.
Hypothesis Model Two: ICLEI Technical Assistance
(H2) Technical assistance from ICLEI has a significant impact on the environmental policy of
those cities that utilize the organization’s programs.
(H0) Technical assistance from ICLEI has no impact on the environmental policy of those cities
that utilize the network’s programs. Cities that do not use ICLEI sponsored or created programs
are just as likely as those cities that seek ICLEI assistance to complete a GHG inventory with a
complementary action plan.

The Models and Time Periods
I use binary logistic regression because the dependent variable in this research is
dichotomous and because of the issues experienced in modeling an ordinal logistic regression. I
initially selected ordinal logistic regression as an analytical model for this research. Ordinal
logistic regression allowed for the construction of a dependent variable that measured different
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important types of local policy meant to improve air quality. The proposed types of local policies
included:
•

local environmental action plans in combination with alteration of city fleet
vehicles with the express goal of reducing emissions

•

emission-reducing building code (residential or commercial)

•

policy that seeks to reduce emissions from transportation-driven activity (on-road
traffic, railways, aviation)

While coding the dependent variable for local GHG policies, many cities scored 0-2 within the
ordinal model. It is for this reason that I chose to change to a binary logistic regression that uses
local GHG inventories combined with local action plans to construct the dependent variable.
Tables 4.1, 4.4, and 4.7 report each variable with its measurement, hypothesized impact, source,
and mean value in all three time periods. Tables 4.2, 4.5, and 4.8 report the ICLEI membership
models in all three time periods. Tables 4.3, 4.6, and 4.9 report the ICLEI technical assistance
models for all three time periods.

Models and Analysis of 1991-2002
(Table 4.1 Here)

(Table 4.2 Here)
Table 4.2 represents the results of the logistic regression model for ICLEI membership
impact on local GHG inventory and plans for 1991-2002. The Model Chi-Square of 24.264 is
significant (p<0.001). The pseudo R squared, Cox & Snell is .190, which is weak in terms of
explanatory power. As a pseudo R squared measurement Cox & Snell takes the sample size into
account and has an upper limit of less than one. The probability of the measured event occurring
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(i.e., GHG inventories in cities) largely determines the upper bound of the Cox and Snell
measurement.402 Event probability is calculated by dividing the number of events occurring403 by
the total number of cities in the data set.404 For this model, the probability of a city having a
GHG inventory with an action plan is .0069. Having the probability of an ‘event’ occurring is
necessary to calculate the upper bound of the Cox and Snell measurement. The calculation of the
upper bound for Cox and Snell is (where p is the probability of an ‘event’ occurring):
Upper Bound= 1- [pp (1-p) (1-p)]2
The upper bound of the Cox and Snell measurement for this model is .3978. With the upper
bound measurement being only .3978, .190 for the Cox and Snell measurement can be
considered weak but understanding that the upper bound is lower than other models. In the
model representing the first time period (1991-2002), ICLEI membership was not significantly
related to GHG inventories from cities. This result was expected in the first time period as ICLEI
membership in the United States was low in general,405 and GHG inventories with action plans
were very low.406 Neither the primary independent variable (ICLEI membership) nor control
variables (Employment in Manufacturing, Education Level, Party Affiliation, Median Income,
and Population Density) were significant. The main issues with the model reporting ICLEI
membership for the time period 1991-2002 is a lack of variance within the dependent variable
due to an extremely low amount of verifiable GHG inventories with complementary action plans.
It is worth noting that of the seven cities that were confirmed to have a GHG inventory with a
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complementary local action plan in place during this time period, only one, the City of Honolulu,
was not a member of ICLEI.

(Table 4.3 Here)

Table 4.3 reports the model measuring the impact of ICLEI technical assistance and local
GHG inventory and complementary action plan for the time period 1991-2002. The Model ChiSquare of 23.928 is significant (p<0.001). The pseudo R squared, Cox & Snell, is .188, which
suggests a weak explanatory power of the model. Calculating the probability of an event (GHG
inventory) occurring in this model (.069) and using that to determine the upper bound of Cox and
Snell (.3978) suggests the explanatory value of the model is weak. In the model representing the
first time period ICLEI, technical assistance was not significantly correlated to GHG inventories
from cities. As in the case of table 4.2, the model representing ICLEI membership during the
same time period (1991-2002), this result was expected. The expected insignificant result again
stems from a lack of variance in the dependent variable.
Additionally, the primary independent variable representing ICLEI Technical Assistance
was nearly identical to the ICLEI membership variable in the previous model. The programs that
make up the primary IV in model 4.2 were underdeveloped until 2002-2004,407 specifically the
CCPC and ICLEI Clearpath software available to cities (both members and non-members). As in
the first model, neither the primary IV (ICLEI Technical Assistance) or control variables
(Employment in Manufacturing, Education Level, Party Affiliation, Median Income, and
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Population Density) were significant.
Models and Analysis of 2003-2010
(Table 4.4 Here)

(Table 4.5 Here)
This model (Table 4.5) represents the time period 2003-2010 and measures the relation
between local GHG inventory with a complementary action plan and ICLEI membership. The
Model Chi-Square of 27.343 is significant (p<0.001). Cox & Snell pseudo R squared is .205.
Using the probability of a city having a GHG inventory, .47, the calculation for the upper bound
of the Cox and Snell measurement for this model is:
Upper Bound= 1- [.47.47 (1-.47) (1-.47)]2
This calculation gives us an upper bound of .74909 for the Cox and Snell reported in this model.
With this in mind, the reported Cox and Snell, .205, with an upper bound of .74909 is low in
terms of explanatory value. ICLEI membership has a significant relationship (.001) to cities
completing GHG inventories with complementary local action plans. These results indicate that
ICLEI member cities are 4.4 times more likely than non-member cities to create a GHG
inventory and action plan at the local level. This result was expected as ICLEI grew its
membership during this time period and expanded the resources available to members to
complete local inventories of greenhouse gasses. None of the control variables in this model are
significantly related to the creation of GHG policy at the local level, which was surprising. As
indicated in the literature reviewed for the control variable, previous research focused on
indicators of local environmental policy commitment found a connection between education
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level, party affiliation, and median income. The next section contains a discussion of issues with
the control variables.

(Table 4.6 Here)

This model (table 4.6) represents an analysis of the time period 2003-2010 and measures
the relationship between local GHG inventory with a complementary action place and ICLEI
technical assistance. The Model Chi-Square of 63.985 is significant (p<0.001). The pseudo R
squared, Cox & Snell, is .416. As in the previous models, I calculate the upper bound of Cox and
Snell, which is .74909. This means the Cox and Snell pseudo R squared reported suggests a
moderate explanatory value. ICLEI technical assistance has a significant relationship (.001) to
cities completing GHG inventories with complementary local action plans. These results indicate
that cities that seek ICLEI assistance are 32.7 times more likely to create a GHG inventory with a
complementary action plan than cities not receiving technical assistance of any kind from ICLEI.
This result was expected as this time period saw the development of Clearpath software from
ICLEI, which is software available for a licensing fee from ICLEI to non-member cities, states,
and other regions. Additionally, the CCPC joined with the Clinton Foundation from 2005-2008.
The funding and expertise offered by the Clinton Foundation aided in the development of GHG
inventory programs used by cities and expanded ICLEI’s capacity to make a deeper connection
with other global networks.
In the 2003-2010 time period, none of the control variables in this model are significantly
related to the creation of GHG policy at the local level. As indicated in the literature review,
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previous research focused on indicators of local environmental policy commitment found a
connection between education level, party affiliation, and median income.

Models and Analysis of 2011-2018
(Table 4.7 Here)

(Table 4.8 Here)
Table 4.8 reports the results of the logistic regression model that tests the impact of
ICLEI membership on local GHG inventory and a complementary action plan for the time period
of 2011-2018. The Model Chi-Square of 45.374 is significant (0.001). The pseudo R squared
Cox & Snell is .317. The probability of a city having a GHG inventory in this time period is
.6722. Using this probability, the upper bound calculation is:
1- [.6722.6722 (1-.6722) (1-.6722)]2
The upper bound for the Cox and Snell for this time period is .71870. This means the reported
Cox and Snell measurement, .317, is adequate in explanatory value. ICLEI membership has a
significant relationship (.001) to cities completing GHG inventories with complementary local
action plans. These results indicate that ICLEI member cities are 9.993 times more likely to
create a GHG inventory with a complementary action plan than non-member cities. This result
was expected as ICLEI has been deeply connected to building networks that aided cities and
regions in the development of GHG inventories for twenty-eight years. The control variable for
party affiliation is significant (<.001) in the analysis for this time period. Cities with party
affiliations that trend liberal are 11 times more likely to conduct a GHG inventory with a
complementary local action plan than conservative cities. This effect may be due in part to the
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political culture of conservative politicians and their voters who see local and international
environmental policies as a threat to individual rights. I will discuss this further in the section
preceding the analysis of the models. The other control variables in this model were not
significantly related to cities establishing GHG inventories and action plans at the local level.

(Table 4.9 Here)

Table 4.9 represents the time period 2011-2018 and measures the relationship between
local GHG inventory with a complementary action place and ICLEI technical assistance. The
Model Chi-Square of 93.294 is significant (p<0.001). Cox & Snell is .543. As discussed above,
the probability of a city having a GHG inventory in this time period is .6722. Using this
probability, the upper bound calculation is:
1- [.6722.6722 (1-.6722) (1-.6722)]2
The upper bound for the Cox and Snell for this time period is .71870. This pseudo R square
measurement suggests the model has adequate explanatory value. ICLEI technical assistance has
a significant relationship (.000) to cities completing GHG inventories with complementary local
action plans. The results indicate that ICLEI member cities are 213.389 times more likely to
create a GHG inventory with a complementary action plan than cities not receiving technical
assistance of any kind from ICLEI. This result was expected due to the continued development
of Clearpath software, which in this time period was utilized by other mayors and city networks
(MCPA andC40). The Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) and ICLEI also
maintained adequate membership in the United States and Canada, which recorded more
regional and state alliances joining the TMNs. The party affiliation variable was significant
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(.005) for this time period. Cities with a more liberal party affiliation are 28 times more likely to
have developed a GHG inventory with a complementary local action plan. None of the other
control variables in this model were significantly related to the creation of GHG policy at the
local level.

Issues with Control Variables and Significance
While four of the six models analyzed revealed significance between the primary
independent variable and the dependent variable, the performance of the control variables is an
issue. Correcting issues with these control variables can only help to strengthen the explanatory
power of the model as a whole. This section will discuss each of the control variables utilized in
each analysis and provide reasons why the control variables were either significant or not.
Research that examines the reasons why cities create environmental policy or join
environmental policy networks often uses the level of education as a control variable. The
education variable for this research is drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada.
Both of these sources have education data at the metropolitan level. Some research has found
education level positively correlated to “sustainability seriousness,”408 higher levels of adoption
of local environmental policy,409 and perceived commitment to environmental policies at the
local level.410 All of the studies referenced above hypothesized a positive relationship between
levels of education and higher levels of environmental commitment or local environmental
policy. Many of the studies used to justify the level of education as a control variable for this

408
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Krause, “Symbolic or Substantive Policy?”.
410
Brody et al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States”; Boyle, “Examination of US
cities as forces in environmental policy”.
409
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research used the environmental policy commitment of cities as the dependent variable.411 Many
studies measured cities as committed to environmental policy if they were members of a regional
climate network, like the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA). While this agreement
was a significant step forward for many cities in pursuit of local environmental policy,
expressing a commitment to environmental policy is not always accompanied by local action.
Many cities have signed on to the MCPA, but for years did not act in a meaningful way to take
local environmental policy action. While the MCPA cannot be discounted for its ability to rally
mayors, city leadership, and local governments to an environmental cause (with many cities
following through on local policy), a signature to the agreement is not the same as local policy
action.
Research concerned with actual environmental policy implementation at the city level has
also highlighted the impact, or lack thereof, of levels of education as a factor. Portney,412 Lubell,
Feiock, and Handy,413 and Krause414 created indices of municipal action that is interpreted as
environmental policy. While Krause found a positive significant correlation between a municipal
environmental index, studies from Portney and Lubell, Feiock, and Handy did not find a
significant correlation between levels of education and municipal environmental commitment as
interpreted through an index. With all this in mind, educational attainment as a variable may
have a more significant impact on a commitment to environmental policy when that commitment
is measured by a city being a member of a regional or transnational municipal network. When a
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Brody et al., “A spatial analysis of local climate change policy in the United States”; Boyle, “Examination of US
cities as forces in environmental policy”; Lubell, Feiock, and Handy. “City adoption of environmentally sustainable
policies”.
412
Portney, Taking Sustainability Seriously.
413
Lubell, Feiock, and Handy. “City adoption of environmentally sustainable policies”.
414
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city’s commitment to environmental policy is measured as an index that takes into account
policy implementation at the local level, the significance of level of education as a variable is
mixed.
Many of the aforementioned studies do draw many of their data from county-level census
data. My research makes the best possible attempt to construct variables at the city level. Though
the county may be a good approximation, if the municipal level data was available, it was used
for my dissertation research. Though the difference between county and city data may be slight,
it could still be a substantial enough difference to impact the correlation with local environmental
policy.
Previous research also identified median household income as a variable that could be
correlated with a commitment to local environmental policy. This research expected a correlation
between median income and GHG inventories with complementary action plans at the city level
in four of the six analyses. However, median household income as a control variable was not
significant in any of the models analyzed for this research. Two studies reported a negative
significant correlation between higher median income levels within a city and lower levels of
environmental commitment at the local level.415 Krause uses the MCPA as an indicator of
environmental commitment, finding a negative significant correlation between higher median
income of a city and a reduced likelihood of a city joining becoming a signatory to the mayor’s
agreement.416 Likewise, Boyle found that median household income had a significant negative
correlation with MCPA commitment.417 Research that uses sustainability indices as an indicator
of local sustainability progress also showed a negative correlation between higher median

415
Krause, “An assessment of the impact of the impact that participation”; Krause, “Symbolic or Substantive
Policy?”.
416
Krause, “Symbolic or Substantive Policy?”.
417
Boyle, “Examination of US cities as forces in environmental policy,” 195.

138

income and higher index scores.418 The findings of these studies all suggested that adding
median income as a variable in this analysis was important in terms of the overall strength of the
model. A possible reason for non-significance might be connected to what level of data was used
and the dependent variable in the studies used to justify the control variable of median income.
All of these studies collected data from the county-level for their analysis. As noted in education,
there are small differences between county and municipal data that may obscure a connection
between the control and dependent variable. Also, many of the studies that included this control
variable used the MCPA as the dependent variable representing city commitment to local
environmental policy. As discussed earlier, using the MCPA as an indicator of a city’s
environmental commitment is not sufficient to measure environmental policy implementation.
Another control variable used for this research is related to the relative local power of the
manufacturing industry in a city. While manufacturing industries have had a more diminished
role in urban areas across the United States since the 1970s, some literature shows those
industries still maintain some influence in local governance. In selected case studies of cities and
their respective ‘sustainability seriousness,’ Portney finds a significant negative correlation
between high employment in manufacturing and a city pursuing strategies of sustainability.419
Boyle’s analysis of MCPA signatories used a proportion of manufacturing variable in an
investment model and found no correlation between MCPA adoption.420 Across all time periods
in my analysis, the control variable used to represent the proportion employed in manufacturing
was not significantly correlated to a city creating a local GHG inventory with a complementary
action plan.

418
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There are a couple of reasons why this variable might not be significant and how to
improve the variable overall for future research. As mentioned in chapter three, this
measurement would be more precise by collecting data on industries associated explicitly with
high carbon emissions. However, the lack of data from the 1990s and a limited research window
made the collection of that data impossible for this particular research project. Also, the results
of the limited amount of studies that have used an employment in manufacturing variable in the
past make it difficult to assess a connection to local climate policy.
Of the control variables used in this research, political party affiliation was significant in
two of the six models analyzed. For the United States, the variable was coded to reflect the
Presidential vote choice of districts within a city’s limits. For Canadian cities, I used vote totals
reflecting Member of Parliament choice. In the models representing the time period 1992-2002, I
expected no significance between GHG inventories and party affiliation. This research did
expect significance from the two of the timelines, 2003-2010 and 2011-2018. The expected
significance was due to the growing political culture of conservatives in the United States against
local environmental initiatives and ICLEI as a network. A problem with using a dummy variable
for party affiliation is a resulting low variation, which could have affected the analysis itself.
A more detailed and precise party affiliation variable could help strengthen the model in the
future.
As a network, ICLEI was instrumental in bringing together a coalition of city leaders
seeking to have a voice in environmental policy in the early 1990s. This included work with
conference bodies before, during, and after the Rio Summit in 1992, and on Agenda 21 and
Local Agenda 21 activities. Many far-right conservative groups and politicians have labeled
Agenda 21 as a United Nations plot to take land rights away from citizens of the United States,
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among other charges. For nearly two decades, ICLEI has been framed by these conspiracy
theorists as a central figure in the international plot initiated by Agenda 21.
By 2012, the voices of conspiracy theorists had reached the Republican National
Committee that passed a resolution titled, “Resolution Exposing United Nations Agenda 21”.
Preceding the RNC resolution, radio personalities and far-right political figures incited antiAgenda 21 sentiments among Tea Party members and other political activists.
It seems that 2012 was a moment when the political culture of the conservative
movement in America embraced conspiracy theories and crafted anti-environmental positions
within state legislative bodies, through political committees, and conservative-leaning media
outlets. With this in mind, the findings of significance in the two analyses from 2011-2018 make
sense. From the late 1990s and early 2000s, a fringe movement against international
environmental action, in the form of Agenda 21, reached the upper echelon of political
leadership in the United States. Anti-Agenda 21 activity did not impact Canadian politics as it
did in the United States. However, as Chapter One illustrates, conservative Canadian politicians
have not been supportive of international environmental initiatives.
This analysis seeks to identify the impact of transnational municipal networks on local
environmental policy, specifically Greenhouse Gas inventories with complementary action plans.
In creating a model to assess this impact, this dissertation included control variables that would
account for factors influencing the implementation of local environmental policy. Researchers on
cities and their commitment to local environmental policies have made a case using each of the
control variables in my study. Unfortunately, most of the control variables did not show a
correlation with GHG inventories or action plans in the three timelines. In the final chapter, I will
discuss how the model and control variables can be improved in future research to provide a
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model with higher levels of explanatory power. In the next section, I test for multicollinearity
issues by using the Variance Inflation Factor of the independent variable.

Testing for Multicollinearity
To assess possible issues with multicollinearity, I will use tests to determine the Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) of the independent variables used for this analysis. I use the VIF to
measure the impact of collinearity among the independent variables in analyses using regression.
If the VIF measurement reports “unusually higher than one”421 or reports a score of eight, then
there is a need to be concerned about multicollinearity.422

(Insert Table 4.10 Here)

(Insert Table 4.11 Here)
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 report the VIF measurement for ICLEI membership and ICLEI
technical leadership during the time period 1991-2002. VIF measurements are all below 2, which
indicates there is little reason for concern of multicollinearity issues between the independent
variable.
(Insert Table 4.12 Here)
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(Insert Table 4.13 Here)
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 report the VIF measurement for ICLEI membership and ICLEI
technical leadership during the time period 2003-2010. As in the case of the VIF measurements
for the previous time period, the VIF measurements were all below 2, suggesting little worry for
issues of multicollinearity between variables.
(Insert Table 4.14 Here)

(Insert Table 4.15 Here)
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 report the VIF measurement for ICLEI membership and ICLEI
technical leadership during the time period 2011-2018. For this time period, there was no VIF
above 2.

Conclusion
This chapter reports the results of the analysis from multiple time periods that test the
hypothesis of this research. Hypothesis 1 postulates that ICLEI membership would have a
significant impact on members completing GHG inventories with complementary action plans.
Specific to this hypothesis, I expected significance during the time periods 2003-2010 and 20112018. As expected, the 1991-2002 time period did not find a connection between ICLEI
membership and GHG inventories. As mentioned previously, this result was due to a lack of
variance in the dependent variable for both models (ICLEI membership and ICLEI technical
assistance) in the 1991-2002 time period. Results of the 2003-2010 analysis show a significant
relationship between ICLEI membership and GHG inventories with complementary action plans,
supporting the hypothesis for H1. For 2011-2018, the results again show a statistical significance
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to the impact of ICLEI membership on member-cities conducting GHG inventories with action
plans.
Hypothesis 2 concerns the capacity of ICLEI to extend beyond membership to diffuse
norms. This hypothesis takes into account, not just ICLEI membership, but other ICLEI created
or ICLEI-operated programs that cities might use to conduct appropriate GHG inventories and
develop local action plans. With this in mind, Hypothesis two postulates that ICLEI technical
assistance has a significant impact on cities conducting GHG inventories with complementary
local action plans. As expected, ICLEI technical assistance was not significantly correlated to
cities developing GHG inventories in the 1991-2002 time period. As was the case for the H1
analysis during this time period, this model suffered from a low sample size of confirmed GHG
inventories and action plans for cities. As expected, the analysis conducted on the 2003-2010
time period found ICLEI technical assistance to be significantly related to cities conducting
GHG inventories and developing local action plans. This analysis was repeated for the 20112018 time period, finding that the impact of ICLEI technical assistance was significantly related
to cities conducting GHG inventories and developing complementary action plans.
In time periods 2003-2010 and 2011-2018, there was a significant impact on cities
conducting GHG inventories and action plans for both the ICLEI membership and ICLEI
technical assistance variable. For both time periods, ICLEI technical assistance outperformed
ICLEI membership in terms of outcomes related to city performance in developing these local
environmental policies. In the 2003-2010 analysis, cities that sought ICLEI technical assistance
were 32 times more likely to conduct GHG inventories with action plans, while ICLEI
membership made cities only 4 times more likely to conduct or carry out the same local
initiatives. Similarly, analysis of the 2011-2018 time period reported that ICLEI membership
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made cities more than 9 times more likely than non-member cities to conduct an inventory and
develop a local action plan. During the same time period, ICLEI technical assistance made cities
213 times more likely to assemble a GHG inventory with a complementary action plan than
cities that did not utilize the ICLEI network. These results indicate a growing impact over twenty
years in terms of the diffusion of a decarbonization norm from a Transnational Municipal
Network of cities. Additionally, the results suggest that ICLEI members and cities that sought
ICLEI technical assistance diffused a decarbonization norm to the local level more efficiently
than cities that did not utilize ICLEI services. I will discuss this further in Chapter Five, where I
will provide a more in-depth interpretation of the results and their implication to current and
future academic work.
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Models and Analysis of 1991-2002
Table 4.1: Variables, Measurement, Hypothesized Impact, and Mean Value for timeline
1991-2002
Variables

Measurement

Hypothesized
Impact

Mean Value

Dependent: GHG
Inventory

0= No GHG/LAP
1= City GHG
Inventory and LAP

N/A

.07

No Significance

.28

ICLEI Technical
Assistance
(Source: ICLEI
Documents, Internal
City Documents,
and Reports)

0= no ICLEI
No Significance
assistance
1= ICLEI assistance
provided

.29

Employment in
Manufacturing
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

% employed in
manufacturing

No Significance

10.763

Education Level
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

% above 25 with
BA

No Significance

18.225

Party Affiliation
(Source: County
/District Data)

0= Conservative
1= Liberal

No Significance

.79

Median Income
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

Median Income

No Significance

$31318.31

Population Density
(Source: American
Factfinder and
Canadian Census)

Number of people
per square mile

No Significance

3503.98

Independent:
0= non-ICLEI city
ICLEI Membership 1= ICLEI Member
(Source: ICLEI
City
Documents, Internal
City Documents,
and Reports)

146

Table 4.2: Logistic Regression Model of ICLEI membership influence on GHG inventory
and action plan, time period 1991-2002
Independent Variables

Logg-Odds

S.E.

Odds-Ratio

pValue

ICLEI Membership

19.726

4203.15

368889335.0

0.996

Employment in Manufacturing 0.004

.063

1.004

0.946

Education Level

-0.065

.075

0.937

0.387

Party Affiliation

17.430

6475.66

37115512.1

0.998

Median Income

0.00

.000

1.0

0.567

Population Density

0.00

.000

1.0

0.955

Constant

-37.856

7720

0.000

0.996

Model Statistics:

Value:

Model Chi Square

24.264

Cox & Snell

0.190

Table 4.3: Logistic Regression Model of ICLEI Technical Assistance influence on GHG
inventory and action plan time period 1991-2002
Independent Variables

Log
Odds

S.E.

Odds-Ratio

pValue

ICLEI Technical Assistance

19.576

4213.772

317371129

0.996

Employment in Manufacturing

0.025

.065

1.025

0.701

Education Level

-0.040

.073

0.961

0.589

Party Affiliation

17.745

6455.35

50904908.5

0.998

Median Income

0.000

.000

1.00

0.317

Population Density

0.000

.000

1.00

0.825

Constant

-39.210

7708.921

0.000

0.996

Model Statistics:

Value:

Model Chi Square

23.928

Cox & Snell

0.188
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Models and Analysis of 2003-2010
Table 4.4: Variables, Measurement, Hypothesized Impact, and Mean Value for timeline
2003-2010
Variables

Measurement

Hypothesized
Impact

Mean Value

Dependent: GHG
Inventory

0= No GHG/LAP
1= City GHG
Inventory and LAP

N/A

.47

Significant

.39

ICLEI Technical
Assistance
(Source: ICLEI
Documents, Internal
City Documents,
and Reports)

0= no ICLEI
Significant
assistance
1= ICLEI assistance
provided

.52

Employment in
Manufacturing
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

% employed in
manufacturing

Significant

19.37

Education Level
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

% above 25 with
BA

Significant

9.14

Party Affiliation
(Source: Precinct
/District Data)

0= Conservative
1= Liberal

Significant

.59

Median Income
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

Median Income

Significant

$46405.45

Population Density
(Source: American
Factfinder and
Canadian Census)

Number of people
per square mile

Significant

6813.75

Independent:
0= non-ICLEI city
ICLEI Membership 1= ICLEI Member
(Source: ICLEI
City
Documents, Internal
City Documents,
and Reports)
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Table 4.5: Logistic Regression Model of ICLEI membership influence on GHG inventory
and action plan, time period 2003-2010
Independent Variables

Log
Odds

S.E.

Odds-Ratio

Pvalue

ICLEI Membership

1.501

.461

4.486

0.001

Employment in Manufacturing

-0.025

.039

0.975

0.975

Education Level

0.025

.043

1.025

0.569

Party Affiliation

0.641

.453

1.899

0.157

Median Income

0.000

.000

1.000

0.167

Population Density

0.000

.000

1.000

0.668

Constant

-2.538

.940

0.079

0.007

Model Statistics:

Value:

Model Chi Square

27.343

Cox & Snell

0.205

Table 4.6: Logistic Regression Model of ICLEI Technical Assistance influence on GHG
inventory and action plan time period 2003-2010
Independent Variables

Log Odds

S.E.

Odds-Ratio

P value

ICLEI Technical Assistance

3.489

.616

32.748

0.000

Employment in Manufacturing

-0.069

.045

0.933

0.124

Education Level

-0.021

.051

0.979

0.685

Party Affiliation

0.027

.574

1.028

0.962

Median Income

0.000

.000

1.00

0.096

Population Density

0.000

.000

1.00

0.698

Constant

-2.993

1.156

0.050

0.010

Model Statistics:

Value:

Model Chi Square

63.985***

Cox & Snell

0.416
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Models and Analysis of 2011-2018
Table 4.7: Variables, Measurement, Hypothesized Impact, and Mean Value for timeline
2011-2018
Variables

Measurement

Hypothesized Impact Mean Value

Dependent: GHG
Inventory

0= No GHG/LAP
1= City GHG
Inventory and LAP

N/A

.67

Independent:
0= non-ICLEI city
ICLEI Membership 1= ICLEI Member
(Source: ICLEI
City
Documents, Internal
City Documents, and
Reports)

Significant

.34

ICLEI Technical
Assistance
(Source: ICLEI
Documents, Internal
City Documents, and
Reports)

0= no ICLEI
assistance
1= ICLEI assistance
provided

Significant

.61

Employment in
Manufacturing
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

% employed in
manufacturing

Significant

7.48

Education Level
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

% above 25 with BA Significant

34.16

Party Affiliation
(Source: Precinct
/District Data)

0= Conservative
1= Liberal

Significant

.73

Median Income
(Source: US and
Canadian Census)

Median Income

Significant

$56497.40

Population Density
(Source: American
Factfinder and
Canadian Census)

Number of people
per square mile

Significant

7613.29
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Table 4.8: Logistic Regression Model of ICLEI membership influence on GHG inventory
and action plan, time period 2011-2018
Independent Variables

Log
Odds

S.E.

Odds-Ratio

P VAlue

ICLEI Membership

2.302

.704

9.993

0.001

Employment in Manufacturing

0.090

.070

1.094

0.199

Education Level

0.009

.028

1.009

0.739

Party Affiliation

2.460

.591

11.701

0.000

Median Income

0.000

.000

1.000

0.128

Population Density

0.000

.000

1.000

0.816

Constant

-3.848

1.314

0.021

0.003

Model Statistics:

Value:

Model Chi Square

45.374

Cox & Snell

0.317

Table 4.9: Logistic Regression Model of ICLEI Technical Assistance influence on GHG
inventory and action plan, time period 2011-2018
Independent Variables

Log
Odds

S.E.

Odds-Ratio

PValue

ICLEI Technical Assistance

5.363

1.143

213.389

0.000

Employment in Manufacturing

-0.022

.110

0.978

0.840

Education Level

-0.036

.044

0.965

0.416

Party Affiliation

3.337

1.180

28.146

0.005

Median Income

0.000

.000

1.000

0.432

Population Density

0.000

.000

1.000

0.964

Constant

-3.800

2.067

0.022

0.066

Model Statistics:

Value:

Model Chi Square

93.294

Cox & Snell

0.543
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Table 4.10: Variance Inflation Factor- GHG Inventory w/Action: 1991-2002
Independent Variables

VIF

ICLEI Membership

1.298

Employment in Manufacturing

1.075

Education Level

1.191

Party Affiliation

1.325

Median Income

1.222

Population Density

1.216

Table 4.11: Variance Inflation Factor - GHG Inventory w/Action: 1991-2002
Independent Variables

VIF

ICLEI Technical Assistance

1.272

Employment in Manufacturing

1.063

Education Level

1.180

Party Affiliation

1.300

Median Income

1.189

Population Density

1.250

Table 4.12: Variance Inflation Factor- GHG Inventory w/Action: 2003-2010
Independent Variables

VIF

ICLEI Membership

1.267

Employment in Manufacturing

1.038

Education Level

1.600

Party Affiliation

1.203

Median Income

1.546

Population Density

1.053
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Table 4.13: Variance Inflation Factor - GHG Inventory w/Action: 2003-2010
Independent Variables

VIF

ICLEI Technical Assistance

1.278

Employment in Manufacturing

1.049

Education Level

1.593

Party Affiliation

1.213

Median Income

1.543

Population Density

1.048

Table 4.14: Variance Inflation Factor - GHG Inventory w/Action: 2011-2018
Independent Variables

VIF

ICLEI Membership

1.092

Employment in Manufacturing

1.057

Education Level

1.320

Party Affiliation

1.054

Median Income

1.292

Population Density

1.056

Table 4.15: Variance Inflation Factor - GHG Inventory w/Action: 2011-2018
Independent Variables

VIF

ICLEI Technical Assistance

1.242

Employment in Manufacturing

1.098

Education Level

1.321

Party Affiliation

1.147

Median Income

1.330

Population Density

1.046
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Introduction
The purpose of my research is to explore the impact of TMNs and their members on the
diffusion of a decarbonization norm from the international level to the local level. Data from
three time periods (1991-2002, 2003-2010, and 2011-2018) were used to test the capacity of
ICLEI to diffuse environmental norms and policies to its members. Previous research has
highlighted a role for sub-national and supra-national actors in the coordination and diffusion of
environmental norms and policy in European countries. However, there are limited research
projects that analyze the diffusion of environmental norms within the United States and Canada.
I chose cities from the United States and Canada because of their central governments’
reluctance to join or follow international environmental agreements.423 While these federal
governments failed to meet their commitments to international environmental efforts, many cities
continued to enact local policies that align with international standards.

Summary and Findings
Chapter One included a historical overview of international climate regime’s response to
environmental crisis, the reaction of uncommitted nation states, and the efforts of municipal
leaders to enact local versions of international agreements.
Chapter Two identified literatures that frame the role of subnational and supranational
actors in a system of multilevel governance and provided a framework to better understand the

423

Kyoto and the Paris Climate Agreement.
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diffusion of norms. Literature on multilevel governance highlighted the decentering of nation
state power and its redistribution to subnational and supranational actors, like cities and TMNs.
Second generation constructivism, specifically the norm life cycle, acted as a framework from
which to view the activity of non-state actors in the diffusion of norms. I used Finnemore and
Sikkink’s conception of norms to develop the norm of decarbonization, which has two central
objectives related to GHG monitoring and action at the local level. I later used these objectives to
construct the dependent variable used in the analysis for my research.
Chapter Three outlined the research design, procedures for analysis, and provided a
presentation of the hypothesis. I used a logistic regression model to explore the relationship
between ICLEI membership and the diffusion of GHG mitigation strategies and action, over
three time periods.
Chapter Four presented the sources, conceptualization, and operationalization of the
variables used in this research. The findings from the analysis in Chapter Four support
hypothesis one424 in two of the three time periods; 2003-2010 and 2011-2018. The 2003-2010
analysis reveals the beginning of a process that brings international environmental norms,
specifically GHG inventories combined with local action, to the local level. During this time
period, ICLEI members were 4 times more likely than non-members to conduct GHG inventories
and develop local action plans. In 2011-2018 time period, those cities that were members of
ICLEI were over 9 times more likely to conduct GHG inventories with a complementary action
plan than non-members. These findings indicate that ICLEI cities were significant actors in the
development of environmental policy in the United States and Canada between 2003-2018. The
federal response to climate change in the form of environmental policy languished during the late

424

(H1) ICLEI membership has a significant impact on the environmental policy of member cities.
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1990s and 2000s in the United States. As a result, many cities began community-driven projects
to develop local policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The results from the analysis of ICLEI technical assistance support hypothesis two in two
of the three time periods; 2003-2010 and 2011-2018.425 From 2003-2010 cities that used ICLEIdeveloped products or services, regardless of membership, were 32 times more likely to develop
GHG inventories than cities that did not use ICLEI services, software, or protocols. This time
period marks an expansion in the capacity of ICLEI to reach both members and non-members to
diffuse standards of appropriate behavior in conducting GHG inventories and developing local
action plans. During the time period 2011-2018, those cities that sought ICLEI’s technical
assistance were 213 times more likely to conduct a GHG inventory than cities that did not use
ICLEI or its services. These two time periods confirm the second hypothesis; Technical
assistance from ICLEI has a significant impact on the environmental policy of those cities that
utilize the organization’s programs. These findings also have implications for literature related to
norms, their life cycles, and significant actors in the diffusion of environmental norms.

Implications for Theory
The findings presented in this research confirm and expand constructivist literature on
norms, the impact of non-state actors in the norm life cycle, and how norm diffusion occurs
within rogue states. The analysis of the time periods 2003-2010 and 2011-2018 reveal a
significant role for TMNs and cities in the diffusion of a decarbonization norm in the United
States and Canada.
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My research confirms that local authorities play a role as norm entrepreneurs in the first
stage of the norm life cycle. Some cities in the United States and Canada responded to
international agreements by creating or proposing local ordinances to phase out contaminants
like CFCs or GHGs. Until the formation of ICLEI, municipal leaders in the United States utilized
domestic networks like LEOSR to challenge the federal government to adopt the decarbonization
norm reflected in the Montreal Protocol.
After the formation of ICLEI, cities used the TMN as an organizational platform to
coordinate blueprints of local action that aligned with international environmental standards. The
use of ICLEI as an organizational platform for norm entrepreneurs conforms with the literature
on norms and their life cycles. Projects initiated by ICLEI included the creation of multiple GHG
emission inventory software platforms for cities and technical support for city-based projects like
the Urban CO2 Reduction Program and the Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide. Additionally, the
network led delegations of cities to international conferences, where city leaders acted as
advocates for and contributors to an international climate regime. The activities of ICLEI
illustrate the importance of the TMN as an organizational platform and network for norm
entrepreneurs in the first stage of the norm life cycle.
This dissertation research also adds to our understanding of the role of TMNs in the
socialization and institutionalization of a norm in the second stage of its life cycle. During norm
cascade, Finnemore and Sikkink theorized that networks of norm entrepreneurs are essential for
their role as “agents of socialization.”426 Networks are considered essential because they
continue to convince state leaders to adopt ascending norms and monitor state adherence to
norms. However, this research analyzes a TMN with members who are not nation states but have
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political authority beyond norm entrepreneurs or NGOs. While ICLEI certainly reinforced the
socialization of a decarbonization norm, I contend that ICLEI and its members also
institutionalized a decarbonization norm.
ICLEI made significant efforts to align international standards to local GHG policy by
means of advancing affiliated networks, expanding the services offered to local governments,
and elevating the position of local governments within an international climate change regime. In
this dissertation, time periods two (2003-2010) and three (2011-2018) show a growth in the
number of cities in the United States and Canada that have achieved the objectives of a
decarbonization norm. Within these time periods, ICLEI’s impact on the local policy of members
and all cities that sought technical assistance expanded significantly. These findings coincide
with research on TMNs and cities that show the proliferation of local initiatives that address
reducing GHG emissions across the EU. At ICLEI-organized symposia, local governments
shared project ideas and results. Local governments demonstrated their efficacy by implementing
local action plans and gained legitimacy at the international level. This legitimacy was necessary
for local governments to gain appropriate recognition within the international climate regime.
The institutionalization of GHG monitoring systems and action plans among local governments
allowed ICLEI, and other TMNs, to make the case for local governments as partners in an
international climate regime.
This dissertation also adds to our understanding of ‘norm leaders’ in the constructivist
life cycle of norms. The findings of this research support the hypothesis that TMNs influence the
policies of cities by diffusing a decarbonization norm. However, cities are the final architects of
local policy aimed at advancing a decarbonization norm and serve a vital role in the norm life
cycle. As discussed in Chapter Two, Finnemore and Sikkink define a ‘norm leader’ as a nation
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state government that has adopted and advocates for a specific norm. One of the reasons states
are labeled as a norm leader is due to their ability to influence the legal and social structures that
frame a new norm for citizens. States that are norm leaders are also influential in the second
stage of the norm life cycle by convincing other states to follow a specific norm. Cities and their
leadership have similar capacities by creating local policies and programs. The findings of this
research and analysis point towards a more significant role for cities as norm leaders in the first
and second stages of a norm life cycle.
As discussed in Chapter One, cities and their networks consistently challenged the Parties
of the UNFCCC for recognition of local action aimed at fighting climate change and working
towards decarbonization at the local level. Local authorities were eventually recognized as
government stakeholders in an international climate regime because of their advocacy at the
international level and leadership in crafting local strategies aimed at achieving decarbonization.
While both the United States and Canada eventually abandoned the Kyoto Protocol, cities in
those countries continued uninterrupted development of local strategies aimed at improving air
quality through actions associated with decarbonization. Cities are norm entrepreneur and norms
leaders because they advocate for norms and implement policies that align with international
standards.
The position of cities as norm leaders becomes more significant when the city is
operating within a rogue state, such as the United States or Canada. This research adds to our
understanding of how subnational actors can diffuse international environmental norms in the
absence of federal support. Within the norm life cycle, a rogue state is one that openly breaks or
ignores a rising norm supported by the majority of states. During the end of the first time period
of 1991-2002, the George W. Bush administration expressed doubts about international
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environmental agreements in his refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. During the second time
period of 2003-2011, Canada conveyed to the international community it would not follow the
Kyoto Protocols beginning in 2006. During the final time period 2012-2018, the United States
experienced a split in environmental leadership. While the Obama administration re-engaged
with the international climate regime, the Trump administration has been antagonistic toward
environmental regulation. However, the findings of this analysis indicate cities in both countries
that were either ICLEI members or cities that sought ICLEI’s technical assistance continued to
work towards decarbonization through local action. The role of networks in the diffusion of
norms within rogue states is vital in terms of staying connected to effective ways to inventory
and reduce local emissions. This research demonstrates that TMNs and cities can diffuse a
decarbonization norm in the absence of central government guidance, which adds to our
understanding of norm leaders within the norm life cycle.
Early ICLEI members were primed towards accepting and advocating for a norm like
decarbonization before joining the TMN. For example, cities like Irvine and San Diego pushed
for local ordinances that aligned with the Montreal Protocol, even before the formation of ICLEI.
However, the findings of this research indicate that cities lean on the resources of ICLEI, or
ICLEI funded networks, in assembling their local action plans and in protocol related to GHG
inventory at the local level. This means that while cities might come to ICLEI primed as norm
advocates, TMNs help cities become norm leaders when their local decarbonization efforts align
to international standards.
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Limitations of the Research
The analysis showed a significant correlation between both ICLEI membership or
technical assistance, and GHG mitigation strategies. However, the model itself is less than
moderate in its predictive strength across all variables and timelines. Various improvements to
the predictive strength of the models are discussed below.
Two of the control variables used in this research can be improved for future analysis to
better reflect the unit being measured. I believe that while these variables were not significant,
they are still valuable indicators that should be accounted for in an analysis. For example, party
affiliation was coded as a dummy variable with 0 representing conservative cities and 1
representing cities that voted for the liberal political party. If the variable was changed to a ratio
that represents the number of votes a candidate receives in a given election,427 it could provide a
more accurate and detailed picture of the political makeup of cities. Additionally, the cities used
in this research trend towards representation from the Liberal or Democratic party. Expanding
the universe of cities can capture more politically diverse cities, to the extent that is possible in a
two-party political system. The variable representing manufacturing employment in cities could
also be improved with a more detailed count of the high carbon or pollutant producing industries
within a city’s limits. A higher level of detail could produce a city-level variable that is more
representative of industries that contribute to GHG emissions. Improvement of the political party
affiliation and employment in manufacturing variables will improve the R squared score and
increase the explanatory value of the model.
Two other variables that would also enhance the explanatory value of the model are the
presence of dedicated a sustainability official and a regional variable. The existence of a
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dedicated office of sustainability or city officials for sustainability increases the likelihood of a
city conducting a GHG inventory with a local action plan. A regional variable can account for
regions, like the western United States, where states like California have laws that mandate cities
conduct a GHG inventory.
The independent variable that represents ICLEI membership can be altered to reflect a
broader membership in TMNs. The proliferation of municipal networks and agreements
beginning in 2005 mark an increase in the amount and type of organizational structure of
municipal networks concerned with environmental issues. Mayoral networks like the C40 and
MCPA developed after ICLEI but have had a profound effect on the urban response to climate
change and the challenges of sustainability. While the ICLEI technical assistance model does
capture some municipal networks in which ICLEI is a contributing force (i.e., the CCPC,
Carbonn Registry), it cannot capture the work of other municipal networks that operate
separately from the network at the center of this research.
Time and financial constraints made it impossible to collect more relevant data to
examine other TMNs and their members to assess the impact of such organizations. Membership
in other TMNs would have an impact on some environmental norms, especially beginning in
2005 when a large number of city-oriented networks began to emerge at the domestic, regional,
and international levels. Furthermore, given more time, this research would have a higher sample
of cities. An expanded universe of cities would improve the identification of outliers and the
accuracy of the findings. Additionally, a survey instrument could improve the research by more
detailed questions related to municipal-specific projects that reflect local environmental action.
Survey data might also help fill in time periods where data was sparse.
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A lack of data from the 1990s was an issue in this research. For example, collecting and
verifying GHG inventories and action plans for the time period 1991-2002 was difficult due to
some city archives lacking data before the early 2000s. A Lexis Nexis search of news articles did
lead to the discovery of some GHG inventories and action plans during the 1991-2002 time
period. However, some similar data may have been unintentionally excluded.
While a quantitative approach was able to confirm the hypotheses of this research, a
mixed methods approach would provide a more in-depth view into the process of environmental
norm diffusion from the international to the local level. A quantitative approach provides insight
into whether ICLEI had an impact on the environmental policy and norms of its members.
However, this approach can tell us nothing about precisely how ICLEI influenced the policy and
norms of its member cities. A mixed method or qualitative approach could isolate individual city
cases to find the ways in which these cities developed their local environmental policy and
response to environmental issues. Without a more detailed analysis of individual city
environmental activity, a more detailed account of how norms are diffused cannot be produced.
In terms of theoretical limits, this research was not able to analyze a decarbonization
norm in the third stage of the norm life cycle. As discussed in Chapter Two, the third stage of the
norm life cycle involves a norm becoming internalized across states and their respective
domestic institutions. A norm related to GHG measurement and mitigation has not yet reached a
position that is accepted by all states and their domestic institutions. At a regional level, literature
points to an internalization of a decarbonization norm across the European Union.428 However,
the abandonment of international environmental agreements in favor of economic interest from
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the United States and Canada shows that a decarbonization norm is slow to internalize across
nation states globally.
Future Research
The dependent variable for this study represents GHG inventories with complementary
action plans and is an adequate demonstration of local action that reflects a response to
international norms. However, the variable itself can be strengthened by including other local
action related to environmental policy. In future research, I plan to expand the dependent
variable to an ordinal variable that includes a GHG inventory, local action plan, green fleet
programs tied to local action plans,429 and green building codes. As discussed in Chapter 2, some
scholars have created indices that account for factors of urban environmental sustainability. An
index could prove to be an excellent dependent variable to measure against TMN membership
across time.
A greater focus should be placed on understanding the beginnings of networks like
ICLEI, which originated from other smaller domestic networks in the early 1980s. Groups like
LEOSR and the LEO Project played a role in demanding a greater voice for cities in issues of
international importance. With more time and resources, a researcher could provide a detailed
qualitative study that expands our understanding of these municipal networks. Topics for further
study include LEOSR demanding divestment from companies connected to apartheid in South
Africa, the development of sanctuary cities, and early efforts to bring the Montreal Protocols to
local governments through municipal policies. Some of the municipal representatives involved in
LEOSR were significant in the founding of ICLEI and served as its inaugural leadership. An
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examination of the role of these actors in early efforts to bring international norms to local levels
and provide a greater voice for cities in international dialogue would add to our understanding of
early urban environmental norm entrepreneurs.
Bulkeley highlights city networks’ organizational changes circa 2005 that saw the
proliferation of new city networks and TMNs that addressed environmental challenges.430 Since
that time, ICLEI has created partnerships with many domestic and global networks representing
cities. The connection between ICLEI and domestic environmental mayoral networks and
agreements should be studied further. Many of the domestic municipal networks of mayors
(National League of Cities, Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement) and TMNs (C40, Global
Covenant of Mayors) partner with ICLEI in the pursuit of similar environmental goals. To what
extent do these organizations aid each other in the diffusion of international environmental
norms, and what can the combined work of these networks and their members tell us about the
life cycle of norms? In addition, are there specific patterns of cooperation between networks that
help the diffusion of norms related to decarbonization?
It is important to restate that researching the life cycle of environmental norms is difficult
because of the incomplete status of environmental norms like decarbonization. While there is an
agreement that sustainable solutions to environmental challenges should be a priority of nation
states, economic factors or ideology have impeded a complete internalization of a
decarbonization norm across all states. Many local and nation state governments support and
advocate for a decarbonization norm. Yet, there is not broad enough support bordering on
“ought-ness” as describe by Finnemore and Sikkink.
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To better understand how political movements might impede the progression of a norm
within the life cycle, the role and impact of anti-environmental movements requires further
examination. Opposition from the fossil fuel industry and anti-Agenda 21 conservatives may be a
factor in governments failing to adopt environmental norms at the national level or leaving
networks that improve local environmental strategies. My data shows a slight drop in the mean
average of cities that were members of ICLEI from the second timeline431 to the third timeline.432
These averages corroborate other research that notes a decline in ICLEI membership beginning
around 2010. However, there was an increase in the mean average of those cities that sought
technical assistance from ICLEI from the second433 to third timeline.434 This may suggest that
some cities dropped ICLEI membership, but continued to use ICLEI technical assistance to
create local action plans and conduct GHG inventories. However, without more research into the
specific reasons why cities left ICLEI the above suggestion is just conjecture. Understanding the
impact and motivations of these groups might explain how a norm like decarbonization might
reach a level of support that borders on internalization. Additionally, more research is required to
see how a norm cascade might be progressing at the local level in the post-Paris agreement era.
Additional research could provide insight into how local authorities have become even more
vocal in their pursuit of local environmental policies.
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Appendix 1: Universe of Cities
0=No membership OR did not find material related to membership in ICLEI
n/a= Still a member OR could not locate documentation of when city left ICLEI
U=The city joined ICLEI during the first time period. However, the exact date is unknown. San
Diego begins to appear in ICLEI documentation as a member in 2000.

Table A1: Universe of Cities
Cities
New York City, NY
Los Angeles, CA
Chicago, Il
Houston, TX
Philadelphia,
Phoenix, AZ
San Antonio, TX
San Diego, CA
Dallas, TX
San Jose, CA
Austin, TX
Jacksonville, FL
Indianapolis, IN
San Francisco, CA
Columbus, OH
Fort Worth, TX
Charlotte, NC
Detroit, MI
El Paso, TX
Memphis, TN
Boston, MA
Seattle, WA
Denver, CO
Washington, DC
Nashville, TN

Year City
Joined UCLEI
1999
1991
1991
2006
2007
0
2012

Year city left
ICLEI
n/a
n/a
2007
2015
n/a
0
2007
2001

2013
1992
1992
0
0
1996
2018
0
0
0
0
0
2000
1998
1992
2008
2016

n/a
2004
n/a
0
0
2005
n/a
0
0
0
0
0
2013
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
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Table A1 (Continued)
Baltimore, MD
Louisville, KY
Portland, OR
Oklahoma City, OK
Milwaukee, WI
Las Vegas, NV

2012
1992
1992
0
0
2007

n/a
n/a
n/a
0
0
n/a

Albuquerque, NM
Tucson, AZ
Fresno, CA
Sacramento, CA
Long Beach, CA
Kansas City, MO
Mesa, AZ
Virginia B., VA
Atlanta, GA
Colorado Springs, CO
Raleigh, NC
Omaha, NE
Miami, FL
Oakland, CA
Tulsa, OK
Minneapolis, MN
Cleveland, OH
Wichita, KA
Arlington, TX
New Orleans, LA
Bakersfield, CA
Tampa, FL
Honolulu, HI
Anaheim, CA
Aurora, CO
Santa Ana, CA
St. Louis, MO
Riverside, CA
Corpus Christ, TX
Pittsburgh, PA
Lexington, KY

2007
2012
0
0
0
2007
0
0
2008
0
2006
2010
1993
2018
0
1993
2012
0
0
2007
0
0
1998
0
0
2018
0
2016
0
2006
0

n/a
n/a
0
0
0
2012
0
0
n/a
0
2013
n/a
n/a
2008
0
2018
2015
0
0
n/a
0
0
n/a
0
0
n/a
0
n/a
0
n/a
0
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Table A1 (Continued)
Anchorage, AK
Stockton, CA
Cincinnati, OH
St. Paul, MN
Toledo, OH
Newark, NJ
Greensboro, NC
Plano, TX
Henderson, NV
Lincoln, NE
Buffalo, NY
Fort Wayne, IN
Jersey City, NJ
Chula Vista, CA
Orlando, FL
St. Petersburg, FL
Norfolk, VA
Chandler, AZ
Laredo, TX
Madison, WI
Durham, NC
Lubbock, TX
Winston-Salem, MA
Garland, TX
Glendale, AZ
Hialeah, FL
Reno, NV
Baton Rouge, LA
Irvine, CA
Chesapeake, VA
Irving, TX
Scottsdale, AZ
N. Las Vegas, NV
Fremont, CA
Gilbert Town, AZ
Boise, ID
Birmingham, AL
Toronto, ON

0
0
2018
1995
2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1994
2016
0
0
0
0
2000
0
0
0
0
0
1991
0
0
2001
0
0
0
0
2007
0
2016
2011
1992

0
0
2008
n/a
2003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
n/a
n/a
0
0
0
0
n/a
0
0
0
0
0
n/a
0
0
n/a
0
0
0
0
n/a
0
n/a
2017
n/a
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Table A1 (Continued)
Montreal, QC
Calgary, AB
Ottawa, ON
Edmonton, AB
Mississauga, ON
Winnipeg, MB
Vancouver, BC
Brampton, ON
Hamilton, ON
Quebec City, QC
Surrey, BC
Laval, QC
Halifax, NS
London, ON
Markham, ON
Vaughan, ON
Gatineau, QC
Saskatoon, SK
Kitchener, ON

1993
1992
1992
1992
1992
1996
1993
0
1992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2017
1992

n/a
n/a
2010
n/a
2003
2002
n/a
0
n/a
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
n/a
n/a
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